City of Atlanta v. Southern States Police
| Decision Date | 18 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A05A1131.,A05A1131. |
| Citation | 276 Ga. App. 446,623 S.E.2d 557 |
| Parties | CITY OF ATLANTA et al. v. SOUTHERN STATES POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF GEORGIA et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Henry Fellows, Jr., Laurie Dugoniths, Fellows, Johnson & La Briola, LLP, Atlanta, for City of Atlanta.
Mary Cooney, Norman Slawsky, Jacobs, Slawsky & Barnett, P.A., Atlanta, Grady Dukes, McDonough, for Southern States Police.
This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their claims for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief pertaining to three City of Atlanta defined benefit pension plans. The three pension plans are the Fire Fighters Pension Fund, which covers firefighters employed by the City of Atlanta; the Police Officers Pension Fund, which covers police officers employed by the City of Atlanta; and the General Employees Pension Fund, which covers employees of the City of Atlanta and the Atlanta Board of Education (collectively, the "City of Atlanta Pension Funds"). After entertaining cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that the board of trustees for each of the three City of Atlanta Pension Funds have the exclusive authority to hire a third-party administrator to handle the administration of pension benefit payments and to obtain advice from independent legal counsel on matters regarding their authority and duties. The trial court also permanently enjoined the City of Atlanta and other defendants1 from interfering with the decisions on these matters made by the board of trustees for the Fire Fighters Pension Fund and Police Officers Pension Fund. The City of Atlanta now appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Separate boards of trustees administer the three City of Atlanta Pension Funds. Each board includes an appointee of the Mayor of the City of Atlanta, the Chief Financial Officer of the City of Atlanta, a City Council member, and members elected from active and retired employees.
Unhappy with the City of Atlanta's administration of the pension funds, the boards of trustees of the Fire Fighters Pension Fund and Police Officers Pension Fund adopted resolutions to hire a third-party administrator to perform benefit administration services for the respective pension plans. On January 30, 2003, both boards signed agreements with Administrative Services, Inc. ("ASI") for this purpose.2
On February 17, 2003, the Atlanta City Council adopted an ordinance entitled "An Ordinance To Amend The City of Atlanta Pension Laws (General, Police and Fire). . . ." The ordinance provided in part:
Any contract entered into by the Board of Trustees on or after January 1, 2003 which affects the administrative staffing, management, or operation of the pension fund shall require the consent of the City by adoption of a Resolution and approval by the Mayor. Any such contract which does not comply with the requirements of this Ordinance shall be null and void.
Subsequently, the City Attorney sent letters to the board chairpersons for the Fire Fighters Pension Fund and Police Officers Pension Fund advising them that it had come to the City Attorney's attention that both boards had voted to hire outside legal counsel to advise them on pension matters. The letters took the position that the City Attorney had sole authority to render legal advice to the pension boards and sole authority to determine if there was any conflict of interest in doing so. The letters further advised that "the Board[s] [are] not authorized to engage the services of outside counsel" unless and until the matter had been discussed and authorized by the City of Atlanta Law Department.
In response to requests from the boards of the Fire Fighters Pension Fund and Police Officers Pension Fund, the City Attorney issued a memorandum dated July 15, 2003 rendering an additional legal opinion concerning the hiring of a third-party administrator and outside legal counsel. The City Attorney acknowledged that the City Council, through its February 17 ordinance, could not retroactively invalidate a lawful contractual obligation entered into by the pension funds with ASI. However, the City Attorney ultimately concluded that any deficiency in the February 17 ordinance was irrelevant because the pension boards lacked authority to independently contract with a third-party administrator in the first instance, thus rendering the boards' actions ultra vires and making the respective signed agreements between the pension boards and ASI null and void from their inception. Additionally, the City Attorney reiterated her conclusion that neither pension board had authority to hire independent legal counsel without prior consultation and approval from the City of Atlanta Law Department.
Plaintiffs commenced this action on December 19, 2003. The plaintiffs in this case are not the respective pension boards themselves. Rather, plaintiffs include participants in the three City of Atlanta Pension Funds, elected members from each of the three pension boards, and three organizations that advocate for the interests of current and future participants in the City of Atlanta Pension Funds. They sought a declaratory judgment clarifying that, among other things, the three pension boards had authority under Georgia law to independently contract for third-party administrators to administer benefit services and to hire outside legal counsel without interference from the City of Atlanta. Plaintiffs also requested an interlocutory and permanent injunction restraining the City of Atlanta from interfering or preventing the pension boards from hiring a third-party administrator and outside legal counsel.3
The City of Atlanta timely answered. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment on their claims for declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction regarding the hiring of a third-party administrator and outside legal counsel, while the City sought summary judgment on all claims. After oral argument and full briefing from the parties, the trial court denied the City of Atlanta's summary judgment motion and granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court issued a declaratory judgment and permanently enjoined the City of Atlanta from interfering with decisions on these matters made by the respective pension boards for the Fire Fighters Pension Fund and Police Officers Pension Fund.4
On appeal, the City of Atlanta asserts multiple grounds for why the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The City claims that: (1) plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit; (2) there is no actual or justiciable controversy warranting the entry of a declaratory judgment; (3) the pension boards have no independent authority to contract for a third-party administrator or to hire outside legal counsel; (4) there is no evidence in the record and a lack of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support entry of a permanent injunction; and (5) the permanent injunction lacked the requisite specificity required by OCGA § 9-11-65(d). We will address each claim of error in turn.
1. The City of Atlanta argues that plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims for permanent injunctive relief and declaratory
relief. The City emphasizes that plaintiffs do not represent the pension boards themselves and have not submitted any evidence showing that they have been authorized to "stand in the shoes" of the respective boards. Furthermore, the City argues that plaintiffs do not have standing because they have not alleged any ultra vires conduct by the City.5 We reject the City's arguments.
( a) Permanent Injunctive Relief. Plaintiffs need not show that they were authorized to bring suit on behalf of the respective pension boards in order to sue for permanent injunctive relief. OCGA § 9-6-24 provides: "Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced."6 Questions concerning the oversight and management of public pension funds implicate public rights and duties such that suits brought pursuant to OCGA § 9-6-24 are authorized. Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of Ga., 257 Ga. 579(1), 361 S.E.2d 805 (1987). However, in order to have standing to bring suit against a municipality under OCGA § 9-6-24, a plaintiff must allege acts by the municipality that constitute ultra vires conduct. Newsome v. City of Union Point, 249 Ga. 434, 437, 291 S.E.2d 712 (1982). "For the action to be considered ultra vires, it must appear that the action taken was beyond the scope of the powers that have been expressly or impliedly conferred on the municipality." Id.
The City of Atlanta's contention notwithstanding, plaintiffs have alleged ultra vires conduct by the City. Plaintiffs have alleged that the City of Atlanta, through its City Council and Law Department, has refused to recognize, implement, or cooperate with any decision by the pension boards to hire a third-party administrator or outside legal counsel. See Complaint Par. 26, 28-30. According to plaintiffs, the City has repeatedly claimed that the City executive branch has sole authority to procure third-party administration and that the City Law Department has sole authority to render legal advice to the pension boards and to decide whether outside legal advice is warranted. See id. Furthermore, plaintiffs have alleged that the Atlanta City Council has attempted to interfere with and supersede pension board decisions by passing an ordinance attempting to retroactively nullify the third-party...
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