City of Bay St. Louis v. Hancock County

• Decision Date: 22 December 1919
• Docket Number: 2925
• Citation: 83 So. 276,120 Miss. 873
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF BAY ST. LOUIS v. HANCOCK COUNTY

83 So. 276

120 Miss. 873

CITY OF BAY ST. LOUIS v. HANCOCK COUNTY

No. 2925

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 22, 1919

October 1919

TAXATION. County need not divide taxes with municipality.

A county cannot be compelled to pay to a municipality one-half of a road tax collected on property within the municipality under the provisions of Laws 1910, chapter 150, as amended by Laws 1918, chapter 140, since said act as amended does not so provide.

HON. D M. GRAHAM, Judge.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Hancock county, HON. D. M. GRAHAM Judge.

Proceeding before the board of supervisors by the city of Bay St. Louis against Hancock county. From a judgment on appeal in the circuit court for the defendant, plaintiff appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

Robert L. Genin, for appellant.

Section 4469, Code 1906 (section 7143, Hemingway's Code), as amended by chapter 140, Laws 1918, in part provides "One-half of the ad valorem tax collected on property within a municipality shall be paid over to the treasurer thereof in cases where the streets are worked at the expense of the municipal treasury or worked by municipal authority."

The object and intention of the legislature is plain. Property should not be burdened with taxation without a corresponding benefit and the legislature properly intended, that money collected from the property in the city for roads should be divided, if the county is not assisting in the upkeep, one-half going to the county as the city's pro rata upkeep of the county roads outside of the city and one-half returned to the city as the county's pro rata of the upkeep of the city streets.

It certainly is a fair division when considering that it is only a division of the city taxpayer's money, no contribution or pro rata being paid by the county taxpayers for their use of the city streets.

The county operating under chapter 150, Laws 1920, and amendments has authority to levy taxes for road purposes which was done, but the county contends, that as the provision for the division is contained in section 4469, Code 1906, and amendments, that section limiting only a three mill levy, we are therefore only entitled to one-half of the three mills. In other words the county assumes the attitude of acquiring the right to burden the property in the city with taxes for road purposes under two separate sections of the law, and that the city for the benefit of its streets can only claim a division of taxes for street purposes under one section.

This is a rather selfish attitude, but we must acknowledge the generosity of the county in giving us one-half of the larger amount, when according to their contention they had the option of doing either. They could just as consistently contend that the two levies were made under chapter 150, Laws 1910, and its amendments.

The county operating under these two laws, constitute one system of collecting and disbursing taxes for road purposes in the county and one-half of the ad valorem tax collected for road purposes on property in the city should be paid the city according to the method of disbursement. All statutes relating to the same subject must be taken as one system and construed consistently, if this can be done. Eskridge v. McGruder, 45 Miss. 294. In construing a statute, the entire legislation on the same subject must be taken as one system and construed consistently. Adams v. Railroad Company, 75 Miss. 275, 22 So. 824.

The county working under both laws above referred to, the laws must be considered together as a harmonious whole. When that is done by placing together chapter 177, Laws 1916, and chapter 140, Laws 1918, that provision providing "One-half of the ad valorem tax collected on property within a municipality shall be paid over to the treasurer thereof in cases where the streets are worked at the expense of the municipal treasury, etc.," is conclusive of the city's contention.

In the case of the City of Holly Springs v. Marshall County, 51 So. 703, one of the questions there was whether or not the adoption of the new road system under chapter 150, Laws 1910, by an order of the board of supervisors automatically repealed the old system under section 4469 of the Code and the court held that it did not and this honorable court has since differed with that decision. In the case at bar it is agreed that the order of the board of supervisors is that Hancock county is working under both jointly. Therefore that portion of the opinion of the court on the question of the distribution of the taxes when a county is working under both systems of working roads is the law of the state. In construing the two methods as one system, the court said: "It appears that the ad valorem tax had been levied in the county for 1911, and we see no reason why the provisions of section 4469 should not control its disbursement. We therefore conclude that the city of Holly Springs should have its one-half of all taxes collected on property within the municipality for that year."

I submit to the court that the matter was passed on in the Holly Springs case and that this court is again called on to decide the meaning of the chapter 100 of the Laws of 1910 as amended by chapter 177 of the Laws of 1916 and section 4469, Code 1906 as amended by chapter 140 of the Laws of 1918, construed together, as the laws of collection and disbursement of taxes collected on property in the city for road purposes, where the levy is in excess of three mills, and whether so construing, a municipality should receive one-half of the taxes collected, the municipality receiving the other half from the county.

"A court in construing statutes must give effect to the legislative intent and should look to the spirit and purpose of the statutes." Kennington v. Hemingway, 57 So. 809, 101 Miss. 259, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 541; Annt. Cases 1914B., 392; City of Holly Springs v. Marshall County, supra; Darnell v. Johnson, 69 So. 780.

In addition to our contention that the three mill limitation in section 4469 cannot be taken as a limitation of the basis of settlement with the city, when the county has authority to levy a larger amount under a combined system; we also contend that it cannot be taken as a limitation to levy and in no way applies to Bay St. Louis; that portion of the section reads as follows: "In addition to the commutation tax there shall be an ad valorem tax not to exceed three mills on the dollar in any one year, on all taxable property within such portion of the county so worked."

That provision or limitation does not apply to the city of Bay St. Louis under the agreed statement of facts, because the county does not work or appropriate money for the working of the streets of the city in any way, by contract or otherwise. The provision is repugnant to and in no way possible can it be harmoniously construed with that portion of the section requiring the disbursement of ad valorem taxes to municipalities, for the manifest reason that the limitation is within the territory worked by the county and the disbursement is for the municipal territory not worked or in any way helped by the county.

The county should not be sustained in their contention that we are only entitled to one-half of the limitation of three mills when such limitation no way applied to a municipality. The levy made by the county totaling five mills is valid and they could have levied more. Martin v. Little, 76 So. 142.

We therefore submit to the court in conclusion, that should this honorable court uphold the contention of the county and affirm this case, they could then levy a total of twenty mills and divide it in two levies, a one mill levy and a nineteen mill levy and say to the city, that you only get one-half of the one mill levy, because we only have authority to levy within a limit of three mills by one section of the law and by that section we can only give you one-half of the one mill. We levied the nineteen mills under the other section and under that section we are not authorized to give you one cent for your streets. Could the legislature have intended such jugling of the statutes to the injury of the taxpaying property of a municipality, when considering that the same property of a municipality must necessarily again be taxed by the city authorities for the purpose of maintaining their streets?

There can be no other reasonable construction than that laid down in the Holly Springs case, that where the city works its streets at the expense of its own treasury without assistance from the county, that one-half of the ad valorem tax collected by the county for road purposes must be paid over to the city.

I therefore respectfully submit that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and a judgment entered in this honorable court in favor of the City of Bay St. Louis in the sum of one thousand, three hundred and ninety-three dollars and ninety-seven cents.

E. J. Gex, for appellee.

We will not discuss the facts separately in this case for the reason that the facts are not disputed and the law is based solely on the question of section 4469 of the Code of 1906, so that we might as well discuss it all, law and facts at one time.

The only right that this appellant has to any money whatever is that right given by statute. If our statute does not give it any right it receives what the statute gives, that and no more. We have several systems of working our public roads. In fact three systems. One is the old overseer system; the other is the contract system; and the third method is the county working the road itself. Hancock county decided to work their roads under two systems, that is the contract system, and to work its roads itself; in fact the method actually...