City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., A12A0620.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A12A0620.,A12A0620. |
| Citation | 730 S.E.2d 486,316 Ga.App. 768 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CITY OF BALDWIN v. WOODARD & CURRAN, INC. |
R. David Syfan, Gainesville, for appellant.
Oliver & Weidner, James Charles Weidner, Clarkesville, Ernest Hal Woods III, for appellee.
Rusi C. Patel, Susan Moore, amici curiae.
The City of Baldwin, Georgia (City) appeals after a jury awarded Woodard & Curran, Inc. (W & C) $203,000 on its claim for money owed under a contract to provide services for the City's wastewater treatment plant. Because there was sufficient evidence to support the award, we affirm.
The record shows that W & C sued for breach of a contract under which it was to be paid for engineering and design services for the City's water system (May contract). W & C claimed that it provided supporting engineering documents for the City's application for government stimulus funds to improve the City's wastewater treatment plant under the May contract and also under a proposal submitted on June 15, 2009 (June proposal). The June proposal was signed by the mayor under "authorization to proceed," and provided that W & C would be paid a sum "not to exceed $210,000.00." In the alternative, the complaint asked for damages of $203,870.44 as the value of the services provided to the City.
The City's position was that it paid the $5,000 owed under the May contract and that was the total amount due. The City stated in its Answer that the mayor's signing of the June proposal was an ultra vires act and was not binding on the City because it was not approved by a quorum of the city council. The City also stated that the June 2009 proposal was to secure funding and C & W failed to secure the funding; therefore, the City was unable to proceed with the project.
Brent Bridges, a senior vice president with W & C testified that the $5,000, as stated in the proposal, was to be paid for the documents to support the funding application for stimulus money. The second part of the proposal agreed to in the May 2009 contract was not covered by the $5,000 and involved supplying the design engineering necessary to apply for funding.
The senior project manager at W & C testified that pursuant to the second part of the May contract, there was a meeting with the mayor and two city council members and they authorized the second project of the May contract and authorized payment of $210,000 for that work.
At this meeting with the mayor and council members, W & C was told to proceed with the work necessary to continue the application process. This work included hiring surveyors, hiring geo-technical core drillers, getting bids for the work, and completing the design plans.
After the mayor signed the authorization to proceed, and as the work progressed, the project engineer was asked to attend a city council meeting and update the mayor and city council on the work that W & C was doing. The engineer stated that he attended the meeting and described the work that was being done and the status of the permits, applications, designs, specifications and reports. He testified that the City owed W & C approximately $203,000 for this work.
The mayor who signed the June proposal testified that it was his understanding that the full amount contracted for was the $5,000 and any additional engineering fees would be contracted for once the funding was committed. The mayor said that he signed the proposal for the additional work but did not date it because he could not obligate the City by himself and it would have to be voted on by the council and reviewed by the city attorney.
The mayor testified as to the benefit to the City if improvements were made to the wastewater treatment plant, stating that improvements to the headworks would have averted the possibility of substantial fines from the EPD. The mayor acknowledged that he knew W & C was doing engineering work for the City in order to obtain the stimulus money, and agreed that there was no question that W & C was going to continue doing work for the City toward applying for the stimulus money. The mayor said that he knew that deadlines existed and knew that the project must be "shovel-ready by November 1[, 2009]."2
The mayor acknowledged that there was a council meeting attended by W & C representatives in September at which the mayor and council were told that W & C was going to have to do "engineering" for the project. The mayor said that he knew at that time that "there was a good deal more to be done." In addition, a tape was played for the jury of this September meeting of the city council at which W & C told the council about the work that had been completed and the work that still needed to be done in order to file the application for funds.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of W & C in the amount of $203,000. The City now appeals.
Where a jury returns a verdict and it has the approval of the trial judge, the same must be affirmed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it as the jurors are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight and credit given the evidence.... The appellate court must construe the evidence with every inference and presumption in favor of upholding the verdict, and after judgment, the evidence must be construed to uphold the verdict even where the evidence is in conflict. As long as there is some evidence to support the verdict, the denial of defendant's motions for new trial and [j.n.o.v.] will not be disturbed.
