City of Barnesville v. Stafford

Decision Date15 January 1926
Docket Number5104.
Citation131 S.E. 487,161 Ga. 588
PartiesCITY OF BARNESVILLE v. STAFFORD.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

A deed conveying land to the city of Barnesville, containing, before the granting clause, provisions that the city agrees to accept the premises for a park for the exclusive use and benefit of its white citizens, and to put the park in a reasonably good condition for such use, and to keep it so and that, "when said park is neglected for longer time than twelve months, or ceases to be used as a park," said land "reverts to the" grantor, "or his estate, or his heirs," and in the habendum clause is the provision that the city is to hold the "premises with conditions named," creates an estate upon a condition subsequent, upon breach of which said land reverts to the grantor, his estate, or heirs.

A valid deed, conveying title to land, is never color of title.

(a) As "color of title" is some writing which defines the extent and character of the claim to land, with parties from whom it may come and to whom it may be made, the grantee in the deed referred to in the above headnote, if it could prescribe thereunder, could acquire by prescription no greater or different estate than that defined in said deed.

(b) The allegations of the petition in this case do not show prescriptive title in the city; and whatever title the city has is that conveyed by said deed.

As a general rule, equity will not lend its aid to enforce a forfeiture, and to divest an estate for breach of condition subsequent.

(a) The petition makes no case for equitable interference, but one for legal relief. In essence and effect it is a statutory complaint for the recovery of land for breach of a condition subsequent.

(b) Title by prescription has, in this state, been substituted for the statute of limitations as to realty.

(c) The doctrine of stale demands is purely an equitable one.

(d) In suits for recovery of land, equity follows the law, and will never close her doors against the true owner of land seeking to recover the same, when the complaint is brought within a less time than that in which prescription could have ripened and where no special circumstances appear demanding an earlier application.

A forfeiture resulting from a breach of a condition subsequent may be released or waived, and the waiver may be either express or implied from the circumstances; but mere inaction does not amount to a waiver of a forfeiture for a breach of a condition subsequent. A waiver or estoppel arises only when the grantor does some act inconsistent with his right of forfeiture, and where it would be unjust for him thereafter to insist upon a forfeiture.

There is no repugnancy between the conditions and the granting clause of the deed involved in this case.

Construing the petition as a whole, the suit was brought by the plaintiff, not in his individual capacity, but in his capacity as executor.

Error from Superior Court, Lamar County; G. Ogden Persons, Judge.

Suit by R. A. Stafford against the City of Barnesville. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Claude Christopher, and E. O. Dobbs, all of Barnesville, for plaintiff in error.

C. J Lester, of Barnesville, for defendant in error.

HINES J.

On June 4, 1906, J. W. Stafford, "for and in consideration of the love and good will for Barnesville, and the sum of $1.00," conveyed to the city of Barnesville, for a park a described tract of land, on the terms named in his deed of conveyance. His deed contained these provisions:

"(1) The city of Barnesville agrees to accept said property * * * for the exclusive use and benefit of the white * * * citizens of said city, and agrees to put said park in reasonably good condition and keep it so. (2) When said park is neglected for longer time than twelve months, or ceases to be used as a park, it reverts to the said J. W. Stafford, or his estate, or his heirs." In the habendum clause it is provided that the grantee is to hold the "premises with conditions named." On April 27, 1919, the grantor died testate. On August 8, 1924, R. A. Stafford filed his petition against the city, in which he alleged that he was the duly qualified executor of J. W. Stafford, deceased, and set out the terms of the above conveyance, a copy of which he attached to his petition. He further alleged that the provisions of said deed created and imposed upon the city a condition subsequent, that the city had wholly failed to comply with any of the conditions set forth in said deed, and had broken absolutely every condition therein named; that said lands were just as they were when said deed was made, had never been converted into a park, were utterly uncared for, and were nothing more than unimproved and unkept commons, lying in waste and neglect, in consequence of which the city had forfeited its right to said property or to use the same in any way, and petitioner is entitled to have said deed canceled as a cloud upon his title, and is entitled to recover possession of said land under the terms of said deed. He prayed for cancellation of said instrument, and for recovery of said land. The city demurred to the petition upon the grounds: (1) That it does not set out a cause of action; (2) that the city has a title by prescription; (3) that the defendant has been guilty of laches; (4) that the testator waived by implication, during his life, the right to forfeit the title of the city to said land; (5) that the conditions contained in said deed are repugnant to the granting clause, and are therefore void; and (6) that the petition is brought by R. A. Stafford individually, and not as executor. The trial judge overruled the demurrer, and to this judgment the city excepted.

1. Properly construed, the deed conveyed to the city of Barnesville the land in dispute for a public park for the exclusive use of the white citizens of said city, upon the condition subsequent that the city would put said park in a reasonably good condition for said purpose, and keep it so, and that, when said park was neglected by the city for a period longer than 12 months, or ceased to be used as a park, said land was to revert to the grantor or his estate or his heirs. Moss v. Chappell, 126 Ga. 196, 54 S.E. 968, 11 L.R.A. (N. S.) 398; Davis v. Jones, 153 Ga. 639, 112 S.E. 891. In this deed it is expressly provided that the land shall revert to the grantor or his estate, or his heirs, upon breach of the subsequent condition therein contained. While the law inclines to construe conditions subsequent so as to render their breach remediable in damages, rather than by forfeiture, still, where the plain words of the grant declare that a breach of the conditions shall defeat the estate granted, there is no room for construction. Jones v. Williams, 132 Ga. 782, 64 S.E. 1081. Under this deed the city, if it neglected, for a period longer than 12 months, to put this land in a reasonably good condition for a park, and to keep it so, forfeited its title thereto, and the premises reverted to the grantor. The petition in this case alleges a breach of this condition subsequent, and sets forth a cause of action, unless certain contentions of the city are well founded.

2. But it is insisted by the city that the allegations of the petition show that it has prescriptive title to the premises in dispute, and that for this reason the petition should have been dismissed upon the ground of demurrer raising this point. Prescriptive title arising from pedis possessio is not involved, for the reason that the petition does not allege possession in the city for a period of 20 years or more. The only ground then on which prescription can be based is that the petition shows that the city had possession of this land under color of title for a period of 7 years or more. No such prescriptive title is shown, for several reasons. In the first place, the deed under which the city claims passes title, and is not color of title. Color of title implies that it is not valid to pass title. Crowder v. Doe, 162 Ala. 151, 50 So. 230, 136 Am.St.Rep. 17. In the second place if the city could prescribe under this deed, the extent of its title would be no greater than that conveyed by this instrument. Color of title is any writing which defines the extent and character of a claim to land, with parties from whom it may come and to whom it may be made. Beverly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 440, 54 Am.Dec. 351; Field v. Boynton, 33 Ga. 239 (3); ...

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