City of Barling v. Ft. Chaffee Redev. Auth.

• Decision Date: 06 December 2001
• Docket Number: 01-531
• Citation: 60 S.W.3d 443
• Parties: CITY OF BARLING, ARKANSAS, APPELLANT, VS. FORT CHAFFEE REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, AN ARKANSAS PUBLIC TRUST, AND ITS TRUSTEES; LINDA SCHMIDT; JERRY R. STEWART, M.D.; JOE EDWARDS, JR.; KEN COLLEY; LINDA HOBBS; BECKY RHINEHART & GREG SMITH, D.V.M.,APPELLEESSUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 6 December 2001 APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF SEBASTIAN COUNTY, ARKANSAS, GREENWOOD DISTRICT, NO.; HONORABLE HARRY A. FOLTZ, CHANCELLOR AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL AND ONTOM GLAZE, Justice. In this appeal, arising from a dispute between the City of Barling and the Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Authority, we are asked to resolve the question of who has the authority to designate the use of 7,390 acres that were formerly a part of Fort Chaffee, but which Barling annexed in a series of three elections in 1981, 1982, and 1991. Before proceeding to the legal issues presented by the appeal, a brief recitation of the facts of Fort Chaffee's history is necessary. In 1941, the United States Department of the Army purchased over 76,000 acres in Sebastian County for the establishment of Camp Chaffee. During its history, Camp Chaffee became Fort Chaffee, and it has served a variety of functions during the past six decades. It was a training base during the Korean War, a relocation center for Vietnamese refugees at the close of the Vietnam War, a relocation center for Cuban refugees in the early 1980s, and a temporary location center for the Joint Readiness Training Center in the 1990s. In September of 1997, Fort Chaffee was closed by the United States government, and, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 22-7-301 (Supp. 1999), the State of Arkansas accepted legislative jurisdiction over the Fort Chaffee property. The cities of Barling, Fort Smith, and Greenwood, as well as Sebastian County, formed the Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Authority (the "FCRA"), an Arkansas Public Trust, to conduct a comprehensive study of all issues related to the closure and redevelopment of the base. Authorized representatives of Barling, F
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

CITY OF BARLING, ARKANSAS, APPELLANT VS FORT CHAFFEE REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, AN ARKANSAS PUBLIC TRUST, AND ITS TRUSTEES; LINDA SCHMIDT; JERRY R. STEWART, M.D.; JOE EDWARDS, JR.; KEN COLLEY; LINDA HOBBS; BECKY RHINEHART & GREG SMITH, D.V.M.,APPELLEES

No. 01-531

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

6 December 2001

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF SEBASTIAN COUNTY, ARKANSAS, GREENWOOD DISTRICT, NO. E-2000-334; HONORABLE HARRY A. FOLTZ, CHANCELLOR

AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL AND ON CROSS-APPEAL.

TOM GLAZE, Justice.

In this appeal, arising from a dispute between the City of Barling and the Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Authority, we are asked to resolve the question of who has the authority to designate the use of 7,390 acres that were formerly a part of Fort Chaffee, but which Barling annexed in a series of three elections in 1981, 1982, and 1991. Before proceeding to the legal issues presented by the appeal, a brief recitation of the facts of Fort Chaffee's history is necessary.

In 1941, the United States Department of the Army purchased over 76,000 acres in Sebastian County for the establishment of Camp Chaffee. During its history, Camp Chaffee became Fort Chaffee, and it has served a variety of functions during the past six decades. It was a training base during the Korean War, a relocation center for Vietnamese refugees at the close of the Vietnam War, a relocation center for Cuban refugees in the early 1980s, and a temporary location center for the Joint Readiness Training Center in the 1990s. In September of 1997, Fort Chaffee was closed by the United States government, and, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 22-7-301 (Supp. 1999), the State of Arkansas accepted legislative jurisdiction over the Fort Chaffee property. The cities of Barling, Fort Smith, and Greenwood, as well as Sebastian County, formed the Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Authority (the "FCRA"), an Arkansas Public Trust, to conduct a comprehensive study of all issues related to the closure and redevelopment of the base. Authorized representatives of Barling, Fort Smith, Greenwood, and Sebastian County signed and agreed to be bound by the terms of the Trust Indenture. In 1997, the Arkansas General Assembly "acknowledged" and "endorsed" the Trust as the entity to prepare and implement a comprehensive plan for the optimal use of the property. Act 1201 of 1997, 14, codified at Ark. Code Ann. 12-63-103(a) & (b) (Repl. 1999).

In June of 1999, the United States Department of Defense recognized the Trust as the entity to implement the redevelopment plan at Fort Chaffee. In August of 1999, the Trust completed a Comprehensive Reuse Plan for a 7,390 acre portion of the Fort Chaffee. On June 30, 2000, the Trust entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of the Army whereby it was agreed that a 5,235 acre portion of the 7,390 acres would be conveyed to the Trust with the remainder being conveyed at a subsequent time. The City of Barling had annexed 13,720 acres of the Fort Chaffee property in three annexations, which occurred in the years 1981, 1982, and 1991, and the 7,390 acres covered in the Comprehensive Reuse Plan are located in these annexed areas. In 2000, Barling passed numerous zoning ordinances that affected the Fort Chaffee property, and which the Trust alleged severely conflicted with the amended Comprehensive Reuse Plan. The conflicts were essentially instances where Barling had zoned park/open space or residential areas that FCRA had designated for public facilities or industrial use.

