City of Alcoa v. Louisville & N. R. Co.
Decision Date | 15 January 1925 |
Citation | 274 S.W. 1110 |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Parties | CITY OF ALCOA v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. |
Bill by the City of Alcoa against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Reversed, and bill dismissed.
Lindsay, Young & Young, of Knoxville, and Crawford & Goddard, of Maryville, for City of Alcoa.
Johnson & Cox and Jas. B. Wright, all of Knoxville, and Brown & Johnson, of Maryville, for Louisville & N. R. Co.
The bill in this cause was filed by the city of Alcoa, a municipal corporation, who will hereinafter be referred to as complainant, against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, to enforce a lien upon certain lots or parcels of land situated within the corporate limits of complainant, and composing a portion of the right of way of said railroad company, for grading, paving, and guttering certain streets described in the bill, which run parallel with, and adjacent to, the right of way of defendant; said grading, paving, and guttering of said streets being made in accordance with the provisions of a certain ordinance passed by the board of commissioners of the city of Alcoa pursuant to chapter 18, Public Acts of 1913 (First Extra Session), known as the Abutting Property Law.
The amount for which the lien is sought to be enforced against defendant's right of way is the sum of $1,748.68 and interest. This amount is for paving done on Lincoln road crossing, Aluminum pike, and Hall road.
Defendant answered the bill, denying that it was indebted to complainant, as alleged in the bill, and denied that complainant had a lien on that portion of its right of way fronting upon said streets for the improvements mentioned and described in complainant's bill.
It denied that, under chapter 18, Public Acts of 1913 (First Extra Session), its right of way was liable for any assessment for improvements made by complainant upon its streets pursuant to the provisions of said ordinance and act.
The answer averred that defendant did not own the fee in any of the property against which complainant was seeking to enforce a lien, but only an easement, and that said property was being used exclusively for railroad purposes, that is, for the passage of its trains, and for no other purpose, and that the making of said improvements by complainant upon the streets in question in no way benefited or enhanced defendant's easement in said property, and, therefore, said easement or right of way was not subject to assessment for said improvements.
The answer further averred that chapter 18, Public Acts of 1913 (First Extra Session), in so far as it may authorize any assessment against defendant's railroad right of way for street improvement, is unconstitutional and void for the reason that said act gives the municipality a lien against the easement or right of way of defendant for a portion of the cost of any improvement that may be made on streets lying adjacent to its right of way, and if the amount assessed against that portion of its easement or right of way lying adjacent to such streets is not paid, the act provides for a sale of such easement or right of way for the payment of said assessment, which cannot be lawfully done for the reason that a railroad company's easement or right of way cannot be segregated and sold in parcels, as complainant attempts to have done under its bill.
The cause was finally heard upon the pleadings and proof by Hon. S. O. Houston, special chancellor, on May 12, 1924, when a decree was rendered against defendant for $1,748.68, the principal amount of said assessment, and the sum of $211.84, interest, or the total sum of $1,960.52, which sum was declared a lien on the several parcels of defendant's right of way abutting on the streets improved, for the satisfaction of said decree, and it was provided that, unless said decree was paid by defendant, the master advertise said parcels of defendant's right of way described in the decree according to law and sell the same on a credit of 6 and 12 months, and in bar of the equity of redemption. From this decree, defendant has appealed and assigned errors.
Through its first assignment of error, it is insisted by defendant that the special chancellor erred in holding that any portion of its railroad right of way was liable for the special assessment made by complainant for the improvement of the streets in question under the ordinance passed by complainant pursuant to the provisions of chapter 18, Public Acts of 1913 (First Extra Session).
Through its second assignment of error defendant insists that the special chancellor erred in holding and decreeing that complainant was entitled to a lien upon the portions or parcels of its railroad right of way abutting on and lying adjacent to the streets improved.
Through its third assignment of error, defendant insists that the special chancellor erred in not sustaining defendant's contention that its right of way was only being used for the passage of its trains and exclusively for railroad purposes, and was in no way benefited or enhanced in value by the improvement of the streets on which its right of way abutted.
Through its fourth assignment of error, defendant insists that the special chancellor erred in awarding a decree against it for the sum of $1,960.52, as its proportional part of the costs of said improvements.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Nor is the contention made by defendant that there was not a substantial compliance by complainant with the provisions of chapter 18, Public Acts of 1913 (First Extra Session), in improving the streets in question.
Section 2 of that act provides:
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