City of Boston v. Lynch

• Decision Date: 08 November 1939
• Citation: 23 N.E.2d 466,304 Mass. 272
• Parties: CITY OF BOSTON v. LYNCH et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

304 Mass. 272

23 N.E.2d 466

CITY OF BOSTON

v.LYNCH et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Nov. 8, 1939.

Proceeding by the City of Boston against Maurice B. Lynch and others to foreclose rights of redemption under tax titles acquired by petitioner. From a decision of the Land Court that the titles were valid, respondents appeal.

Affirmed.Appeal from Land Court, Suffolk County; Corbett, Judge.

M. B. Lynch, of Boston, for appellants.

S. S. Dennis, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Boston, and Charles E. Frazier, Jr., of Welfleet, for appellee.

LUMMUS, Justice.

This is a petition to foreclose rights of redemption under tax titles acquired by the petitioner in 1932 G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 60, § 65, as amended by St. 1933, c. 325, § 12 and St. 1938, c. 305. In general the practice in such a proceeding conforms to the practice in land registration. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 60, § 75, as amended by St. 1936, c. 189, § 1. The respondents, claiming an interest in the land, contested the validity of the tax titles, and claimed an appeal from a decision that the tax titles were valid. The decision expressly failed to deal with an offer by a mortgagee to redeem from the tax title as to one parcel. ‘Questions of law arising in the land court on any decision or decree may be taken by any party aggrieved directly to the supreme judicial court for revision in the same manner in which questions of law are taken to that court from the superior court.’ G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 185, § 15. An appeal by a party aggrieved ‘by any order decisive of the case founded upon matter of law apparent on the record’ is thus made possible. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, §§ 96, 142. Such an appeal raises only questions of law, but the facts stated in the decision of the Land Court are generally deemed part of the record. Sheehan Construction Co. v. Dudley, Mass., 12 N.E.2d 180;McCarthy v. Lane, Mass., 16 N.E.2d 683. The statute (section 96) provides that ‘no appeal * * * shall be entered in the supreme judicial court until the case is in all other respects ripe for final disposition by the superior [on this case, land] court.’ That states the general rule of appellate practice. But where within one proceeding there are separable controversies wholly independent of each other, an appeal in one need not await the determination of the other. Each is a ‘case’ within the statute. Fuller v. Chapin, 165 Mass. 1, 42 N.E. 115;Joyce v. Dyer, 189 Mass. 64, 75 N.E. 81,109 Am.St.Rep. 603;Kingsley v. Fall River, 280 Mass. 395, 399, 400, 182 N.E. 841, and cases cited. In this instance the question of redemption could hardly be dealt with until the validity of the tax titles had been determined. Lexington v. Ryder, Mass., 6 N.E.2d 828. The appeal is properly before us.

The taxes for the year 1919 on the three adjoining lots in Boston involved in this case, were assessed, according to the recitals of the subsequent tax deeds, to ‘Charles J. Lynch, heirs or devisees.’ That meant, we think, the heirs or devisees of Charles J. Lynch. Although it appeared from the probate records that Charles J. Lynch died intestate and that his heirs were Annie M. Lynch, Maude A. Lynch and Maurice B. Lynch, we think that the assessment in the disjunctive or alternative was authorized by St.1909, c. 490, Part I, § 21, and G.L.1921, c. 59, § 16. Nothing to the contrary is decided by Tobin v. Gillespie, 152 Mass. 219, 25 N.E. 88, or Conners v. Lowell, 209 Mass. 111, 119, 95 N.E. 412, Ann.Cas.1912B, 627. See now St. 1937, c. 114. The tax deeds under that assessment properly recited a demand upon Maurice B. Lynch, one of the heirs. G.L. 1921, c. 60, §§ 16, 45. Conners v. Lowell, 209 Mass. 111, 118, 95 N.E. 412, Ann.Cas.1912B, 627. It is immaterial that the notice of sale recited a demand upon a different person, even though that notice was included in the affidavit recorded under authority of law in the registry of deeds (G.L. 1921, c. 60, § 57; Southworth v. Edmands, 152 Mass. 203, 208, 25 N.E. 106,9 L.R.A. 118), for we are concerned, as will appear, only with the validity of the tax deeds on their faces. Moreover, the recital in the notice of demand upon another person is not inconsistent with the recital in the deed of demand upon Maurice B. Lynch. We need not have recourse to the last sentence of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 60, § 37, which has bee in our statutes ever since St. 1915, c. 237, § 17. See Fall River v. Conanicut Mills, 294 Mass. 98, 99, 100, 1 N.E.2d 36;Springfield v. Hotel Charles Co., 1 Cir., 84 F.2d 589, 591.

The purchaser at the sale for the taxes of 1919, held in 1921, was Harry P. Chadwick of Boston. Tax deeds were given to him, and were duly recorded. The respondents, heirs of Charles J. Lynch, contend that these deeds were invalid upon their faces. The description of the grantee Chadwick as of Boston was a sufficient statement of his residence under G.L. 1921, c. 60, § 45. Nothing more was stated in the deed in Charland v. Trustees of Home for Aged Women in City of Worcester, 204 Mass. 563, 91 N.E. 146,134 Am.St.Rep. 696, cited by the respondents. The descriptions of the lots, though meagre, were not insufficient on their faces. A person visiting the streets and numbers stated would find there lots containing the number of square feet stated. ‘Whether land is identified by a description is commonly and in the case at bar a question of fact’ (Springfield v. Arcade Malleable Iron Co., 285 Mass. 154, 155, 156, 188 N.E. 639, 640), and here any question of fact has been determined in favor of the petitioner. Other alleged defects in the proceedings do not disturb the fact that the deeds to Chadwick were not invalid on their faces.

That being so, the tax for 1931 was properly assessed to Chadwick as owner, whether the tax titles held by him were valid or not. ‘The statute does not put upon the assessors the burden of inquiring into the validity of titles which...