City of Auburn v. Brooke
| Decision Date | 10 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | 57972-5,Nos. 57867-2,s. 57867-2 |
| Citation | 836 P.2d 212,119 Wn.2d 623 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF AUBURN, Respondent, v. James A. BROOKE, Petitioner. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Casper Scott WANDLER, Petitioner. |
Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, C. Wesley Richards, Elaine Winters, and Jeffrey E. Ellis, Seattle, for petitioner Wandler.
Margeurite Schellentrager, Auburn City Atty., Stephen R. Shelton and Judith C. Ausman, Asst. City Attys., Auburn, for respondent Auburn.
Mark H. Sidran, Seattle City Atty., Margaret M. Boyle, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, for respondent Seattle.
Nancy Talner, Seattle, amicus curiae, for petitioners on behalf of Washington Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
These two consolidated cases involve the constitutional requirements for misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor citations used as final charging documents.
On March 18, 1987, the City of Auburn charged James A. Brooke by citation with disorderly conduct and trespass. The citation was issued by a police officer at the scene of the alleged crimes. The trespass charge was ultimately dismissed and is not in issue. The citation described the disorderly conduct charge simply as follows:
"9.40.010(A)(2) Disorderly Conduct."
On April 21, 1987, Brooke pleaded guilty to this charge and was sentenced to 90 days in jail (60 days suspended) and fined $500 ($300 suspended).
Brooke subsequently moved to set aside his guilty plea on grounds not relevant here. The Superior Court refused to set the plea aside. Brooke sought review in the Court of Appeals arguing for the first time that the disorderly conduct citation, also used as the final charging document, was constitutionally defective because it failed to include all of the essential elements of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals granted review on the sole issue of whether the charging document was sufficient.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the citation was a constitutionally adequate charging document and affirmed Brooke's conviction. Auburn v. Brooke, 60 Wash.App. 87, 803 P.2d 1325 (1991). We accepted review and consolidated the Brooke case with Seattle v. Wandler, 60 Wash.App. 309, 803 P.2d 833, review granted, 117 Wash.2d 1008, 816 P.2d 1223 (1991).
On February 3, 1987, Casper Scott Wandler was charged with two violations of the Seattle Municipal Code. The citation was signed by the two investigating police officers and described the offenses as follows:
"11.56.420 Hit/Run; Attended" and "11.56.020(B) DWI"
Wandler did not sign the citation; in place of his signature appears the word "refused". Wandler was booked into jail following his refusal to sign the citation. The parties have stipulated that some initials appearing on the citation (which was the only charging document used) represent the signature of an assistant city attorney. At his municipal court trial, a jury found Wandler guilty of hit and run driving, and not guilty of driving while intoxicated.
Wandler appealed the hit and run driving conviction to the Superior Court on several grounds not relevant here and the Superior Court affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted review on the issue of the validity of the Seattle ordinance and also on the issue of the constitutional We accepted review of Wandler on the sole issue of the sufficiency of the citation as the charging document.
sufficiency of the citation also used as the final charging document. Wandler first raised the issue of the constitutionality of the charging document in the Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the conviction holding the Seattle ordinance valid and, relying on the Brooke decision, held that the citation was a constitutionally adequate final charging document. Seattle v. Wandler, 60 Wash.App. 309, 803 P.2d 833, review granted, 117 Wash.2d 1008, 816 P.2d 1223 (1991)
These consolidated cases present a single issue.
Does a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor citation used as the final charging document in a criminal prosecution satisfy the "essential elements" rule if it states only a numerical code section and the name of a criminal offense?
CONCLUSION. The essential elements rule applies to all charging documents, including citations used as final charging documents; the recitation of no more than a numerical code section and the title of an offense does not satisfy that rule unless such abbreviated form contains all essential elements of the crime(s) charged.
An accused must be informed of the criminal charge he or she is to meet at trial and cannot be tried for an offense which has not been charged. 1 It has long been settled law in this state that all essential statutory 2 elements of a crime must be included in the charging document in order to afford notice to an accused of the nature and cause of an accusation against the accused. 3 This rule of law is In the fairly recent case of State v. Leach, 113 Wash.2d 679, 782 P.2d 552 (1989), we addressed the issue of whether a charging document, involving a misdemeanor offense filed in a court of limited jurisdiction, must state all the statutory elements of the alleged crime in order to satisfy due process. Our unanimous opinion in Leach stated:
based on Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) and on the Sixth Amendment; it is generally referred to as the essential elements rule. Many of the cases in this court which have applied the essential elements rule were misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor prosecutions. 4
In holding that a charging document which omits a statutory element of the crime charged violates a defendant's constitutional rights, the court in [State v.] Holt[, 104 Wash.2d 315, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985) ] did not distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies, nor between complaints and citations. In applying the Holt rule, there is no logical reason to distinguish between complaints and citations or felonies and misdemeanors.
If a misdemeanor citation or complaint omits a statutory element of the charged offense, the document is constitutionally defective for failure to state an offense and is subject to dismissal.
Leach, 113 Wash.2d at 687, 782 P.2d 552. Leach also reiterated that "[a] defendant's due process right to notice of the offense charged does not depend upon whether the charging document is a complaint or a citation and notice." 5
Relying on Leach, the respondent cities argue that while misdemeanor complaints have to satisfy the essential elements rule, misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor citations 6 do not have to state the essential elements of the crime Although the constitutional requirement for adequate notice is the same whether that notice is given by complaint or by citation and notice, there is a logical basis for reasonably distinguishing between misdemeanor defendants issued citations and those served with complaints. Complaints must be more detailed since they are issued by a prosecutor who was not present at the scene of the crime. Defining the crime with more specificity in a complaint assists a defendant in determining the particular incident to which the complaint refers. Citations, however, are generally issued by law enforcement officers who have personal contact with defendants at the scene. Defendants charged by citation are necessarily aware of the particular incidents for which officers are charging them. They presumably know the facts underlying their charges. Further, the citation charging procedure permits officers to initiate prosecutions without unjustifiable expense and delay. In addition, the procedure under CrRLJ 2.1(b) facilitates an officer's ability to charge defendants at the scene and then to release those persons for whom jailing is unnecessary. Differing procedures and requirements for charging by complaint and by citation and notice do not violate due process and equal protection rights.
charged. This appears to be a misunderstanding of a distinction drawn in Leach. Leach, 113 Wash.2d at 697-98, 782 P.2d 552 states as follows
The cities conclude from this that the elements of the crime need not be stated in a citation even when it is used as the final charging document in a criminal prosecution. If we accepted this contention, the effect would be that one defendant charged by complaint would be afforded a statement of the essential elements of the crime charged while another defendant charged with the identical crime by citation used as a final charging document would not have to be given a statement of the essential elements of the crime charged. Leach does not lead to such an anomalous result.
To understand the distinction in Leach, it is helpful to look to the purpose and function of charging documents. The primary purpose is to give notice to an accused so a defense can be prepared. 7 There are two aspects of this Although Leach stated that the facts need not be as detailed in a citation because it is issued at the scene of the alleged crime, it did not say that a citation need not set out the essential elements of the crime charged. In fact, Leach specifically held that a citation describing an offense as DWI (the well known acronym for Driving While Intoxicated) was sufficient because it was "a complete statement of the statutory elements constituting the offense charged". 10 Any misconception in this regard engendered by Leach should have been put to rest by Seattle v. Hein, 115 Wash.2d 555, 799 P.2d 734 (1990). In Hein, the defendant was convicted of violating Seattle Municipal Code (S.M.C.) 11.56.020(B) (). The Superior Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the citation, also used as the final charging document, described the offense...
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