City of Alexandria v. Richmond F. & P. R. Co.

Decision Date12 March 1982
Docket NumberNos. 791447,791580,s. 791447
Citation223 Va. 293,288 S.E.2d 457
PartiesCITY OF ALEXANDRIA v. RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG AND POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY. RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG AND POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY v. COUNTY OF HENRICO. Record
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

Fred C. Alexander, Jr., Alexandria (Urchie B. Ellis, Richmond, Boothe, Prichard & Dudley, Alexandria, on briefs), for Richmond F. & P. R. Co.

Joseph P. Rapisarda, Jr., Acting County Atty., for appellee Henrico County.

State Corporation Commission (Lewis S. Minter, Richmond, on brief), amicus curiae, for appellee.

Nolan B. Dawkins, Asst. City Atty., for appellant City of Alexandria.

Before CARRICO, C. J., COCHRAN, POFF, COMPTON, THOMPSON and STEPHENSON, JJ., and HARRISON, Retired Justice.

POFF, Justice.

Does a circuit court have jurisdiction to entertain an application filed under Code § 58-1145 by a public service corporation to correct a local real estate tax levy on the ground the underlying evaluation made by the State Corporation Commission (SCC) was erroneous? Two circuit courts have entered diverse judgments on that question, and, in combined appeals, we are asked to resolve the conflict.

In Virginia, real estate is "segregated for, and made subject to, local taxation only, and shall be assessed for local taxation in such manner and at such times as the General Assembly may prescribe by general law." Va.Const., Art. X, § 4. See also Code § 58-9. For purposes of local taxation, the fair market value of real estate owned by public service corporations, including that of railway companies, is determined by SCC, the "central State agency" designated by statute. Va.Const., Art. X, § 2; Code §§ 58-503.1, -529. Values, fixed annually by SCC order, are certified to local governments, Code § 58-538, which apply local tax rates to those values and levy the taxes, Code §§ 58-518, -522.

In determining the values fixed in its August 1975 order, SCC employed an "additive factor". In a hearing on an application filed with SCC under Code § 58-672, Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company (RF&P) argued that the use of that factor in the evaluation of its property in Arlington County violated the fair-market-value standard of Va.Const., Art. X, § 2. By order entered in December 1977, SCC rejected the argument and denied the application. Upon appeal of that order, we upheld the constitutional challenge in respect to RF&P's Arlington County property and remanded the case with instructions that SCC correct its evaluation of that property and enter an order under the provisions of Code § 58-675 authorizing RF&P to recover the excess of taxes paid to Arlington County. RF&P v. Corporation Commission, 219 Va. 301, 247 S.E.2d 408 (1978) (hereinafter, the Arlington County case).

RF&P filed § 58-672 applications with SCC for review and correction of SCC evaluations of its property located in Alexandria and Henrico County for taxable years 1976, 1977, and 1978. Pursuant to SCC orders entered under § 12.1-15 after our decision in the Arlington County case, the city and the county refunded the excess of taxes collected for those years.

RF&P did not address its § 58-672 applications to taxable year 1975, and the SCC refund orders did not extend to that year. However, the three-year limitation of Code § 58-1145 had not expired, and RF&P filed applications invoking that statute in the Circuit Courts of the City of Alexandria and the County of Henrico. The Alexandria court accepted jurisdiction and granted RF&P summary judgment. The Henrico court ruled that it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the application with prejudice.

Defending one judgment and appealing from the other, RF&P argues that "the remedy provided the taxpayer by § 58-672 1 is not exclusive" and that the remedy provided by § 58-1145 2 is "available to the taxpayer". We agree that § 58-672, which provides the means of contesting property assessments, does not exclude a remedy afforded by another statute when the provisions of the two statutes "differ materially with respect to the nature of the tax assessed and the circumstances under which relief may be sought." Railway Express v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 368, 371, 83 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1954) (§ 58-672 does not foreclose a public service corporation's right under § 58-1122 to petition SCC for correction and refund of gross receipts license tax). The question, then, is whether the § 58-1145 remedy was "available" to RF&P in these cases.

