City of Atlanta v. Southern Ry. Co., s. 19891
| Decision Date | 10 January 1958 |
| Docket Number | 19892,Nos. 19891,s. 19891 |
| Citation | 101 S.E.2d 707,213 Ga. 736 |
| Parties | CITY OF ATLANTA v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al. v. CITY OF ATLANTA. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
J. C. Savage, J. M. B. Bloodworth, Henry L. Bowden, Robert S. Wiggins, Newell Edenfield, Ferrin Y. Mathews, Martin McFarland, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Edgar A. Neely, Greene & Neely, Atlanta, for defendant in error.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court.
By an act approved February 21, 1951 (Ga.L.1951, p. 3074), the charter of the City of Atlanta was amended so as to authorize and empower its mayor and general council, in their discretion, to grade, pave, repave or otherwise improve any of its nonarterial streets or portions of its streets and assess the cost thereof against the abutting property. Section 12 of the act is as follows: 'It is declared to be the intention of this charter amendment to authorize the improvement of non-arterial streets, public alleys or public places only and that the method herein provided for shall be cumulative and shall not be construed as repealing any other section of the charter of the City of Atlanta authorizing such improvements.' On July 18, 1956, the city adopted an ordinance to pave Perry Boulevard from the point where it intersects Hollywood Road 'approximately 5,120 feet southeast to end of project,' and to assess the total cost therefor against the abutting property. It also, but later, adopted an ordinance to curb the same portion of Perry Boulevard wholly at the expense of the abutting owners. The plaintiffs instituted this litigation against the defendant city on July 3, 1956, and prayed that it be enjoined from paving and curbing the aforementioned portion of Perry Boulevard under the provisions of the charter amending act of 1951 and from assessing any part of the cost therefor against their abutting property. So far as need be stated, the amended petition alleges: Perry Boulevard is a part of the city's public street system. It connects Hollywood Road and Marietta Road and is approximately 12,855 feet in length. It is by the public generally for all kinds of vehicular travel, including city and school buses, and it is a much shorter route than other mentioned streets to downtown Atlanta from specified places both within and outside the city. Wholly at its expense, the defendant city is paving and curbing 6,500 feet of it or approximately that half of it which extends northwesterly from the point where it intersects Marietta Road. Of the portion of it which the defendant now proposes to pave and curb, the plaintiffs' land abuts it approximately 2,100 lineal feet on the east and approximately 1,430 lineal feet on the west, and for the cost of such paving and curbing the defendant city expects to levy an assessment of $7.10 against the plaintiffs' property for each abutting lineal foot. Such abutting land is west of but adjacent to the plaintiffs' Inman Yards property and it was acquired by the plaintiffs solely for the purpose of assisting the defendant city in securing a new right-of-way for Perry Boulevard. The part of it which is located west of the boulevard is a very narrow strip of completely unusable property which the plaintiffs offered to donate to the defendant city without charge therefor. However, the defendant city declined to accept such a donation of it, and the cost of the proposed improvements will far exceed its actual value after such improvements are made. The charter amending act of 1951 is too vague, uncertain and indefinite to be enforced; and it is also unconstitutional and therefore void because it offends the due process and equal protection clauses of the State and Federal constitutions, Const. art. 1, § 1, pars. 2, 3, Const.U.S. Amend. 14. The defendant city demurred generally to the amended petition on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action for any of the relief sought . It also demurred to several paragraphs of the amended petition and moved to strike them. The court overruled the defendant's renewed demurrer to the amended petition as a whole, but sustained some of the demurrers to specified paragraphs of it and overruled the remaining grounds thereof. The defendant city excepted, and sued out a writ of error to this court assigning error on the rulings adverse to it. The plaintiffs also excepted to the rulings on the demurrers which were adverse to them, and in due time presented and caused to be certified a cross-bill of exceptions assigning error on such adverse rulings. Held:
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