City of Biddeford v. Holland
Decision Date | 09 December 2005 |
Citation | 2005 ME 121,886 A.2d 1281 |
Parties | CITY OF BIDDEFORD v. Rory HOLLAND. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Keith R. Jacques, Esq. (orally), Smith Elliott Smith & Garmey, P.A., Saco, for plaintiff.
Stephen C. Whiting, Esq., Jennifer A. Carey, Esq. (orally), The Whiting Law Firm, P.A., Portland, for defendant.
Panel: CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.
[¶ 1] Rory Holland appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, Crowley, J.) dismissing his notice of appeal and demand for a jury trial de novo following a bench trial in the District Court (Biddeford, Brennan, J.) in a land use enforcement action brought by the City of Biddeford pursuant to 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4452 (1996 & Supp.2004) and M.R. Civ. P 80K. Holland argues that he has the right to a jury trial de novo in the Superior Court because he has the constitutional right to a jury trial and he could not have removed this case to the Superior Court and received a jury trial prior to judgment in the District Court. Although we disagree with Holland that he has the right to a jury trial de novo, we agree that he has the constitutional right to a jury trial. Because we hold that the procedure for receiving a jury trial for defendants like Holland has, prior to now, not been clear, we vacate the decision of the District Court denying Holland's initial request for removal and remand to that court to allow Holland time to comply with M.R. Civ. P. 76C.
[¶ 2] This case began when the City filed a land use complaint against Holland in the District Court seeking injunctive relief, fines, and attorney fees. The City alleged that Holland, the owner of rental property located in Biddeford, violated certain local codes by renting an apartment without a valid occupancy permit and by deactivating power to his tenants' apartment. Before Holland answered the City's complaint, the City withdrew its motion for injunctive relief, but it continued to seek civil penalties.
[¶ 3] Thereafter, Holland, representing himself, filed an answer and motion to continue pending removal to the Superior Court. The District Court (Douglas, J.) denied Holland's request for removal "[t]o the extent that this is a request for removal under Rule 76C."1 Specifically, the court found Holland's request to be incomplete and untimely pursuant to Rule 76C(a) because he did not tender payment of the removal fee with the removal request. [¶ 4] Prior to trial in the District Court, that court denied Holland's further motion for removal to the Superior Court. The court subsequently entered judgment against Holland, finding that the City had established that Holland violated two City ordinances. The court imposed the minimum penalty on Holland and also ordered him to pay the City's attorney fees.
[¶ 5] Following judgment, Holland filed in the District Court a notice of appeal and demand for a jury trial de novo together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. The Superior Court dismissed Holland's appeal, concluding that it was without jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a Rule 80K action. The court also denied Holland's request for a jury trial de novo, concluding that there is no such procedure for Rule 80K actions. This appeal followed.
[¶ 6] Holland contends that, notwithstanding his attempts to remove this matter to the Superior Court, that court was not authorized to hear this action prior to a decision in the District Court because 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4452 "clearly indicates" that actions brought pursuant to it must be litigated in the District Court. Holland also argues that only after a decision of the District Court may the Superior Court conduct a jury trial—a jury trial de novo—pursuant to either its general jurisdictional grant contained in 4 M.R.S.A. § 105 (Supp.2004), or out of necessity to avail him of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Holland further asserts that because Rule 80K provides a comprehensive scheme for the expeditious handling of land use enforcement actions in the District Court, this scheme would be frustrated if removal were allowed prior to judgment in the District Court. The authority of the Superior Court is a matter of law that we review de novo. Cf. In re Cyr, 2005 ME 61, ¶ 11, 873 A.2d 355, 359 ( ).
[¶ 7] We are not persuaded by Holland's arguments. Holland relies on the following language to support his first assertion:
30-A M.R.S.A. § 4452(1)(C) (1996) (emphasis added). Contrary to Holland's argument, the highlighted language in section 4452(1)(C) cannot be construed to mean that land use enforcement actions must be litigated in the District Court. The clear import of this language is that a municipal official may, when specifically authorized by the municipality, represent the municipality in District Court if such an action has been brought in District Court. See M.R. Civ. P. 80K(h) ( )(emphasis added). This subsection does not divest the Superior Court of jurisdiction because it neither says anything about the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to hear a land use enforcement action, nor does it vest exclusive jurisdiction in the District Court.
[¶ 8] Holland points to no other rule of law, and we know of none, that would divest the Superior Court of jurisdiction. The Superior Court possesses jurisdiction in cases not confined to the exclusive jurisdiction of either the District Court or the Law Court. See 4 M.R.S.A. § 105; Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d 441, 443 n. 1 (Me.1986) (). Because there is no exception to Superior Court jurisdiction for such actions, the Superior Court could have exercised jurisdiction under its general jurisdictional grant in 4 M.R.S.A. § 105. Therefore, we reject Holland's contention that the Superior Court could not have entertained this case prior to a decision of the District Court.
[¶ 9] We likewise find unpersuasive Holland's argument that the Superior Court should not be allowed to entertain a section 4452 action because it would frustrate Rule 80K's enforcement scheme for the expeditious handling of land use enforcement actions. Although Holland's concerns for trial expedience may have some justification, his argument ultimately misconceives the nature of Rule 80K. Simply stated, Rule 80K is a rule providing a summary procedure for the enforcement of land use laws and ordinances in the District Court. M.R. Civ. P. 80K. Although Rule 80K, by its terms, applies only to proceedings in the District Court, its existence does not limit the continuing jurisdiction possessed by the Superior Court. Cf. Inhabitants of the Town of Boothbay Harbor v. Russell, 410 A.2d 554, 558 (Me. 1980) ( ).
[¶ 10] Holland next asserts that he has the constitutional right to a jury trial in this case because the City was seeking a civil penalty. We agree. See City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669, 671 (Me. 1987) (). Consequently, we now turn to how a defendant like Holland may invoke his right to a jury trial when a section 4452 action has been filed in District Court pursuant to Rule 80K.
[¶ 11] As noted above, Rule 80K applies only to "proceedings in the District Court involving alleged violations of land use laws and ordinances." M.R. Civ. P. 80K(a). Rule 80K contains no provision for how a defendant in a land use enforcement action may remove that matter to the Superior Court for a jury trial.
[¶ 12] Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 76C(a) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in these rules, a defendant or any other party to a civil action or proceeding in the District Court may remove that action to the Superior Court for [a] jury trial." However, Rule 76C does not reference Rule 80K. The 1991 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 76C does contemplate that "Rule 76C(a) is intended to make clear that the removal rule applies to all civil actions and proceedings in the District Court, including civil violation proceedings under Rule 80K." M.R. Civ. P. 76C Advisory Committee's Note to 1991 amend., Me. Rptr., 576-588 A.2d XLV. Yet, nothing in the text of either Rule 80K or Rule 76C make clear this intent.
[¶ 13] Indeed, the provisions of Rule 80K and Rule 76C, when read together, are unclear as to whether Rule 76C applies to Rule 80K proceedings. Rule 80K makes no provision for a written answer, M.R. Civ. P. 80K(e)(1), and, pursuant to Rule 76C(a), a party's notice of removal must be filed "within the time for serving the answer or reply." Although Rule 80K(e)(1)'s oral answer requirement and the written notice of removal filing of Rule...
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