City of Atlanta v. Wright

• Decision Date: 10 December 1903
• Citation: 45 S.E. 994,119 Ga. 207
• Parties: CITY OF ATLANTA v. WRIGHT, Comptroller General.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

45 S.E. 994

119 Ga. 207

CITY OF ATLANTA v. WRIGHT, Comptroller General.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 10, 1903

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Ordinarily the writ of mandamus is a remedy for official inaction. It does not lie to control the conduct of an officer vested with a discretion, except where the exercise of that discretion has been so capricious or arbitrary as to amount to a gross abuse.

2. Under the act approved December 24, 1890 (Acts 1890-91, p 152; Pol. Code 1895, § § 725-728), providing for the taxation of railroad property for municipal purposes, and which adopted the system of assessment and collection prescribed by the act approved October 16, 1889 (Acts 1889, p. 29; Pol Code 1895, § § 784, 789), relating to the taxation of such property for county purposes, the Comptroller General must make his assessment for municipal taxation "upon the basis of the value given by the returns." He may, in the exercise of the powers granted him by the general law (Pol Code 1895, § 807 et seq.), reject the return made by a railroad company of the value of its entire property for state taxation; and if, by means of the legal machinery provided, such property is assessed at a higher valuation than that shown by the return, the effect will be to correspondingly increase the proportionate valuation of the property in the different municipalities through which the railroad runs. But the proportion which the value of the property situated in those municipalities bears to the value of the entire property is, under the statute, determined by the return, and cannot be altered by the Comptroller General.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; J. H. Lumpkin, Judge.

Action by the city of Atlanta against W. A. Wright, Comptroller General. From an order refusing a mandamus, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Jas. L. Mayson and Wm. P. Hill, for plaintiff in error.

Jno. C. Hart, Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

CANDLER J.

By an act approved October 16, 1889 (Acts 1889, p. 29; Pol. Code 1895, § 784 et seq.), the General Assembly undertook to "provide a system of taxation of railroad property in each of the counties of this state through which said railroads run, and to provide a mode of assessing and collecting the same." By this act it was made the duty of each railroad company in the state, on or before the 1st day of May of each year, to make a return to the Comptroller General, under the oath of its president or other chief executive officer, showing the following facts as they existed on the 1st day of April preceding: (1) The aggregate value of its whole property, (2) the value of its real estate and track bed, (3) the value of the rolling stock and all other personal property belonging to it, and (4) the value of the company's property in each county through which it runs. It was then provided that, whenever the amount of the tax levy of any county through which the railroad runs is assessed by authority of the county, it shall be the duty of the ordinary of the county to certify the same and transmit his certificate to the Comptroller General, who shall assess the amount of the property of each railroad in every county through which it runs, in the following manner: "First, it shall be assessed upon the property located in each county, upon the basis of the value given by the returns. Second, the amount of tax to be assessed upon the rolling-stock and other personal property is as follows: As the value of the property located in the particular county is to the value of the whole property, real and personal, of the said company, such shall be the amount of rolling-stock and other personal property to be distributed for taxing purposes to each county. The value of the property located in the county and the share of the rolling-stock and personal property thus ascertained, and apportioned to each of such counties, shall be the amount to be taxed to the extent of the assessment in each county." Pol. Code 1895, § 786. By an act approved December 24, 1890 (Acts 1890-91, p. 152; Pol. Code 1895, § 725 et seq.), the system of taxation of railroad property for county purposes prescribed by the act of 1889 was made applicable to the various municipalities in the state through which railroads run, it being provided that the amount of property for municipal taxation should be ascertained and assessed in like manner and upon the same basis as laid down in the act relating to taxation of railroads for county purposes.

The petition in the present case was brought by the city of Atlanta in the superior court of Fulton county. It recited the enactment of the legislation above referred to, and in addition set out, in substance, the following material allegations: Certain named railroads owning track beds and real estate in the city of Atlanta, and as such required by law to pay taxes to the city on their property, have not complied with the law in making their returns for the year 1903, the returns made being defective and illegal in the following particulars: "The value of the real estate and track bed of said companies are not returned, or do not appear returned from the statements or returns on file from said railroad companies. The returns of said roads *** do not show the value of the property of the several companies in the city of Atlanta on the 1st day of April of the present year. This is the main defect in said returns of which petitioner complains. The city charges that the returns of each of said railroads show the value of the railroad tracks including main and side tracks, and that the value placed upon the tracks, including main and side tracks, is transposed, and returned as the full and true value of the tracks and track bed. The distribution of the pro rata of the value of personal property to the city of Atlanta in said several returns appear as made by the railroad corporations themselves, instead of by the employés and office of the Comptroller General, as required by law." The same charge is made with reference to the distribution of the value of the franchises, "to wit, that the value of the same are distributed to the city of Atlanta and other municipal corporations by the railroads or their officers, *** rather than by the Comptroller General or his assistants." It is also charged that the railroad corporations return the alleged value of their whole property, real and personal, the alleged value of the entire personal property, and also the total mileage; that an arbitrary figure is then selected as the value per mile, and upon this basis the value of the property in the city to be returned for municipal taxation is fixed according to the mileage of the road in the city. In selecting a method of valuing the franchises, the Comptroller General and the officers of the railroad companies base their calculations upon the earnings of the roads, and the Comptroller General "accepts the return giving the value of their franchises upon the basis of their earning capacity, upon some per cent. unknown to petitioner, but under the legal rate of interest." It is claimed that this method is unfair to the plaintiff and to the other municipalities concerned, and permits the roads to return a very small value for their franchises, whereas they are of great value. The plaintiff has made formal demand upon the Comptroller General that he reject the returns of the companies as not showing the value of their property within the limits of the city of Atlanta, that the scheme or system of distributing the total value of the roads to each municipality at an arbitrary valuation per mile or according to the length of the tracks situated in the municipality be discarded, and that each of the companies be required to make a return showing the value of its property in the corporate limits of the city, without regard to any such arbitrary and unfair system, and without regard to the value of the company's property in any other city, village, or town. This demand was refused. The method now employed, it is alleged, works a great hardship upon the city, and the petition prays for the writ of mandamus, directed to the Comptroller General, requiring him (1) to require each of the roads named to return the value of its property in Atlanta; (2) to require that these returns shall be made according to value, and not according to mileage of tracks; (3) to require that these returns be made according to value; without regard to any arbitrary plan or system, and without regard to the value of the real estate of said companies in some other section of the state; and (4) to require the value of the several franchises of...