Citizens for Safe Waste Management v. St. Louis County

• Decision Date: 14 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 58379,58379
• Citation: 810 S.W.2d 635
• Parties: CITIZENS FOR SAFE WASTE MANAGEMENT, Mary Stellhorn, and Mark Heil, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al., and Halls Ferry Investments, Inc. Defendants/Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 635

810 S.W.2d 635

CITIZENS FOR SAFE WASTE MANAGEMENT, Mary Stellhorn, and Mark Heil, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al. and Halls Ferry Investments, Inc. Defendants/Respondents.

No. 58379.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Two.

May 14, 1991.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court

Denied June 12, 1991.

Application to Transfer Denied July 23, 1991.

Lewis C. Green and Bruce A. Morrison, Green, Hennings & Henry, St. Louis, for plaintiffs/appellants.

Gerald A. Rimmel, Michael Waxenberg, St. Louis, John Ross and James White, Clayton, for defendants/respondents.

AHRENS, Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court affirming the St. Louis County Planning Commission's approval of a Final Development Plan for a sanitary landfill in North St. Louis County. We dismiss the appeal of corporate plaintiff Citizens for Safe Waste Management and in all other respects affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. Background

On April 15, 1982, a Petition to the St. Louis County Planning Commission for a Conditional Use Permit (CUP) was filed by "New Halls Ferry Land Fill" as developer and lessee of the property named in the Petition as the site of the proposed landfill. "New Halls Ferry Land Fill" was, at the time of the Petition for CUP, a joint venture of R.W. Meyer and Donald R. Zykan, acting in their capacity as presidents of their respective corporations, Riverview Stone and Material Company and Zykan Brothers, Inc.

The Planning Commission on September 14, 1982, recommended that the Council approve the Petition for the CUP. On March 3, 1983, the St. Louis County Council by Resolution No. 3187 approved the CUP after a public hearing on December 9, 1982. A citizens' group appealed the Council's decision to the Circuit Court; the Missouri Supreme Court on a writ of prohibition held that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because it was not timely filed. State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1984).

On February 29, 1984, the individuals and corporations who were granted the CUP under the name "New Halls Ferry Land Fill" assigned their interests related to the landfill site to "Halls Ferry Investments, Inc.," which had been incorporated on April 25, 1983. On February 11, 1986, Halls Ferry Investments, Inc., as the developer of the landfill, submitted its Final Development Plan (FDP) to the St. Louis County Department of Planning. On October 27, 1986, the Planning Commission approved the FDP, as modified, after consideration by the Department of Community Health and Medical Care, the Department of Public Works, the Department of Parks and Recreation, and the Department of Highways and Traffic.

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment in Circuit Court to invalidate the Planning Commission's approval of the FDP and sought injunctive relief to prevent St. Louis County from implementing the FDP or from issuing an operating permit. From a judgment denying relief to plaintiffs and affirming the Planning Commission's approval of the FDP, plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in affirming the Planning Commission's approval because the FDP failed to meet the minimum requirements established in the conditions governing the CUP.

II. Jurisdiction

Although not raised by the parties at trial or on appeal, we must as a preliminary matter address the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The issue is one of jurisdiction to be addressed by courts sua sponte, if necessary. American Hog Co. v. County of Clinton, 495 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo.App.1973).

The Board of Adjustment was not required to hear plaintiffs' appeal under § 64.120.1, RSMo 1986. That section declares a county board of adjustment's powers and duties:

(1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error of law in any order, requirement, decisions, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of the county zoning regulations;

(2) To hear and decide all matters referred to it or upon which it is required to pass under county zoning regulations;

(3) In passing upon appeals, where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of carrying out the strict letter of such order, which difficulties or hardship constitute an unreasonable deprivation of use as distinguished from merely granting a privilege, the board may vary or modify the application of any of the regulations or provisions so the intended purpose of the regulation shall be strictly observed, public safety and welfare secured and substantial justice done.

Subsection (1) does not apply because in the present case the decision was made not by an "administrative official," but by the Planning Commission.

