City of Boston v. Boston Port Development Co.
| Decision Date | 06 January 1941 |
| Citation | 30 N.E.2d 896,308 Mass. 72 |
| Parties | CITY OF BOSTON v. BOSTON PORT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
October 9, 1940.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, DOLAN COX, & RONAN, JJ.
Tax, On real estate: assessment, demand, sale, flats; Exemption. Flats. Evidence, Letter.
Evidence that a collector of taxes mailed, postage prepaid with a return address on the envelope, a demand addressed to the taxpayer a corporation, care of its treasurer, at a street address which was not that of the corporation but was a mailing address of persons who were its treasurer and directors, and that the letter was not returned to the collector, and an affidavit by the collector under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c.
60, Section 1 warranted inferences that the demand actually was received by the taxpayer and that the inaccuracy in the address was not substantial nor misleading; and, under Section 37, a tax title based on such demand was not invalid because of the inaccuracy.
Evidence did not show that a separate assessment of several parcels, some of them flats, resulting from the assessors' subdividing a tract of land in accordance with a plan on file in their office, was arbitrary or invalid.
Descriptions, with references to plans, of certain of many parcels of land of a taxpayer included in a published notice of a tax sale could not be said to be insufficient in the circumstances.
Flats, except certain flats of the Commonwealth, are not exempt from taxation.
PETITION, filed in the Land Court on December 9, 1938, to foreclose rights of redemption from tax titles.
The case was heard by Fenton, J.
H. H. Ham, (K.
L. Pease with him,) for the respondent.
S. S. Dennis Assistant Corporation Counsel, (M.
Corman with him,) for the petitioner.
This is a petition to foreclose rights of redemption under certain tax titles, acquired by the petitioner in 1934, for nonpayment of the real estate taxes assessed for the year 1932 on ten parcels of real estate, of which the respondent was then and is now the owner of record. The case comes before us on the appeal of the respondent from the decision of the judge in which he ruled that the tax titles are valid, and ordered that the case stand for further hearing on the matter or redemption.
The first ground upon which the respondent bases its contentions that the tax titles involved are not valid is that no proper demand was made as required by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, Section 16. The material facts found by the judge which bear on this subject matter are these: The lands involved were acquired from the East Boston Company in 1928. In that year the East Boston Development Company was formed but almost immediately thereafter its name was changed to Boston Port Development Company. The address of the respondent and of its treasurer Charles H. Gifford, for the year 1933 was "1 Court Street, Boston, Mass." Gifford was also a director of the East Boston Company whose address during that year was "89 Broad Street, Boston, Mass." The demand for payment of the amount due on the ten parcels of land was sent out by mail on July 3, 1933, by the then acting deputy collector, now chief deputy collector, of taxes for the city of Boston (John J. Connors), in a "window envelope" bearing a return address to which the demand, if undelivered, would be returned. A single demand for the ten parcels with the total amount due for all the parcels stated on its face and a statement of the amount due on each individual parcel set forth on its back, was mailed addressed to "Boston Port Development Company, c/o Charles H. Gifford, President, 89 Broad Street, Boston, Mass." This address was obtained from a card which was on file in the tax collector's office bearing the notation, "East Boston Co., c/o Chas. H. Gifford, Pres., 89 Broad, Room 722" (Exhibit 2A). There was another card on file there which had at the top the notation "East Boston Co., Jos. Weeks, 16 State St." and below, opposite
1929, the words "East Boston Development Co." written in ink in the first column, and in the next column, above these words, "90 Ames Bldg., Court St., Charles H. Gifford, treas.," Written in pencil (Exhibit 2B). The address "90 Ames Bldg., Court St." is in fact 1 Court Street. These cards were the only sources of information for the addresses on file in the collector's office, and there was no record there that showed the change of name from East Boston Development Company to Boston Port Development Company or any card bearing the name of Boston Port Development Company, nor was there any information sent to the collector's office concerning the change of name. The usual practice in the collector's office if a demand came back as undelivered was to make a notation in the demand book, "by posting and mailing copy postpaid addressed to Boston, Mass.," and where a demand did not come back to make a notation in the demand book, as there was in this case, "by mail postpaid to place of business."
