City of Albuquerque v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 28 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 20288,20288
• Parties: CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, a municipal corporation, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Vergia BROOKS, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 822

844 P.2d 822

114 N.M. 572

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, a municipal corporation, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Vergia BROOKS, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 20288.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Dec. 28, 1992.

[114 N.M. 573] John Schoeppner, Albuquerque, for appellant.

David S. Campbell, City Atty., Susan M. Biernacki, Asst. City Atty., Albuquerque, for appellee.

OPINION

RANSOM, Chief Justice.

This case arose under the New Mexico Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 47-8-1 to -51 (Repl.Pamp.1982 & Supp.1992). It involves a twenty-year tenant of a public housing unit. The metropolitan court granted a request by the City of Albuquerque for a money judgment in the amount of $2,305.05, plus costs, and for a writ of restitution (ordering the premises be vacated within thirty days of the hearing held April 1, 1991). The evidence showed that Vergia Brooks, the tenant, failed to report that she and a member of her household earned certain income from which a monthly rent should have been paid, and that she was also responsible for repairs and maintenance completed by the City at a cost of $134.05.

Judgment was filed on April 25, 1991, and the writ was issued May 1. At a rehearing later in the day on May 1, the court ruled, apparently from the bench, that the writ would be set aside. On May 7 the court entered an order that set aside both the writ and the "Order issued by this Court on April 1, 1991." The referenced order of April 1 was in fact the judgment of April 25 (following the hearing of April 1). On May 7, the court further ordered the tenant to pay back rent based on a schedule established by the court. The City appealed that decision to the district court, which held that the metropolitan court erred in ordering a payment schedule to which both parties did not agree, and that when a money judgment for back rent is rendered, a writ of restitution also must issue. Brooks has appealed that decision to this Court. At oral argument, the parties stipulated that the back rent and amount due for repairs have been paid in full, making this appeal moot. However, because the question here presented is of public interest and importance, and because the City of Albuquerque has asked for guidance in the resolution of the issue since it is likely to recur, we will use our inherent discretion to address the issue on the merits. See City of Albuquerque v. Campos, 86 N.M. 488, 491, 525 P.2d 848, 851 (1974); Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 43 n. 1, 811 P.2d 75, 76 n. 1 (1991). Accordingly, while we dismiss this appeal, we nevertheless render this opinion to clarify the law on an important issue.

Metropolitan court order was not final. First, we note the district court may not have had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the May 7 order from which appeal was taken apparently was not a final order. It contemplates further action by the court. Dismissal of the cause of action for the writ of restitution was contemplated if conditions were met. If the conditions were not met, the court was to issue the writ of restitution without need of another hearing. It is clear that the metropolitan court intended to maintain jurisdiction over the parties and that it was not through with the case. See Riblet Tramway Co. v. Monte Verde Corp., 453 F.2d 313, 319 (10th Cir.1972) (court with equitable powers may enter interlocutory order allowing debtor time to bring obligation current).

Equity jurisdiction to enter interlocutory order. Under the Act, the metropolitan court has both equitable and legal jurisdiction. See Section 47-8-45. Further, because this case involves a public housing tenancy, federal regulations impose a "good cause" requirement upon local authorities before termination of a tenancy. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 966.4(l )(1)-(2) (1992); see Robert S. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant Secs. 13:1 to :4 (1980 & Supp.1992) (interest in remaining in public housing is constitutionally protected). "A tenant in reality has a life tenancy determinable at his choosing, or if he exceeds the income limitations of the program, or by the authority for good cause." Id. Sec. 13:4, at 756. Automatic eviction cannot be authorized under summary proceedings based upon proof that rent is in arrears.¹ See id. (procedural due process entitles aggrieved tenant to notice and hearing to contest grounds for eviction).

In cases involving public housing, it is an equitable defense to an action for eviction for failure to pay back rents that a tenant is indigent and unable to pay the back rent. See Maxton Hous. Auth. v. McLean, 313 N.C. 277, 328 S.E.2d 290 (1985) (tenant in public housing rebutted presumption that nonpayment of rent was good cause for terminating her tenancy by proving that she lacked funds or source of income to pay the rent due); accord Housing Auth. v. Austin, 478 So.2d 1012 (La.Ct.App.1985) (citing Maxton ); Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Green, 41 Ohio App.3d 365, 536 N.E.2d 1 (1987) (tenant allowed affirmative defense that nonpayment of rent was due to circumstances beyond her control).

"The application of ... equitable defenses rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial court's exercise thereof will not be disturbed on appeal." Wolf & Klar Cos. v. Garner, 101 N.M. 116, 118, 679 P.2d 258, 260 (1984) (citation omitted). The metropolitan court could determine that, although the back rents were due and payable, the tenant should be given an adequate amount of time based on her income to pay the rent before the City could go forward with its request for a writ of restitution based on failure to pay back rents. We do not consider the issue of whether the interlocutory order was appealable, as neither party raised the issue, but the metropolitan court apparently still has jurisdiction over this case.

Continuing jurisdiction over final judgment. The judgment entered on April 25 was a final judgment. The City argues that Brooks could obtain relief from the writ issued on May 1 only under SCRA 1986, 3-704(B) (Repl.Pamp.1990), which limits relief to (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct; (3) a void judgment; or (4) satisfaction, release or discharge of the judgment or the reversal or vacation of a prior judgment upon which it is based. However, NMSA 1978, Section 34-8A-6(E) (Repl.Pamp.1990), states that "All judgments rendered in civil actions in the metropolitan court shall be subject to the same provisions of law as those rendered in district court." Under NMSA 1978, Section 39-1-1 (Repl.Pamp.1991), final judgments and decrees entered by the district courts remain under the control of such courts for thirty days after entry thereof. Therefore, the metropolitan court retained control of its judgment and had the right to set it aside after granting a rehearing on the matter. See, e.g., Nichols v. Nichols, 98 N.M. 322, 326, 648 P.2d 780, 784 (1982) (district court is...