City of Boston v. City of Chelsea

• Decision Date: 24 May 1912
• Citation: 212 Mass. 127,98 N.E. 620
• Parties: CITY OF BOSTON v. CITY OF CHELSEA et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

212 Mass. 127

98 N.E. 620

CITY OF BOSTON v. CITY OF CHELSEA et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 24, 1912

COUNSEL

Joseph

J. Corbett, of Boston, for petitioner.

Samuel R. Cutler and Harry W. James, both of Boston, for respondents.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

Article 30 of the Bill of Rights of our Constitution provides that 'In the government of this commonwealth the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.' It has been decided many times that the Legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws conferred upon it by a Constitution sharply separating the three departments of government. Wyeth v Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474-481, 86 N.E 925, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147; Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 241-247, 89 N.E. 245, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1168; Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598-600, 66 N.E. 607; Opinion of Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N.E. 488, 23 L. R. A. 113; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214-220. When the attempt is to confer the power to make laws upon one of the other two departments of government, there is encountered the double prohibition of the Constitution against delegation of the law-making powers by the legislative, and against the exercise of that power by the coordinate departments. It applies as strongly to the one as to the other. It is operative in equal degree upon the judicial and upon the other two departments of government. Case of Supervisors of Elections, 114 Mass. 247, 19 Am. Rep. 341. The question is whether Resolves of 1910, c. 109, as amended by chapter 482 of the Acts of 1911, violates this article of the Constitution by imposing a law-making power upon the judicial department. In substance, the act requires the Supreme Judicial Court upon application either by Boston, Chelsea, Revere, or Winthrop (which municipalities constitute the county of Suffolk) to appoint commissioners who after hearing shall 'consider and report upon such an adjustment and apportionment, if any, of the expenses of the county of Suffolk, and the proportion thereof, if any, that should fairly be borne by said municipalities of Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop, as they may deem to be just and practicable. '* * * Said commission * * * shall return their decision to the Supreme Judicial Court at such time as the court may order, and the decree of said court confirming the decision shall be final and binding.' R. L. c. 20, § 7, provides that the city of Boston shall furnish all necessary public buildings and pay all charges of the county of Suffolk with comparatively insignificant exceptions, while St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 1, § 52, expressly exempts the other municipalities of that county from all county taxes. Counties in Massachusetts are territorial subdivisions of the state bounded and organized by the Legislature for political purposes and the administration of government. They may be changed at the will of the Legislature, and the character and extent of the sovereign powers to be exercised through them are subject to modification in like manner, according to legislative judgment of the requirement of the interests of the public. Opinion of Justices, 6 Cush. 578. Manifestly the determination of the functions of counties and the distribution of governmental authority among them is purely legislative in its nature. It partakes in no respect of the characteristics of judicial proceedings or determinations. The administration of county affairs and the division of county expenses in every revision of the body of our Statutes has been the subject of one or more chapters. The payment of the expenses of the county of Suffolk by the city of Boston has been required by legislative provision since St. 1821, c. 109.

Analysis of the terms of the statute now under consideration shows that it contains no decision by the Legislature touching the division of expenses of Suffolk county among its constituent cities and towns, and that it does not disclose a determination to change the existing law upon the subject. It requires an examination into the matter by a commission appointed by the Supreme Judicial Court. The only rule prescribed for their guidance is that they shall report such apportionment of the county expenses, if any, as they think should fairly be borne by the other municipalities as matter of justice and feasibility. The fullest discretion is vested in the commission to report in favor of a continuance of the present plan or any modification of it, which in view of practical and equitable considerations in fairness seems to them wise. The commission is not required to report to the Legislature in order that it may act in the light of the recommendations and reasoning...