City of Bellevue v. Acrey

• Decision Date: 06 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 50510-1,50510-1
• Citation: 691 P.2d 957,103 Wn.2d 203
• Parties: CITY OF BELLEVUE, Respondent, v. Maurice C. ACREY and Cynthia Lynn Bandle, Petitioners.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 203

103 Wn.2d 203

691 P.2d 957

CITY OF BELLEVUE, Respondent, v. Maurice C. ACREY and Cynthia Lynn Bandle, Petitioners.

No. 50510-1.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Dec. 6, 1984.

Rigby & Jones, Bradley Jones, Seattle, for petitioners.

Dick Andrews, Bellevue City Atty., Susan Irwin, Scott C. McKee, Asst. City Attys., Bellevue, for respondent.

PEARSON, Justice.

This case requires us to decide whether a These two consolidated cases arose from the same set of facts. Petitioners Acrey and Bandle were involved in a car accident in November 1981 when their car collided with a second vehicle. Petitioners gave false information to the investigating officer at the scene of the accident. As a result, they were subsequently cited for the misdemeanor of obstructing a public officer under Bellevue City Code 10.16.030. That ordinance provides:

                criminal defendant effectively waives his rights to trial by jury and to counsel where, being fully aware of those rights, he proceeds through trial without an attorney and without a request for a jury.   We hold that such inaction by a defendant, without an express waiver on the record, does not rise to the level of a knowing and intelligent waiver of these important constitutional rights
                

It is unlawful for any person to make any wilfully untrue, misleading or exaggerated statement, or to wilfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer in the discharge of his official powers or duties.

Both petitioners appeared for arraignment on January 12, 1982, in Bellevue District Court, without counsel. The judge read the "Statement of Rights of Accused Persons" form to all defendants in the room. That form itemizes nine specific rights that defendants have; included are the rights to jury trial and to counsel. The form states that a public defender will be appointed at no cost if defendant cannot afford a lawyer. The phone number and address of the public defender is prominently displayed on the form. Nowhere on the form is there a statement of waiver of any right.

The arraignment judge called the petitioners individually to the bench. The following colloquies occurred:

COURT: Maurice Acrey. (pause) Mr. Acrey, do you feel you understand your rights in this court?

ACREY: Yes.

COURT: Any questions you'd like to ask me about?

ACREY: No.

COURT: You're charged with two offenses; first is Obstructing a Police Officer. Do you feel you ACREY: I don't know the nature of the charge, of the specifics, I know what the charge means.

understand the nature of that charge?

COURT: O.K. Are you prepared to enter a plea at this point?

ACREY: Yes, not guilty.

COURT: Ms. Bandle, do you feel you understand your rights in this Court?

BANDLE: Yes.

COURT: Any questions you'd like to ask me about those rights?

BANDLE: No.

COURT: You're charged with Obstructing a Public Officer also on the 21st of November, 1981. Do you feel you understand what the nature of the charge is?

BANDLE: Yes.

COURT: Are you prepared to enter a plea to that charge?

BANDLE: Yes, not guilty.

COURT: Do you have any questions about any of that?

BANDLE: No.

No further pertinent discussion occurred between the judge and petitioners. Petitioners signed the "Rights Form" and received a copy; however, neither petitioner signed a waiver of any right.

The petitioners appeared for trial in Bellevue District Court, again without counsel, on April 8, 1982. The trial judge called petitioners to the defense table, asked if there was any reason the two cases could not be tried together, and instructed the prosecution to call its first witness. The judge did not comment on the absence of counsel for petitioners, nor did he inform petitioners of the possible penalties for obstructing a public officer. Likewise, the judge did not question petitioners regarding their desire for a jury trial, nor their lack of request for a jury.

A bench trial resulted in the convictions of both petitioners and each petitioner was sentenced to the maximum 90 days in jail, with all but 10 days suspended.