If the envelope containing the demand was not delivered, it would have been returned to Connors. It was not returned to him, and, accordingly, he prepared the information with reference to mailing the demand for the affidavit of another deputy collector. This affidavit in turn became the basis for that of the collector. In each affidavit it is stated that demand was made by mailing postpaid as hereinbefore set forth. The collector knew that the address of the respondent was "1 Court Street, Boston."
The judge further found that the demand was not returned to the tax collector, and inferred and found that it was received by Gifford "who had charge of paying the taxes" of the respondent, "that when he received it he knew it was a demand on the . . . [respondent] for the payment of taxes assessed to it; that . . . [the respondent] was not substantially harmed or misled," and ruled that the error or irregularity in the demand did not invalidate the tax titles.
The respondent contends that this conclusion of the judge is plainly inconsistent with the subsidiary facts found by him. We do not sustain this contention. The appeal brings before us only questions of law apparent on the record. Findings of fact cannot be revised and must be accepted as true. If, upon all the facts thus displayed and the reasonable inferences of which they are susceptible, the ultimate finding is justified as matter of law, it must stand. Horowitz v. Peoples Savings Bank, 307 Mass. 222 . It is true that there was an irregularity in the service of the demand. Under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, Section 16 (see now St. 1933, c. 168, Section 1; c. 254, Section 51), it is required that the demand be made by the collector by mailing it "to the last or usual place of business or abode, or to the address best known to him." But under Section 37 it is provided in part that "No tax title shall be held to be invalid by reason of any errors or irregularities in the proceedings of the collector which are neither substantial nor misleading," and by Section 1 it is provided that "The affidavit of the collector . . . [or] deputy collector . . . serving the . . . demand . . . shall be kept on file in the office of the collector, and shall be prima facie evidence that the same was so served." It has been held that where a letter irregularly addressed could be found to have been received by the proper person, that is sufficient. Lynn v. Lynn Commercial Realty Co. 286 Mass. 368 , 370. Kenney v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co. 306 Mass. 282 , 285. See also Fall River v. Conanicut Mills, 294 Mass. 98 , 99, 100. The placing of the notice of demand in the mail is prima facie evidence that it was received by the addressee. Kenney v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co. 306 Mass. 282 , 285. In the instant case the envelope containing the demand was not returned to the collector. The address 89 Broad Street, as found by the judge, was that of the East Boston Company, of which Gifford was a director. Three directors of the respondent also had addresses there when the demand was mailed. In all the circumstances we think that it cannot be said as matter of law that the inference drawn by the judge that the demand was in fact received by the respondent's treasurer was not a reasonable inference from the facts found, or that his finding that the respondent was not substantially harmed or misled by the irregularity in the demand, is error of law apparent on the record.
The next ground of objection relied upon by the respondent is that the assessment of the taxes was invalid because of improper and arbitrary subdivisions of land by the assessors in connection with parcels 1 to 8 inclusive. The contention of the respondent in this respect is in effect that the assessors were without authority to make the subdivision in accordance with a set of plans on file in their office, by which the respondent argues it was not bound.
The parcels of land involved are part of a large tract of land owned by the respondent. Parcels 1, 2 and 3 lie below high water mark and are classed as flats. The assessors in making all assessments for taxes for the year 1906 and in all subsequent years, with reference to lots 1 to 8 inclusive, followed the descriptions shown on a plan denoted in the assessments as the "E. W Adams" plan on file in the assessors' office. A set of plans was and is on file in the assessors' office entitled "East Boston Company, Edward P. Adams, C.E.," on which may be found parcels 1 to 8 inclusive. The other two parcels may be found on a plan of Parkway lands owned by the East Boston Company by F. O. Whitney, C.E., which is recorded with Suffolk County registry of deeds. A letter of E. P. Adams attached to the Adams plan, addressed to an assessor, was received in evidence to...
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