City of Boulder v. Niles

• Decision Date: 24 December 1886
• Parties: CITY OF BOULDER v. NILES.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

12 P. 632

9 Colo. 415

CITY OF BOULDER v. NILES.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December 24, 1886

Appeal from district court, Boulder county.

This action was brought in the court below by the appellee, Niles against the defendant city to recover damages for injuries resulting from a fall upon snow and ice accumulated upon defendant's sidewalk. The accident happened to the plaintiff upon the evening of the sixth of February, while walking, after dark, upon Pine street. The obstruction upon which the plaintiff slipped and fell was an accumulation of snow and ice forming a ridge near the center of the sidewalk according to the testimony of the plaintiff, nearly a foot in height, oval in shape, and about two feet wide at the base and extended for quite a distance along the center of the sidewalk. Upon either side of the ridge the sidewalk had been cleared from the snow and ice by the witness Temple, the owner of the abutting premises. According to the testimony of a number of other witnesses, the ridge was not more than three or four inches in height. It was the bottom of an original path trodden in the snow after the storm, and took the shape of a ridge, or, as some witnesses call it, 'a core,' after the snow on either side had been removed. While the plaintiff knew generally of the slippery and unsafe condition of the streets and sidewalks resulting from the snow-storm, he denied all knowledge of the particular obstruction on which he slipped and fell. He appears to have been walking at an ordinary pace, and says he was looking ahead of him at the sidewalk, but did not see the obstruction. His injuries were such as to incapacitate him for work for several months, and to cause him great suffering and pain. The snow-storm commenced on the thirtieth of January, and lasted three days. The snow fell to a depth of about two and one-half feet. The testimony of the street commissioner of the defendant city, showing the heavy snow-fall, and the general condition of the streets and sidewalks, and want of notice of the obstruction which caused the injury, is given in the opinion of the court.

The fourth and fifth instructions, to which the opinion of the court refers, are as follows:

' Fourth. The court instructs you that, if the jury believe from the evidence that on or about the sixth or seventh of February, 1883, there was an obstruction on the sidewalk on Pine street, at or near the place alleged by plaintiff, and that the plaintiff, in walking on said sidewalk, stumbled over said obstruction, and fell, without fault or negligence on his part, and was injured by reason thereof, and was thereby crippled or injured, not knowing that said obstruction was there at the time, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in damages for the full amount of all the injuries plaintiff has proven he has sustained thereby.

' Fifth. That, if the jury believe from the evidence, the plaintiff has been injured in person, arising from the negligence of defendant, by not removing any obstruction on the sidewalk which plaintiff may have proven was on it at the time the injury was sustained, the jury have the right to take into consideration, as compensation therefor, the loss of time plaintiff has sustained by his inability to labor, his doctor bills, expenses for medicines, and expenses incurred, if any, for services for nursing and attention, and for the pain and suffering in mind and body which the plaintiff may have proven he endured. It is also the duty of the jury to take into consideration any permanent disability the plaintiff may have proven he received, and his diminution of power to earn money in the future.'

The jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $650.

In an action against a city to recover damages for a personal injury received by the plaintiff by falling on the defendant's sidewalk, owing to the negligence of defendant in not removing ice and snow which had formed a ridge thereon, the question whether the defendant should have known of such obstruction, and removed it, is one for the jury to determine from all the circumstances,--the extent of the snowfall, condition of the weather thereafter, amount of travel on the street, and the lapse of time between the snowfall and the accident.

O. F. A. Greene, for appellant.

G. Berkley, M. B. Camplin, and E. B. Kellogg, for appellee.

ELBERT J.

The subject of the implied liability of municipal corporations in civil actions, for misconduct or negligence on their part, or on the part of their officers, in respect to corporate duties resulting in injuries to individuals, is very fully and ably discussed by Chief Justice BECK in the case of City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 339; S.C. 3 P. 705. The conclusion reached is as follows: 'The general current of authority supports the view that when municipal corporations are invested with exclusive authority and control over the streets and bridges within their corporate limits, with ample power of raising money for their construction, improvement, and repair, a duty arises to the public, from the nature of the powers granted, to keep the...