City Council of Springfield v. Mayor of Springfield
| Decision Date | 22 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | SJC-13154 |
| Citation | 181 N.E.3d 496 |
| Parties | CITY COUNCIL OF SPRINGFIELD v. MAYOR OF SPRINGFIELD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Michael P. Angelini, Worcester, for the defendant.
Thomas Lesser (Michael Aleo also present), Northampton, for the plaintiff.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
As cities across the country consider changes to their police departments to ensure greater accountability, control over these decisions can be hotly contested, as it is in the instant case. This appeal requires us to determine whether the city council of Springfield (city council) can reorganize the Springfield police department to be headed by a five-person board of police commissioners rather than a single commissioner under the provisions of the Springfield city charter passed in accordance with G. L. c. 43, §§ 46 - 55. The city council contends it can do so pursuant to its legislative powers, and the mayor of Springfield (mayor) disagrees, claiming it infringes on his executive appointment authority. We conclude that the city council may so reorganize the police department, based on the plain language of the relevant statutes and city ordinances, and therefore affirm the Superior Court's entry of declaratory judgment in favor of the city council.
Background. 1. Springfield's city government. The parties agree to the material facts.
In 1962, the city of Springfield adopted a "Plan A" model city charter based on G. L. c. 43, §§ 46 - 55, codified in the city charter at sections 46 - 55. See Kaczmarski v. Mayor of Springfield, 346 Mass. 432, 432-433, 193 N.E.2d 574 (1963). In a Plan A model, the division of executive and legislative powers is as follows. The mayor is the "chief executive officer" of the city. G. L. c. 43, § 48. The mayor can appoint "all heads of departments and members of municipal boards" without approval from the city council. G. L. c. 43, § 52. The appointment becomes effective when the mayor files a certificate with the city clerk providing that the appointment is made "solely in the interest of the city" and that the appointee either "is a recognized expert in the work which will devolve upon [him or her]" or "is a person specially fitted by education, training or experience to perform the duties of said office." G. L. c. 43, § 53. The mayor can also remove a head of department or board member without city council approval by filing a statement with the city clerk. G. L. c. 43, § 54. Due in part to these unilateral appointment and removal powers, Plan A is also referred to as a "responsible executive," Kaczmarski, supra at 432, 193 N.E.2d 574, or "strong mayor" government, City Council of Boston v. Mayor of Boston, 383 Mass. 716, 719, 421 N.E.2d 1202 (1981).
The city council is vested with the legislative powers of the city. G. L. c. 43, § 50. Another section of G. L. c. 43, not connected to any particular model charter plan, provides:
"[T]he city council or other legislative body may at any time by ordinance, consistent with general laws, reorganize, consolidate or abolish departments, in whole or in part; transfer the duties, powers and appropriations of one department to another, in whole or in part; establish new departments; and increase, reduce, establish or abolish salaries of heads of departments or members of boards."
G. L. c. 43, § 5. Springfield adopted this section in its city charter as section five.
2. The Springfield police department. In 1902, pursuant to a grant of authority by the Legislature, the city council established a police commission to manage and control the Springfield police department. The commission had five unpaid members, who were required to be residents of Springfield and could not be employees of the city. The mayor had appointment and removal powers over the commissioners, subject to approval of the city council. The commission had the power to appoint a chief of police and other officials. St. 1909, c. 244. This remained the case even after Springfield adopted the Plan A city charter in 1962.1
In 2004, the Legislature responded to Springfield's acute fiscal distress by creating a finance control board that assumed all powers of the city government, both of the mayor and city council. See St. 2004 c. 169. In 2005, the finance control board abolished the five-member commission and restructured the Springfield police department to be headed by a single, professional police commissioner. The commissioner was appointed solely by the mayor, but had a three-year term, which was not to be coterminous with the mayor's term; and the commissioner could only be removed for cause. The commissioner was to have at least seven years of experience as a captain or its equivalent and a master's degree or its equivalent. The 2005 ordinance authorized the police commissioner to appoint, establish, and organize the police department and provided that the police commissioner would hold office until a successor was appointed and qualified. The new commissioner position integrated the duties of the "chief of police," which were laid out in separate ordinances. The finance control board was dissolved in 2009, when the fiscal health of the city had recovered.
In 2018, the city council attempted to restore the pre-2005 structure of the police commission, passing an ordinance that replaced the professional commissioner with a board of police commissioners (board) comprised of five unpaid civilians, and reimposed the requirements that the members of the board be residents of Springfield who were not city employees,2 as provided in sections 67-84 to 67-96 of the municipal code. The mayor vetoed the ordinance, and the city council voted to override the veto.
The mayor refused to implement the ordinance, and entered into a contract with a new, full-time professional police commissioner in 2019. The council responded by commencing the present action in October 2020 seeking declaratory relief, an injunction, and mandamus to require the mayor to comply with the ordinance. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
The motion judge held that all provisions of the ordinance were valid except for the eligibility criteria for board members, which he held violated the mayor's appointment authority under the charter. The court entered a judgment declaring that the mayor must "without further delay and in good faith endeavor to identify and appoint qualified individuals to serve on the [b]oard." However, the motion judge refused to grant an injunction or mandamus relief. The mayor appealed and filed an unopposed motion to stay enforcement of the judgment, which a Superior Court judge granted.3 We granted the parties’ joint application for direct appellate review.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 636, 175 N.E.3d 383 (2021), citing Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 637, 977 N.E.2d 552 (2012). There are no factual disputes, and the only issue is one of statutory interpretation.
2. The city council's powers under G. L. c. 43, § 5. As explained above, G. L. c. 43, § 5, gives the city council the power to "reorganize, consolidate or abolish departments, in whole or in part" and to "establish new departments." The city council claims, and the motion judge held, that the 2018 ordinance was clearly within the scope of its power to "reorganize" municipal departments. We agree.
"Ordinarily, where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent" (citation omitted).
Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 620, 135 N.E.3d 711 (2019). "If the words used are not otherwise defined in the statute, we afford them their plain and ordinary meaning." Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118, 92 N.E.3d 724 (2018). "Reorganize," unsurprisingly, means to "organize again or anew." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/reorganize [https://perma.cc/9LTV-RTXN]. "Organize" means, inter alia, "to set up an administrative structure for." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/organize [https://perma.cc/FT2T-XLXJ].
The plain meaning of "reorganize ... departments," in § 5, clearly encompasses changing the structure of the department, including how it shall be overseen. See Duggan v. Third Dist. Court of E. Middlesex, 298 Mass. 274, 280-282, 10 N.E.2d 61 (1937) (); Reynolds v. McDermott, 264 Mass. 158, 165, 162 N.E. 1 (1928) (); Gabriel v. Mayor of Fitchburg, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 984, 984, 439 N.E.2d 841 (1982) ().
3. The mayor's appointment and removal powers. The mayor contends that even if the 2018 ordinance was within the scope of G. L. c. 43, § 5, it violates G. L. c. 43, §§ 52 - 54, which give him the unilateral right to appoint and remove "all heads of departments and members of municipal boards." G. L. c. 43, § 52. In challenging the validity of the ordinance, the mayor "bear[s] a heavy burden." Springfield Preservation Trust, Inc. v. Springfield Library & Museums Ass'n, Inc., 447 Mass. 408, 418, 852 N.E.2d 83 (2006), citing Grace v. Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 49–50, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979). For the ordinance to be invalid, "[t]here must be a ‘sharp conflict’ between the ordinance or bylaw and the statute" (citation omitted). Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 470 Mass. 284,...
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