City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson

• Citation: 785 So.2d 1128
• Parties: CITY OF BAYOU LA BATRE v. Vernon ROBINSON.
• Decision Date: 08 December 2000
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

785 So.2d 1128

CITY OF BAYOU LA BATRE v. Vernon ROBINSON.

1990411.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

December 8, 2000.

Jay M. Ross and Brandy B. Osborne of Ross & Jordan, L.L.C., Mobile, for appellant.

John W. Parker, Mobile; and John R. Parker, Mobile, for appellee.

LYONS, Justice.

The City of Bayou La Batre, the defendant in an action pending in the Mobile Circuit Court, appeals from that court's order denying its motion for a summary judgment. This Court permitted the City to appeal. See Rule 5, Ala.R.App.P. The appeal raises two issues: (1) Whether a municipality may be held liable for false imprisonment based on negligent acts of its agent, and (2) whether a magistrate has judicial immunity when recalling an arrest warrant.

I. Factual Background

On April 27, 1997, Bayou La Batre police arrested Vernon Robinson and charged him with public intoxication. On September 2, 1997, he was found guilty of public intoxication, in the Bayou La Batre municipal court, and was ordered to pay a fine of $206. Three days later, Robinson paid $5.50 toward the amount due. Because he made no more payments on the fine, Bayou La Batre magistrate Donna Gainey, on November 18, 1997, issued a notice directing Robinson to show cause for failing to pay the fine. Robinson did not respond to the notice. Magistrate Gainey then issued a warrant for Robinson's arrest and sent the warrant to the Bayou La Batre Police Department.

On January 26, 1998, Robinson paid the remaining balance of his fine, as well as a $50 "contempt charge," and received a receipt that reflected his full payment of the balance due. Because Robinson had paid all the money owed to the City, Magistrate Gainey, on the same day, entered a "warrant-recall order." She then attempted to fax the recall order to the police department. However, she placed the recall order upside down in the fax machine so that she in fact transmitted the back of the order—a blank page—rather than the recall order itself. Magistrate Gainey then attached the recall order to the case action summary sheet and placed it in Robinson's file in her office. She never received the original warrant back from the police.

On the night of February 7, 1998, the Mobile County Sheriff's Department stopped a vehicle in which Robinson was a passenger. A check of Robinson's name through NCIC records¹ revealed an outstanding warrant for his arrest—the Bayou La Batre warrant issued for failure to pay the public-intoxication fine and a related fine on a contempt charge. The sheriff's department contacted the Bayou La Batre Police Department to confirm the existence of the outstanding warrant. When Officer Shane McClain of the Bayou La Batre Police Department looked in the drawer where the department keeps its warrants, he found the warrant for Robinson's arrest. Officer McClain instructed another officer to go to the sheriff's location and pick up Robinson on the warrant. The other officer picked up Robinson; when he was picked up, Robinson protested that he had paid the fine in full and had been issued a receipt. At approximately 2:30 on the morning of February 8, Robinson was brought to the Bayou La Batre jail. Robinson remained there for the next 12 hours. During this time, no one contacted Magistrate Gainey to confirm the status of Robinson's warrant.

Robinson sued Bayou La Batre, alleging false arrest and false imprisonment. On any claim against a municipality, liability cannot be imposed beyond the limitations set forth in § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, which provides:

"No city or town shall be liable for damages for injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or corporation, unless such injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of the municipality engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty ...."

(Emphasis added.) Bayou La Batre contends that the immunity of its agent as a judicial officer shields it from liability. Alternatively, it argues that Robinson's action alleges an intentional tort for which it cannot be liable, because of the provisions of § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975.

II. Municipal Liability for False Imprisonment

We first address the question of a municipality's liability for false imprisonment. This Court at one time held that false-imprisonment claims against a municipality were barred by the doctrine of immunity. Boyette v. City of Mobile, 442 So.2d 61 (Ala.1983). However, Boyette was expressly overruled in Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So.2d 848 (Ala. 1995).² This Court stated in Franklin:

"In reaching this result, we are not altering or modifying any existing cause of action. We merely state that where a plaintiff alleges a factual pattern that demonstrates `neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness' the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-190. Whether the plaintiff's allegations state a cause of action and whether the plaintiff has presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact can be evaluated by the trial court upon proper motion. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim against the city; however, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the claims alleging false arrest and false imprisonment is reversed."

670 So.2d at 852 (emphasis added).

The Legislature has defined "false imprisonment" as follows:

"False imprisonment consists in the unlawful detention of the person of another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty."

§ 6-5-170, Ala.Code 1975. Had the Legislature intended to restrict the tort of false imprisonment to intentional acts, it easily could have chosen words far more specific than the word "unlawful" to characterize the conduct constituting the tort. The allegations of Robinson's complaint relating to the improper use of a fax machine describe conduct that could constitute "neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness." Assuming Robinson can present substantial evidence to support this allegation, we must conclude that to allow his claim to proceed would not violate the municipality's immunity granted pursuant to § 11-47-190.

III. Judicial Immunity for the Act of Recalling a Warrant

We now turn to the extent to which the municipality can escape liability by reason of judicial immunity enjoyed by its magistrate. This Court recognized in Gore v. City of Hoover, 559 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.1990), that, under principles of vicarious liability, where a municipal employee enjoys immunity, the municipality likewise is immune as to claims based on the employee's conduct. While some aspects of Gore were overruled in Franklin, this holding as to immunity was not.³ Broad policy interests support allowing immunity for judges acting within their judicial capacity:

"Since the English common law doctrine of absolute judicial immunity was recognized in the United States, courts have held its application necessary to preserve the system established for the administration of justice and the law. Judicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent and impartial judgment about the merits of a case without apprehension of the personal consequences of exposure to potential damages liability from vexatious and frivolous actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants."

46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 69 (1994) (footnotes omitted).

Judicial immunity does not apply to every act of a judge. "[A] judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)).

"The first step is to determine whether the judge acted in an official capacity. Assuming the action was official, a determination must be made concerning the particular function being performed by the judge when the disputed action takes place. In this regard, a judge may perform either a judicial, legislative or executive function. When a judge performs an executive role, the Supreme Court held, he or she may or may not have immunity depending upon which phase of the executive role is being performed. The Supreme Court defined two phases of the executive role—the ministerial phase and the prosecutorial phase. Ministerial actions include daily administrative activities and personnel decisions. Prosecutorial activities occur primarily when a judge participates in decisions involving the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, such as deciding whether to bring a criminal charge against a defendant. There is no immunity when a judge acts in a ministerial phase."

Cronovich v. Dunn, 573 F.Supp. 1330, 1336 (E.D.Mich.1983) (citing Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980)) (holding that the justices on the Virginia Supreme Court were immune from suit because they had exercised a legislative, rather than an executive, function when promulgating rules that restricted advertising by attorneys in the state). In Cronovich, the court found that various acts of sex discrimination charged against the judicial defendants would have been performed by the "defendants in the ministerial phase of their executive roles"—thus, the defendants were not entitled to judicial immunity. 573 F.Supp. at 1337. See, also, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) ("[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a `judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself."). A judge acting in his or her judicial capacity must enjoy freedom from risk of a lawsuit, lest the administration of justice be inhibited by fear of personal liability. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980).

This Court has extended the...