City of Los Angeles v. Department of Health
Decision Date | 02 November 1976 |
Citation | 133 Cal.Rptr. 771,63 Cal.App.3d 473 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 48697. |
Burt Pines, City Atty., Claude E. Hilker, Asst. City Atty., and Sally Disco, Deputy City Atty., for plaintiff and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., N. Eugene Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald V. Thunen, Jr., Patric Hooper, and John H. Sanders, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and respondents.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 5116, enacted in 1970, provides in part: The section authorizes any city or county to require a conditional use permit for the maintenance of a 'home' but limits the conditions imposed to those no more restrictive than applicable to similar dwellings in the 'same zones unless such additional conditions are necessary to protect the health and safety of the residents.' The case at bench tests the applicability of section 5116 to a 'home rule' chartered city in light of California Constitution, article XI, section 5.
We conclude that: (1) section 5116 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is, by its terms, applicable to both chartered and general law cities; and (2) the statute is part of a statutory scheme of treatment of mentally ill and handicapped persons which is of statewide concern. Accordingly, we affirm a judgment of the trial court declaring that city planning and zoning ordinances contrary to the state statute are invalid.
The City of Los Angeles (City) is a chartered municipality within the meaning of California Constitution, article XI, section 5. It has enacted a general planning and zoning ordinance containing a definition of single family dwelling which If valid, precludes the location of a facility described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 5116 in an area zoned for single family residences. 1
City filed its action seeking a declaration that its zoning ordinance was valid despite the state statute. Both City and the defendants moved for summary judgment. Based upon an agreed statement of facts, the trial court determined that Welfare and Institutions Code section 5116 is controlling over City's ordinances to the contrary.
On this appeal from that judgment, City contends: (1) Welfare and Institutions Code section 5116 should be interpreted as applicable only to general law and not to charter cities; (2) California Constitution, article XI, section 5 precludes the applicability of section 5116 to charter cities because zoning is a 'municipal affair'; and (3) if the state statute is viewed as in implementation of a matter of statewide concern so as generally to be applicable despite the home rule provisions of the California Constitution, the statute is nevertheless overbroad.
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5000 et seq.) was enacted in 1967 as a comprehensive statewide scheme for the treatment of 'mentally disordered' persons. The act makes special provision for the confinement of persons who are 'gravely disabled' by reason of mental disorder. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 5150--5152, 5250--5268, 5300--5331, 5350--5368.) SECTION 5358 OF THE WELfare and institutIons Code empowers a 'conservator' appointed by the court for the benefit of a mentally disordered person
In 1970, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act was amended to express policy guidelines for the placement of persons subject to it. Section 5115, enacted in that year, states:
Welfare and Institutions Code section 5116, the statute which directly concerns us in the case at bench, was enacted in conjunction with section 5115. The preamble to section 5116 states that it is enacted, 'Pursuant to the policy stated in Section 5115 . . ..'
On Their face, sections 5115 and 5116 are equally applicable to chartered and general law cities. The statutory reference is to cities and counties without distinction. Only by equal application to zoning regulations in all municipalities can the statewide policy, as opposed to insularly differentiated methods of housing handicapped persons, be achieved.
City seeks to avoid the construction dictated by the wording of the sections by reference to the convolutions experienced by AB 2406, the amending statute, in its way through the legislative process. As originally introduced in the 1970 legislative session, AB 2406 proposed to add a section to the Government Code providing that city or county zoning ordinances 'shall be applicable' to the use of property for facilities for handicapped persons. The bill was first amended to read: 'A state-authorized, certified, or licensed family care, foster home, or group home serving six or fewer mentally disordered or otherwise handicapped persons, shall be considered a family for the purposes of zoning.' A staff report questioned that 'family' was a precise enough term to accomplish the purpose of the amended legislation. The report recommends, also, that if state preemption is intended, there should be an expression to that effect. AB 2406 was amended in the Assembly to amplify the Welfare and Institutions Code rather than the Government Code to provide: 'A state-authorized (etc.) . . . home serving six or fewer . . . handicapped persons, shall be considered a residential use of property for the purposes of zoning.' The bill, as so amended, passed the Assembly and proceeded to the Senate.
The staff of the Senate Local Government Committee suggested that its members might 'wish to consider the issue of implied state preemption . . ..' The bill was amended in the Senate. The first Senate amendment introduces the language of what is now Welfare and Institutions Code section 5115. It also uses the language of present section 5116, with the additional phrase 'the provisions of this section shall be applicable to chartered cities as well as general law cities.' The bill was again amended to eliminate the specific reference to charter as well as general law cities, and was passed as amended bo both houses of the Legislature.
Unquestionably, the deletion of the specific reference to charter as well as general law cities must be considered in determining the legislative intent which underlies Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5115 and 5116. The significance of the deletion is, however, unclear. The Legislature may have omitted the language because it did not desire the statutes to be applicable to charter cities, or it may have done so because it viewed the words as surplusage in light of the other language of the legislation referring to cities and counties without distinction as to type.
The latter seems the more reasonable inference. When AB 2406 was originally introduced, its thrust was 180 degrees away from the ultimate outcome of the legislation. The bill then provided that local zoning ordinances controlled. It is fair to assume that the Legislature, knowing the original wording of the bill, would have expressly reinstated it as to charter cities if it intended to exempt them and would not have attempted to accomplish the exemption by implication.
Thus, we construe Welfare and Institutions Code section 5116 as applicable to charter as well as general law cities. The statute controls over local ordinances to the contrary unless the operation of state law is precluded by California Constitution, article XI, section 5.
By reason of the power granted charter cities by California Constitution, article XI, section 5, ordinances of those cities 'relating to matters which are purely 'municipal affairs' are not invalid because they are in conflict with general state laws or because state laws have been enacted to cover the same subject. (Citation.) 'As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home...
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