City of Barberton v. O'Connor
| Decision Date | 05 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1033,84-1033 |
| Citation | 17 OBR 452,17 Ohio St.3d 218,478 N.E.2d 803 |
| Parties | , 17 O.B.R. 452 CITY OF BARBERTON, Appellee, v. O'CONNOR, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A Uniform Traffic Ticket properly charges the defendant with an offense when it describes the nature of the offense as "DWI" and makes reference to the ordinance that gives rise to the offense, even if it does not indicate the substance that caused the defendant to be intoxicated. (Traf.R. 3[C], construed and applied.)
2. A Uniform Traffic Ticket effectively charges an offense even if the defendant has to make some reasonable inquiry in order to know exactly what offense is charged. Such inquiry should be made before trial by filing a request for a bill of particulars. (Traf.R. 3[C] and Crim.R. 7[E], construed and applied.)
Appellant, Paul O'Connor, was arrested on January 23, 1983 and given an Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket charging him with "DWI in violation of Sec. No. 333.01 Cod.Ord. of Barberton." A copy of an Alcohol Influence Report Form was filed in the Barberton Municipal Court with the ticket. An Alcohol Influence Report Form is a form upon which the Barberton Police record a defendant's condition after he has been arrested for an alcohol-related offense. Part of the information recorded on the form is supplied by the defendant, and the remainder consists of observations made by the police. The January 23, 1983 Alcohol Influence Report Form indicated appellant admitted having "3 or 4, 5 or 6" beers on the night of his arrest. It also indicated he had the "strong" odor of alcohol on his breath. Appellant was asked to submit to a breathalyzer test and he refused.
The deputy clerk of the Barberton Municipal Court requested a copy of appellant's driving record from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. When received, it revealed that appellant had a history of committing traffic offenses.
On January 29, 1983, attorney Mark H. Ludwig entered his appearance as counsel for appellant. On March 18, 1983, a pretrial conference was held and it is undisputed defense counsel was provided with the discovery information that he had requested. On April 13, 1983, appellant, by and through his counsel, pled no contest to the charge of "DWI in violation of Sec. No. 333.01 Cod.Ord. of Barberton." Appellant was found guilty, fined $200 and costs, sentenced to three days in jail and had his driver's license suspended for three years.
On May 30, 1983, appellant was arrested again and given an Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket charging him with "DWI in violation of Sec. No. 333.01A Cod.Ord. of Barberton." Again, a copy of an Alcohol Influence Report Form was filed in municipal court with the ticket. The report indicated that appellant had the "strong" odor of alcohol on his breath. On June 4, 1983, attorney Ludwig entered a plea of not guilty on behalf of appellant. On July 20, 1983, a pretrial was held. On August 17, 1983, appellant appeared in court with his attorney and changed his plea to no contest. He was found guilty, fined $400 and costs, sentenced to six days in jail, and ordered "to bring in license plates and registration to all vehicles in his name."
Appellant's conviction and sentence in both cases were consolidated and he appealed them to the Court of Appeals for Summit County. In the appellate court he argued that the two Uniform Traffic Tickets that were issued to him did not apprise him of the nature of the offense with which he was charged. Essentially, appellant argued he did not know if he had been accused of driving while intoxicated by alcohol, or drugs, or both. He contends that since he did not know the substance of the charges, he could not adequately defend himself. The appellate court held that while the tickets could have provided appellant with more information with respect to the offenses charged, they adequately notified him that he had been charged with driving while intoxicated by alcohol. The judgments of the trial court were affirmed.
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
James A. Merlitti, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellee.
Cole Co., L.P.A., and Mark H. Ludwig, Akron, for appellant.
The issue presented in this case is whether an Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket properly charges the defendant with an offense when it describes the nature of the offense as "DWI" and makes reference to the ordinance that gives rise to the citation, but when it does not indicate the substance that caused the defendant to be intoxicated.
On January 23, 1983, appellant was charged with "DWI in violation of Sec. No. 333.01 Cod.Ord. of Barberton." At that time Sec. No. 333.01 read 1:
On May 30, 1983, appellant was charged with "DWI in violation of Sec. No. 333.01A Cod.Ord. of Barberton." At that time Sec. No. 333.01 read:
Appellant contends that the January 23, 1983 ticket did not advise him whether he had been charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, and/or being in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or both. Appellant claims the ticket was so vague that it failed to charge him with an offense as required by Traf.R. 3(C).
Appellant contends that the May 30, 1983 ticket did not advise him whether he had been charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both. Again, appellant claims that the ticket was so vague that it failed to charge him with an offense as required by Traf.R. 3(C).
The purpose of the Ohio Traffic Rules is, in large part, to ensure "simplicity and uniformity in procedure * * *." (...
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