City and County of Denver v. Tondall
| Decision Date | 21 October 1929 |
| Docket Number | 12184. |
| Citation | 282 P. 191,86 Colo. 372 |
| Parties | CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER v. TONDALL et al. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 1929.
In Department.
Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Henley A Calvert, Judge.
Condemnation proceeding by the City and County of Denver, a municipal corporation, against Ben Tondall and others. To review a judgment approving an award of compensation to defendant Charles F. Heimbecker, plaintiff brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
Thomas H. Gibson and Frank L. Hays, both of Denver, for plaintiff in error.
William H. Scofield and Con K. O'Byrne, both of Denver, for defendants in error Heimbecker.
The city and county of Denver, as it might do under its special charter powers, adopted a plan to straighten the channel of the South Platte river, which flows through the city, and to erect an embankment or dike along its banks to prevent flooding of the adjacent premises. Not being able to acquire by purchase the lands necessary for the public improvement the city instituted this action or proceeding under the pertinent eminent domain statute of the state to acquire 16 different parcels of land, each containing one or more city lots, that were essential thereto. The statute is chapter 129, S. L. 1911, p. 373; chapter 173, C. L. 1921 (section 9076 et seq.). It relates to condemnation of public property for any public improvement by right of eminent domain in cities of the first and second classes and those created, as the city of Denver was, by the state Constitution. As required by the provisions of this statute, the first hearing on the plaintiff's petition was before a commission of three freeholders. The commission made its report and award of compensation of damages to each of the respective owners of the 16 separate parcels. Four different owners of parcels filed objections to the commission's award, and demanded and were granted jury trials, which under the statute they were entitled to. The jury made separate awards to these four different owners. In the awards to three of them the city has acquiesced. To the award of compensation to the fourth owner, Charles F. Heimbecker, of four parcels 8, 11, 12, and 13, which the district court approved, the city objected, and is here with its writ of error to have that award set aside.
On the hearing before the commission that tribunal fixed the value of these respective parcels and damages to the remainder of the land which Heimbecker owned, and that had not been taken for the improvement, as follows:
Parcel No. 8, actual fair cash market value $ 500 00
Parcel No. 11, actual fair cash market value 115 00
Parcel No. 12, actual fair cash market value 1,335 65
Parcel No. 13, actual fair cash market value 733 34
Parcel No. 12, actual damage to remainder
thereof not taken........................... 1,225 00
---------
Parcel No. 12, which consisted of several lots, was the only one that had any land 'remaining' to which was applicable damages, if any, to such remainder. The commission allowed Heimbecker $3,908.99 for the property which the city actually took for the improvement and damages to the remainder thereof, which remainder, as stated, related only to parcel No. 12. Upon the hearing before the jury it awarded to Heimbecker $5,000 for the land actually taken and $15,000 for damages to the remainder, which is approximately $16,000 more than the award of the commission. To this verdict of the jury, which was approved by the court, this writ of error is prosecuted.
Neither the printed abstract of the record, as prepared by plaintiff in error, nor the supplemental abstract prepared by the defendant in error, nor the second supplemental abstract prepared by plaintiff in error, nor all combined, enable us properly or with satisfaction to ourselves to determine all of the questions discussed by counsel. There is, however, one objection to the judgment so obviously good that the judgment must be reversed on that ground alone. We therefore decline to pass upon all other questions argued by counsel, in the absence of a printed abstract of the record that properly and fully presents them for decision. This disposition of the case may not be satisfactory to either party. We cannot, however, in justice to other litigants in other cases who comply with our rules, and without apparent reward to litigants who ignore or violate them, resort to a voluminous transcript to ascertain for ourselves the facts of a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority
...changing the rule to correct supposed inequities is properly a matter of legislative action and not judicial declaration. Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191. We reaffirmed this rule in City and County of Denver v. Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 493 P.2d 348, where it was 'The reasoning beh......
-
Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Loveland
...(measure of damages for residential property is fair market value less increased value by reason of improvement); City of Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191 (1929) (measure of damages is fair, actual cash value of property condemned, and diminution of value of any untaken property ......
-
E-470 Public Highway Authority v. Jagow
...even though jury was properly instructed, there was no admissible evidence supporting the damages award); City & County of Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191 (1929)(same). In this case, there was no evidence at trial that $2.88 million in damages was caused to the remainder of resp......
-
Mack v. Board of County Com'rs of Adams County
...v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 62 Colo. 167, 161 P. 301; Farmers' Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Cooper, supra; Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191; Wassenich v. Denver, supra. It is true that general benefits which incur to the residue by reason of the improvement may not be......
-
Chapter 4 - § 4.3 • PETITION IN CONDEMNATION
...to name the treasurer; rather, burden of joining treasurer was on the governmental entity).[19] See City & County of Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191 (1929), as an example of a case where the statute was used to condemn, in one action, 16 different parcels of land. The opinion al......
-
Chapter 8 - § 8.9 • BUSINESS PROFITS RULE
...the income approach, as that approach is described in § 10.3, "Income Approach."78 --------Notes:[66] City & County of Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191 (1929).[67] See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. Quick, 113 P.2d 999, 1001 (Colo. 1941); City & County of Denver v. Hinsey, 493......
-
Chapter 16 - § 16.3 • EXCESSIVE VALUATION AWARDS
...opinion. --------Notes:[8] Wassenich v. City & County of Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533 (1920).[9] City & County of Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191 (1929).[10] Sch. Dist. No. 12 v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 185 P.3d 781 (Colo. 2008).[11] Id. at 790.[12] Jagow v. E-470 Publ......