City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco

• Decision Date: 18 December 1951
• Docket Number: Nos. 18442,18443,s. 18442
• Citation: 238 P.2d 581,38 Cal.2d 156
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.

Page 581

238 P.2d 581

38 Cal.2d 156

CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.

Nos. 18442, 18443.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Dec. 18, 1951.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1952.

Dion R. Holm, City Atty., Norman Sanford Wolff, Deputy, San Francisco, for petitioners, City and County of San Francisco et al.

Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, William S. Tyson, U. S. Solicitor, Bessie Margolin, Asst. U. S. Solicitor and Kay Kimmell, U. S. Atty., all of Washington, D. C., Kenneth C. Robertson, Regional Atty., James F. Scott, Senior U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attys. Gen., Hartwell H. Linney, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Wilmer W. Morse and James E. Sabine, Deputies Atty. Gen., Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher, Long & Levit, and George England, all of San Francisco, amici curiae for petitioners.

Knight, Boland & Riordan, F. Eldred Boland and John H. Riordan, all of San Francisco, for petitioner, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

Milton Marks, Milton Marks, Jr., San Francisco, for respondents, Superior Court in and for the Citv and County of San Francisco.

SHENK, Justice.

The petitioners seek a writ prohibiting the enforcement of an order of the respondent Superior Court for the inspection of documents and data claimed to be in the records of official proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission of the City and County of San Francisco. An alternative writ was issued.

In September 1949 several hundred employees of the city and county, representing as well other employees similarly situated, filed in the superior court a petition for the Writ of Mandate naming as respondents the City and County of San Francisco, its board of supervisors, and its civil service commission. The purpose of the petition was and is to compel the respondents to fix, establish and pay to each of the petitioners and to persons similarly situated for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1949, and ending June 30, 1950, the rates of compensation for the respective classifications referred to in the petition in accordance with the requirements of section 151 of the Charter of the City and County.

Prior to July 1, 1949, but effective as of that date, the board of supervisors enacted salary standardization and annual salary ordinances providing for schedules of compensation to be paid officers and employees whose compensations were subject to the provisions of section 151 of the charter. That section as amended in 1943 provides that schedules of compensation for municipal employees shall be in accord with the generally prevailing rates of wages for like service and working conditions in private employment or in other comparable governmental organizations in the state. The schedules are required to be recommended by the civil service commission solely on the basis of facts and data obtained in a comprehensive investigation and survey. The commission is required to 'set forth in the official records of its proceedings all of the data thus obtained' on the basis of which it makes findings and an order whereby a rate of pay for each classification is recommended to the board of supervisors. The section provides that the salaries and wages paid to employees shall be those fixed in the schedule of compensations adopted by the board as provided by the charter and in accord with the provisions of the ordinance enacted in pursuance thereof.

It was alleged in the petition filed in the Superior Court that the commission made such a survey; that the commission transmitted its findings and recommendations to the board and that the salary ordinance was adopted in accordance therewith. The rates of compensation thus adopted for the several classifications were set forth at length. The rates of compensation for employees in the same classifications in private employment and other comparable governmental organizations were also set forth. It was charged that the commission and the board disregarded the generally prevailing rates of wages and that the established schedules were not in accord with the prevailing rates for the period 1949-1950 as required by the charter provisions and as alleged. The adopted rates as to 49 classifications, listed on a comparative basis with those alleged to be prevailing, were stated to be grossly less than rates in private and other governmental employment. The petitioners also sought declaratory relief and the recovery of the difference between the ordinance rates and the alleged prevailing rates in outside employment.

The defendants answered, making certain denials and admissions. The plaintiffs thereupon moved pursuant to section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an inspection of all the documents, papers and data including the complete survey in connection with the preparation of the adopted wage schedules. A hearing was had on the motion at which the respondents presented evidence of the confidential nature of the specific data sought to be examined, and the effect of disclosure on the public interest. In making the wage rate survey the commission solicited information from private employers on the written promise and agreement with each that the source of all information supplied would be held in confidence, that the wage scales and other data would not be identified except by a code known only to the commission. The defendants gave testimony to the effect that but for the written agreements and pledges to hold in confidence the source of and identity of the employers furnishing the information, it would be impossible to obtain the voluntary cooperation of the private employers in making the survey. The names of nearly 200 private employers are in the record, as are also the lists of wage rates assumed to have been submitted by them; but unprocurable except by compliance with the order for inspection is the data whereby to identify the employer submitting a specific wage list. It was also shown without conflict that disclosure would forment public disturbance and unrest in industrial employment relations and would interfere with the competitive activities of the employers in private industry.

The trial court granted the motion for inspection and a stay order was entered for the purpose of permitting the filing of the present applications for the writ of prohibition. The members of the board of supervisors and of the civil service commission joined in filing one application (S.F. 18442), and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, one of the employers affected, filed another application (S.F. 18443) for the writ to restrain the enforcement of the order for inspection. Numerous briefs are also on file on behalf of the state personnel board, various employers, and the Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, as amici curiae in support of the application for the writ of prohibition.

A preliminary question relates to the basis for the issuance of the writ of prohibition. That writ is an appropriate remedy to arrest the proceedings in a court when they are 'without or in excess of' its jurisdiction and there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1102, 1103.

Notwithstanding the fact that the respondent court unquestionably has jurisdiction to grant or deny the motion for inspection, this court may act in a proper case when it appears that otherwise a failure of justice will occur in a matter of public importance by a wrongful or excessive exercise of jurisdiction. The reviewing courts have frequently acted to resolve the problem on jurisdictional grounds where the public interest has indicated the necessity for prompt settlement of the issue. See Spreckles Sugar Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 186 Cal. 256, 260-261, 199 P. 8; Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262, 269-270, 89 P.2d 109; Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405, 407-408, 106 P.2d 411; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 466-467, 171 P.2d 8. Thus the writ of prohibition has been held to lie to prevent the exercise of an unauthorized power in a matter as to which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction, no less than where the entire cause is without its jurisdiction; and has also been directed to prevent the enforcement of an order. Evans v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.2d 563, 579-581, 96 P.2d 107 and cases cited; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 290-291, 109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715. In Franchise Tax Board v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 538, 225 P.2d 905, the writ was issued to prohibit the enforcement of an order for inspection of tax returns; and in Kohn v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.App.2d 459, 55 P.2d 1186, the writ issued to restrain inspection of private documents as an unauthorized exercise of judicial power in a matter otherwise cognizable by the respondent court.

In Coldwell v. Board of Public Works, 187 Cal. 510, 522, 202 P. 879, claimed confidential matter had been opened to public inspection and it was held that it had lost its confidential character; and to similar effect is People v. King, 122 Cal.App. 50, 57, 10 P.2d 89. Thus to leave the matter for possible correction on an appeal would be too late, would render that remedy inadequate and would result in a failure of justice. See also Gorbacheff v. Justice's Court, 31 Cal.2d 178, 180, 187 P.2d 407.

Tested by these and similar cases no good reason appears justifying the denial of the writ if otherwise the petitioners are entitled to protection against violation of the agreements of confidence. We shall not pause to consider whether the application filed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company as one of the employers shows that it is entitled to the issuance of the writ. The question might be pertinent were that the only petitioner. But since the issuance of the writ in the...