The Trust filed suit against Barling on September 5, 2000, alleging that the 1981, 1982 and 1991 annexations were void ab initio for numerous reasons. It further sought a declaratory judgment that Barling's land use ordinances were ultra vires an dvoid to the extent that the ordinances regulated Fort Chaffee property. The Trust also sought to enjoin Barling from exercising legislative jurisdiction over the Fort Chaffee property; enforcing or threatening to enforce Barling city ordinances within the boundaries of that property; collecting taxes, fees, or assessments from the FCRA; and annexing any portion of the Fort Chaffee property without prior approval of the FCRA.

Barling initially filed a motion for summary judgment, submitting in part that FCRA's challenge to Barling's 1981, 1982, and 1991 annexation ordinances and elections was untimely under Ark. Code Ann. 14-40-304 (Repl. 1998). That statute requires that challenges to annexations must be filed within 30 days of the election. The trial court agreed and granted Barling's motion for summary judgment on November 3, 2000. FCRA cross-appeals from that order.

FCRA then filed its own motion for summary judgment, and asked the trial court to hold as a matter of law that Barling had ceded its legislative authority to the Trust over the Fort Chaffee property, and had no legislative authority over that property. Barling responded by filing its second motion for summary judgment, wherein it urged the court to hold Barling had not ceded its legislative authority to the Trust; it further asked the trial court to hold Barling's ordinances and regulations applied equally to that part of Barling in the annexed areas within the Fort Chaffee property, as they do in all other parts of Barling "proper." FCRA's response asserted that the facts were undisputed and that Barling's imposition of its zoning ordinances would delay implementation of the Trust's Comprehensive Reuse Plan, discourage potential developers, and endanger the ability of FCRA to complete its Reuse Plan.

The trial court entered an order on January 18, 2001, granting FCRA's motion for summary judgment and declaring that Barling's zoning plans conflicted irreconcilably with the Trust's Reuse Plan. The court further found that had Barling not annexed the Fort Chaffee property in 1981, 1982, and 1991, Barling "would be in the same position as the other municipal beneficiaries of the Trust (Fort Smith and Greenwood) and would be unable to assert any claim that it had legislative authority over the property." The court went on to note, however, that the State of Arkansas authorized a suspension of Barling's legislative authority over the annexed area during development of that area and during the life of the Trust, and that Barling agreed to the cessation of authority when its representative signed the Trust Indenture. In granting FCRA's motion for summary judgment, the court also enjoined Barling from exercising legislative jurisdiction over the annexed areas within the Fort Chaffee property. On direct appeal, Barling raises three arguments for reversal.

Our standard of review is that summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Lowell v. City of Rogers, 345 Ark. 33, 43 S.W.3d 742 (2001). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try the issues, but to determine whether there are any issues to be tried. BPS, Inc. v. Parker, 345 Ark. 381, 47 S.W.3d 858 (2001). We have ceased referring to summary judgment as a drastic remedy. We now regard it simply as one of the tools in a trial court's efficiency arsenal; however, we only approve the granting of the motion when the state of the evidence as portrayed by the pleadings, affidavits, discovery responses, and admission on file is such that the nonmoving party is not entitled to a day in court, i.e., when there is not any genuine remaining issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Flentje v. First National Bank of Wynne, 340 Ark. 563, 11 S.W.3d 531 (2000). However, when there is no material dispute as to the facts, the court will determine whether "reasonable minds" could draw "reasonable" inconsistent hypotheses to render summary judgment inappropriate. In other words, when the facts are not at issue but possible inferences therefrom are, this court will consider whether those inferences can be reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts and whether reasonable minds might differ on those hypotheses. Id. We now turn to Barling's numerous points and subpoints it advances for reversal.

For its first assignment of error, Barling argues that the trial court erred in ruling the statutory law, 12-63-103, and the Fort Chaffee Trust Indenture signed by Barling, Fort Smith, Greenwood, and Sebastian County conveyed upon the FCRA the authority over zoning and land use issues. In response to the federal closure of Fort Chaffee, the General Assembly enacted Act 1201 of 1997, entitled an act "to provide for the management and operation of Fort Chaffee as a reserve component military training reservation . . . and for other purposes." Section 14 of Act 1201 became 12-63-103 (a) & (b), supra; this statute is captioned "Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Authority Public Trust," and it reads as follows:

(a) The State of Arkansas acknowledges and endorses the establishment of the Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Authority Public Trust, created by Sebastian County, Arkansas, on February 19, 1997, as set forth in the Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Authority Indenture of Trust and pursuant to the provisions of the laws of the State of Arkansas, including specifically 28-72-201 et seq.

(b) The Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Authority Public Trust is hereby recognized by the State as the entity to: prepare a comprehensive study of all issues related to the closure and redevelopment of Fort Chaffee Military Base surplus properties and to ensure proper planning and optimal use of the property embodied therein; after conversion of such portions of the Base as the United States Department of Defense deems unnecessary to its overall military mission, to manage, own and operate those portions so as to yield the maximum benefit to the residents of affected counties and communities in the State of Arkansas; and for other purposes as enabled and set forth in the Fort...