(Punctuation omitted.) Lofty v. Fuller, 223 Ga.App. 95, 97, 477 S.E.2d 30 (1996).
1. The City contends that the trial court erred in allowing the claim for quantum meruit to go to the jury. First, we note that the verdict form does not show whether the award was made on the breach of contract claim or whether it was made on the basis of the quantum meruit claim. The City did not request special findings and did not object to the verdict form. This Court will not speculate as to the findings of fact supporting the verdict. All Risk Ins. Agency v. Southern Bell Tel., etc. Co., 182 Ga.App. 190, 192, 355 S.E.2d 465 (1987).
Further, we reject the City's argument that H.G. Brown Family, L.P. v. City of Villa Rica, 278 Ga. 819, 607 S.E.2d 883 (2005), precludes claims of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment where an alleged contract between the municipality and a contractor is ultra vires and void. Although the trial court held that the June proposal was not a valid contract because it was not approved by a quorum of the city council, the City overlooks the fact that there was evidence submitted to the jury that the work was done in accordance with the May contract, which was a valid contract.
Further, it is well-settled law that "[w]here, as here, an ‘agreement’ exists to perform lawful services for a municipality but it is not otherwise enforceable as a valid express contract, a recovery in quantum meruit is authorized to the extent of the value of the benefit that the municipality receives." (Punctuation omitted.) Walston & Assoc. v. City of Atlanta, 224 Ga.App. 482, 484, 480 S.E.2d 917 (1997) ; City of St. Marys v. Stottler Stagg & Assoc., 163 Ga.App. 45, 46, 292 S.E.2d 868 (1982) ; City of Dallas v. White, 182 Ga.App. 782, 783, 357 S.E.2d 125 (1987).
The City argues that it can no longer be held liable under the quasi-contractual theory of quantum meruit because the Supreme Court's holding in H.G. Brown, impliedly overruled the above cases. In H.G. Brown the Court held that because the contract was not approved by a quorum of the city council before being signed by the mayor, Id. at 821, 607 S.E.2d 883.3 The City argues that in light of H.G. Brown, the reasoning in City of St. Marys v. Stottler, supra, no longer applies. In Stottler, this Court held:
Quantum meruit is not available when a county is the defendant. This result is dictated by the statutory requirements for establishing a contract with a county. See Code Ann. § 23–1701 [now OCGA § 36–10–1 ] and Division 1. (Emphasis supplied.) PMS Const. Co. [v. DeKalb County] , 243 Ga. at 872 , supra. We know of no "statutory requirements" for establishing a contract with a municipality which are comparable to those cited in PMS Const. Co. as precluding a quantum meruit recovery against a county. Indeed it appears to have long been the law that, under certain circumstances, quantum meruit is an available remedy against a municipality. Since the city could have legally contracted for the service it received, it would seem that an implied contract would arise to pay a reasonable value for such beneficial service. We find no decision in Georgia to prohibit it; and the many cases hereinabove cited and others, under the ‘common-honesty rule’, intimate the liability of the city.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 47, 292 S.E.2d 868.
Contrary to the City's argument, there are still no statutory requirements for...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Monitronics International, Inc. v. Veasley
...while car-surfing given that plaintiff knew this to be an obviously dangerous activity). 40.See City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., 316 Ga.App. 768, 775–76(6), 730 S.E.2d 486 (2012) (holding that it was not error for trial court to refuse to give requested charge that was not adjuste......
-
City of Baldwin v. Woodard
...in a general verdict that did not specify the basis for the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. See City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., 316 Ga.App. 768, 730 S.E.2d 486 (2012). We granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that qua......
-
Rowe v. Brodhead
...jury found in favor of Brodhead on the Loan, this Court cannot determine whether error occurred. See City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, 316 Ga.App. 768, 771(1), 730 S.E.2d 486 (2012) (verdict form did not show upon which of two claims it was based). Compare Curran v. Scharpf, 290 Ga. 780(......
- Bates v. Bates