Citizens' Rapid Transit Co. v. Seigrist

• Decision Date: 30 January 1896
• Citation: 33 S.W. 920,96 Tenn. 119
• Parties: CITIZENS' RAPID-TRANSIT CO. v. SEIGRIST.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

33 S.W. 920

96 Tenn. 119

CITIZENS' RAPID-TRANSIT CO. v. SEIGRIST.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 30, 1896

Error to circuit court, Davidson county; J. W. Bonner, Judge.

Action by Solomon Seigrist against the Citizens' Rapid-Transit Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Steger Washington & Jackson and P. D. Madden, for plaintiff in error.

Lemuel R. Campbell and J. S. Pilcher, for defendant in error.

CALDWELL J.

Solomon Seigrist brought this suit against the Citizens' Rapid-Transit Company to recover damages for personal injuries which, he averred, it wrongfully and negligently inflicted upon him. The trial, before court and jury resulted in verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $650, and the defendant, after motion for a new trial had been overruled, appealed in error. The Citizens' Rapid-Transit Company was a regularly chartered street-car company, operating electric street cars upon Cedar street in the city of Nashville, and upon the Charlotte pike to West Nashville, by one continuous line. Both Cedar street and the Charlotte pike were public highways, properly in constant use by the general public, as well as by the street-car company. Solomon Seigrist, the plaintiff below, was a baker, residing in West Nashville, and furnishing bread daily, from his covered wagon, to his customers in Nashville. The injuries complained of in this case were caused by a severe collision in which one of the street-car company's out-going cars ran against and overturned his wagon, while he, as driver returning to his home, was passing across the company's track at a regular and well-known crossing on the Charlotte pike.

That the injuries were thus inflicted, and that they were of a serious nature, is not disputed; but the company, through its counsel, contends that the collision was the result of such negligence on the part of Seigrist as to bar his action, and therefore, that there is no evidence to support the verdict. What were the relative and respective legal rights and duties of the two parties at the particular time and place? Undoubtedly, they both had the legal right to use that part of the public highway upon which the collision occurred; but, since they could not use it at the same moment of time, it was the duty of each to so use it as not to injure the other, or unreasonably impede the other's use. The right of neither was superior to that of the other. The duty of neither was more exacting than that of the other. Their rights and their duties were equal. Both were bound to exercise reasonable care and diligence to prevent a collision, and each was allowed to assume that the other would do so, and to act accordingly. It was the duty of Seigrist to look and listen, and to have his horse under reasonable control, as he approached the crossing; and so it was the duty of the motorman to survey the highway ahead of him, and to have his car under reasonable control as he approached the crossing. Neither one, reaching the place first, would have been under any obligation to stop and wait for the other to approach and pass; but either, in that situation, would have been authorized to proceed on his way, assuming that the other, being in reasonable control of his vehicle, and otherwise in the exercise of ordinary care, as he should be, would not collide with him; and no mistake he might have made in that rightful assumption could be charged to him as negligence, unless the lack of such control and care on the part of the other person was apparent to him at the time. Neither party, in such a case, could excuse himself for going into obvious danger if he knew it was impending. In his late work on Street Railways, at section 304, Booth says: "As already stated, as a general rule, especially, between street crossings, cars have a right of way superior to that of other vehicles and pedestrians,-this preferential right to be exercised in a reasonable and prudent manner. But this rule does not apply to crossings of tracks at street intersections. There the car has a right to cross, and must cross, the street; and vehicles and foot passengers have a right to cross, and must cross, the railroad track. Neither has a superior right to the other. The right of each must be exercised with due regard to the right of the other, and in such a careful manner as not unreasonably to abridge or interfere with the right of the other. This equality of right, however, does not absolve one who is about to cross the tracks from the duty of taking proper precautions to avoid accidents." Another short statement of the law as to injuries at street crossings is as follows: "It is generally held that street railroads have no superior right of way over vehicles at street crossings, and the company will be liable for negligence of its employés in failing to have the car under control at such place, thereby causing injury to persons with vehicles; and the question...