Second, no evidence in the record ¹ requires the Board of Zoning Adjustment to hear appeals of the Planning Commission's decision to approve the Final Development Plan, and the County Council did not refer the matter to the Board. Therefore, subsection (2) does not apply.

Finally, this case does not fall within the "hardship" variance provision of subsection (3), so the Board was not required to hear the appeal on that ground.

Because we find nothing within § 64.120 or the record to require the Board of Zoning Adjustment to hear the appeal now before us, we find no jurisdictional barrier to the trial court's or this court's consideration of this case based upon plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

III. Standing

Plaintiff Citizens for Safe Waste Management is a not-for-profit corporation organized to promote and study environmentally safe methods of waste management lessen dependence upon landfills for waste disposal, and educate the public concerning safe waste management. A number of the organization's members are owners or residents of property in close proximity to the landfill site at issue in this case, including plaintiff Mary Stellhorn, who jointly owns property adjacent to the site. Plaintiff Mark Heil rents property located within a mile of the site. The individual plaintiffs allege that they are adversely affected by the dust, noise, fumes and offensive odors, and increased traffic generated by the landfill operation. The corporate plaintiff makes these same allegations with respect to those of its members who live near the landfill site.

We note that whether the party opposing the administrative decision has standing is an ad hoc determination to be made by the courts under the particular facts of the case. Stickelber v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 442 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Mo.App.1969). On the record before us, we find the allegations sufficient to confer standing on the individual plaintiffs but insufficient as to the corporate plaintiff.

In order to gain standing to challenge an administrative zoning decision, plaintiffs must demonstrate a specific and legally cognizable interest in the subject matter of the decision and show that the decision will have a direct and substantial impact on plaintiffs' personal or property rights or interests. State ex rel. Crouse v. Savannah, 696 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Mo.App.1985) (citing City of Eureka v. Litz, 658 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Mo.App.1983)). Plaintiff Citizens for Safe Waste Management is a legal entity distinct from the persons who comprise its membership. As such, the corporation in order to gain standing must itself demonstrate a legally cognizable interest separate and apart from the interests of its members. Citizens Against Rezoning v. St. Louis County, 563 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Mo.App.1978) (citing Lindenwood Improvement Assoc. v. Lawrence, 278 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo.App.1955)).

Plaintiff corporation alleges no interest in the subject matter of the Planning Commission's decision other than the interests of its individual members. Its vague allegation of "irreparable injury" demonstrates no specific and direct effect on any interest sufficient to confer standing. We decline to apply in zoning cases the liberalized federal rule of organizational standing. See Citizens for Rural Preservation v. Robinett, 648 S.W.2d 117, 133 n. 14 (Mo.App.1982). Claims of environmental damage are by their nature capable of being made by a great number of parties; it is therefore important to limit the entitlement to judicial review to those parties capable of demonstrating a direct, specific, legally cognizable interest distinct from the interests of the general public. To permit each member of the public who disagrees with a zoning decision to seek judicial review would effectively destroy the administrative zoning structure. Palmer v. St. Louis County, 591 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo.App.1980). Plaintiff corporation has failed to demonstrate the requisite interest on the record before us.

As noted earlier, plaintiffs' petition alleges that plaintiff Mary Stellhorn jointly owns and resides on property adjacent to the landfill site and that she will be adversely affected by the fumes and odors, increased traffic, dust, and noise generated by the landfill operation. She also alleges that the operation will depreciate the value of her property.

An adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner has standing, without further proof of special damage, to assert the right for review of an administrative decision affecting the property in question. Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Mo.App.1972). The proximity of plaintiff's property to the site in question is sufficient to bestow standing. See Palmer, 591 S.W.2d at 41-42; State ex rel. Housing Auth. of St. Louis County v. Wind, 337 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Mo.App.1960).

Under the case authorities cited, plaintiff Mary Stellhorn has alleged sufficient facts to gain standing to challenge the Planning Commission's decision. Defendants challenge her standing by arguing that plaintiff, as a single owner of property assumed to be held in a tenancy by the entirety, may not alone challenge a zoning decision affecting the property. We disagree. Defe...