Petitioners, having secured counsel prior to sentencing, appealed those convictions to the Superior Court; the convictions Petitioners raised the issues of jury and counsel waiver for the first time at the Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the convictions, holding that such waiver could be implied from petitioners' actions: "Standing trial without counsel or a jury under the circumstances of this case is an affirmative act ... which we treat as the equivalent of a verbal expression of waiver." Bellevue v. Acrey, 37 Wash.App. 57, 66, 678 P.2d 1289 (1984).

were affirmed.

I Waiver of Jury Trial

The holding of the Court of Appeals, that a waiver of jury may be imputed to a defendant based on his actions, is not supported by law. In Washington, every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial, even when charged with a misdemeanor. Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87, 653 P.2d 618 (1982). A waiver of that right must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v. Forza, 70 Wash.2d 69, 422 P.2d 475 (1966). Additionally, a court must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental rights. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

This court has expressed its opinion regarding jury waiver in several recent cases; these cases control the decision in the present case. In each case, we have refused to infer a waiver when the record shows less than an affirmative, unequivocal waiver by defendant. Accordingly, we do not find a valid waiver in the present case. Although petitioners were fully aware of the right to a jury, the record fails to show an express waiver of that right by petitioners.

In State v. Wicke, 91 Wash.2d 638, 591 P.2d 452 (1979), this court refused to find that the defendant had effectively waived a jury trial. There, the defendant appeared in court with his attorney; the attorney orally waived a jury trial. The defendant did not sign a written waiver, nor did the trial judge ask him whether he concurred in counsel's waiver. This court held that a waiver of jury must be Implied waivers were again found to be inadequate by this court in Seattle v. Crumrine, 98 Wash.2d 62, 653 P.2d 605 (1982). The defendant in Crumrine had an attorney and waived arraignment; he did not request a jury trial and was convicted by the trial judge. Crumrine argued on appeal that his conviction must be reversed because no affirmative waiver of jury trial appeared on the record. This court agreed, stating, "the only indication that the petitioner waived his right to a jury trial was his failure to demand one. That is not sufficient to meet constitutional requirements." Crumrine, at 65, 653 P.2d 605.

expressly made, by defendant, on the record.

The present case is indistinguishable from Wicke and Crumrine. In fact, the present case presents less evidence of knowing and intelligent jury waiver than those precedents; significantly, petitioners here did not have the benefit of counsel as did Wicke and Crumrine.

Finally, this court's most recent case on jury waiver again indicates our strong resistance to implied waiver of jury trial. In Seattle v. Williams, 101 Wash.2d 445, 680 P.2d 1051 (1984), this court stated that any conditional waiver of jury undertaken at arraignment must be written. Where a defendant is demonstrably aware of the constitutional right to a jury and has expressly waived that right in writing, the waiver will be effective. The written waiver requirement of Williams thus eliminates implied waiver of jury.

However, the Williams written waiver rule cannot resolve the present case, as the events in this case arose before Williams was decided. We therefore hold that in a pre-Williams case an express waiver, either oral or written, and made by the defendant, must appear on the record to establish a valid jury waiver. This holding applies only to the present case and to other pre-Williams cases that are currently in the process of appeal.

II Waiver of Counsel

A waiver of counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and In Faretta, the Court articulated the test for valid waiver of counsel:

                intelligent, as with any waiver of constitutional rights.   Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).   If counsel is properly waived, a criminal defendant has a right to self-representation.   Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10);  U.S. Const. amend. 6;   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)
                

Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. [269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 241, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) ].

(Italics ours.) Faretta, at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Faretta test as dicta. Bellevue v. Acrey, 37 Wash.App. at 67, 678 P.2d 1289. That interpretation of Faretta cannot stand. The waiver test articulated by the Faretta Court was necessary to its ultimate holding that Faretta made a valid waiver of counsel. The Court examined the record and applied the test, finding that the trial judge had adequately warned Faretta of the "dangers and disadvantages" of self-representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808 n. 2, 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2527 n. 2, 2541.

The federal circuit courts interpret Faretta in two ways. A number of the circuits require a colloquy on the record between the judge and defendant whereby the judge informs the defendant of the risks of self-representation. The colloquy must show that the trial judge advised defendant in unequivocal terms of the technical problems he may encounter in self-representation, United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir.1982), or that the...