The first sentence of that statute authorizes "[a]ny person assessed ... [to] apply for relief to the circuit court ... wherein such assessment was made", and the second sentence places the burden "upon the taxpayer to show ... that the assessment is ... invalid or illegal". We have held that, in the first sentence, "assessment" means the amount of the tax imposed and, in the second sentence, the evaluation of the property, and that the General Assembly intended that "the remedy provided by Code § 58-1145 shall be available to a landowner to attack an assessment in whichever of its two meanings the word is employed." Hoffman v. Augusta County, 206 Va. 799, 802, 146 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1966). Relying upon that language in Hoffman, RF&P argues that § 58-1145 is "a broad, general statute" available to all taxpayers who choose to "challenge the invalidity or illegality of the amount of the tax (the money)". 3

Hoffman is not germane to the issue here. There, we were required to decide whether the § 58-1145 time limitation began to run on the date the landowner's property was assessed (evaluated) for taxation or the date on which the tax was assessed (levied). We decided that the period of limitation began to run when the assessment process was completed, that is, when the tax was levied. Here, the assessment process was bifurcated; SCC evaluated the property and the local governments imposed the levies. To prevail upon its applications, RF&P had the burden of proving that SCC's assessments (evaluations) were "invalid or illegal".

RF&P contends that it discharged that burden in its appeal in the Arlington County case and, hence, that SCC's order evaluating its properties in Alexandria and Henrico County was not at issue in the circuit courts. We disagree.

In the Arlington County case, we held that the procedure employed by SCC to evaluate RF&P's Arlington County property was unconstitutional and that such procedure rendered the evaluation of that property invalid. The validity of SCC's August 1975 order fixing values state-wide was not before the Arlington circuit court or before us on appeal, and, with respect to RF&P's Alexandria and Henrico County properties, that order was not reversed or otherwise altered by our mandate. Accordingly, the validity of SCC's order and its evaluations of those properties were necessarily challenged by RF&P's § 58-1145 applications to the circuit courts. Had the circuit courts had jurisdiction to consider those challenges, RF&P could have prevailed, but the fact that a party has a meritorious claim will not confer jurisdiction upon a court. The question before us is whether RF&P chose the proper remedy in the right forum.

A party aggrieved by SCC action has an appeal of right to this Court, and "[n]o other court of the Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any action of the Commission ...." Va.Const., Art. IX, § 4; Code § 12.1-39.

... We believe the prohibition of Article IX, Section 4 applies whether Commission action is attacked directly or collaterally. If, in either case, the challenge requires review leading to reversal, correction, or annulment of Commission action, the constitutional section, in no uncertain terms, forecloses jurisdiction to any Virginia court save this tribunal.[ 4

Little Bay Corp. v. VEPCO, 216 Va. 406, 409, 219 S.E.2d 677, 679 (1975).

In Little Bay, we held that a circuit court...

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4 cases
  • Gahres v. Phico Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 87-637-A.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • 16 Octubre 1987
    ...for use of electric equipment, installation, and advertising. Little Bay, 219 S.E.2d at 678. 5 See also City of Alexandria v. R, F & P R.R. Co., 223 Va. 293, 288 S.E.2d 457 (1982) (SCC order can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court); Forest Grove Services Corp. v. Prince William County, No......
  • Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R. Co. v. State Corp. Com'n
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • 27 Noviembre 1985
    ...203 Va. 294, 124 S.E.2d 206 (1962); RF & P v. Corporation Commission, 219 Va. 301, 247 S.E.2d 408 (1978); and City of Alexandria v. RF & P, 223 Va. 293, 288 S.E.2d 457 (1982). RF & P challenged the assessments on a number of grounds, but the SCC held that all except one ground had been liti......
  • Atlas Underwriters, Ltd. v. State Corp. Com'n, 870077
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • 13 Enero 1989
    ...See, e.g., Commonwealth Gas Services v. Reynolds Metals, etc., 236 Va. 362, 374 S.E.2d 35 (1988) (rate making); City of Alexandria v. RF & P, 223 Va. 293, 288 S.E.2d 457 (1982) (tax assessments). Moreover, as Atlas acknowledges, the word "appeal" as used in Article IX, § 4, has the same mea......
  • Forest Grove Service Corp. v. Prince William County
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • 4 Septiembre 1987
    ...concedes the Commission's authority to assess its property used for water services. The trial court, citing City of Alexandria v. RF & P, 223 Va. 293, 299, 288 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1982), held that the court lacked jurisdiction to review and correct an order entered by the Commission. We agree.......

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