City of Bridgeport v. Agostinelli
| Decision Date | 27 July 1972 |
| Citation | 163 Conn. 537,316 A.2d 371 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al. v. Nathan G. AGOSTINELLI, Comptroller, State of Connecticut. The CONNECTICUT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Thomas J. MESKILL, Governor, State of Connecticut, et al. |
George C. Hastings, Hartford, with whom was S. Frank D'Ercole, Hartford, for City of Bridgeport and others.
Jerome E. Caplan, Hartford, for Connecticut Education Ass'n.
Raymond J. Cannon, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Richard M. Sheridan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on the brief, Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., for defendants.
Before HOUSE, C.J., and RYAN, SHAPIRO, LOISELLE and MacDONALD, JJ.
These two cases seeking declaratory judgments and ancillary injunctive relief were combined by the Superior Court for the purpose of trial and then reserved for the advice of this court on a stipulation of facts. The first case was brought against the comptroller of the state by the cities and towns of Bridgeport, Danbury, New Haven and Norwalk, the towns of East Hartford,Hamden and Wallingford and the Connecticut Conference of Mayors, an association having an office in the city of New Haven. In the second case the plaintiffs are The Connecticut Education Association, Inc., of Hartford, Raymond W. Rossomando of Trumbull and James E. Burke of the town of Bristol. The defendants are the governor, the comptroller and the secretary of the state board of education.
This case was presented on a stipulation of facts dated May 4, 1972.
By virtue of Special Act No. 1 of the June special session of 1971, the General Assembly appropriated certain sums for payments to local governments for educational purposes including the following: Aid to industrial arts under the provisions of § 10-96 of the General Statutes; assistance to towns for educational purposes based on average daily membership of pupils (hereinafter referred to as the ADM grants) under § 10-262 of the General Statutes; educational programs for disadvantaged children under §§ 10-266a and 10-266b of the General Statutes; and adult education under § 10-71 of the General Statutes. Appropriations of funds were made as tax relief grants to municipalities as provided in § 8-159a and 10-266k of the General Statutes together with an appropriation of $15 per student in average daily membership as defined in $ 10-261 of the General Statutes.
It was stipulated that the defendants intended to pay the full amount of each appropriation if the actual revenues of the state should be sufficient to permit full payment of all appropriations without incurring a deficit at the end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1972). To avoid a deficit, however, it was the intention of the governor to modify the allotments relating to the aforementioned appropriations and this may result in payment to the towns and cities of less than the full amount of their share of each appropriation. Based on known revenues from July 1, 1971, to May 4, 1972, and the revised estimates of the tax revenues from this date to the end of the current fiscal year, full payment of the appropriations in issue here will probably result in a deficit.
The following table shows the actual sums appropriated for the items involved in this case and the amounts actually paid out on each as of May 4, 1972:
Amount
paid as of
Appropriation and Amount of May 4
Statutory Reference: Appropriation: 1972
Aid to Industrial Arts
(§ 10-96) $ 437,500 $ 111,392
ADM Grants
(§ 10-262) 140,700,000 137,617,410
Educational Programs
for Disadvantaged
Children (§§ 10-266a
and 10-266b) 8,500,000 6,084,496
Adult Education (§ 10-71) 415,000 332,173
Grants under § 8-159a 7,150,000 3,500,000
Grants under § 10-266k 4,500,000 2,500,000
Grants of $15 per student
in average daily
membership 10,050,000 3,320,745
Some of the plaintiff towns included as revenue estimates in their respective budgets a sum representing their share of these state payments based on the governor's recommended budget. Other towns estimated the revenue that would be received from the state in amounts exceeding their share based on the governor's recommendations, and in some instances these estimates corresponded to the amounts receivable under the appropriations act as finally passed. All of the plaintiff towns adopted their budgets after the governor's budget message on February 16, 1971, and prior to the enactment of the appropriations act on July 1, 1971.
During oral argument, the defendants informed this court that the ADM grants under § 10-262 and the tax relief grants to municipalities under §§ 8-159a and 10-266k are in the process of being paid and will be paid in full, prior to he end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1972). This court has since been informed by counsel for the defendants, with the consent of the plaintiffs' counsel, that by letter dated July 7, 1972, the commissioner of finance and control announced that the following grants were paid in full before the fiscal year ended on June 30, 1972: Assistance to towns for educational purposes under § 10-262 ($210 ADM) and the tax relief grants to municipalities under §§ 8-159a, 10-266k and 10-261 ().
The questions reserved for our advice are as follows: (1) If actual state revenues are insufficient to permit full payment of all the appropriations involved in these cases, may the governor, under the authority of § 4-85 of the General Statutes, modify allotments to the plaintiff towns thereby resulting in payments to these towns of lesser amounts than they otherwise would be entitled to receive from the full sums appropriated in Special Act No. 1 of the June special session of the 1971 General Assembly? (2) As long as the appropriation had not already been paid in full, is the comptroller required to pay to the plaintiff towns the amounts which they otherwise would be entitled to receive under each of the appropriations involved herein, even if the governor may modify allotments of such appropriations? (3) May a plaintiff town which has included in its budget a revenue estimate no greater than its proportionate share of the sum presented in the governor's recommended budget nevertheless receive a sum based on the amount appropriated by the legislature in Special Act No. 1 of the June special session of the 1971 General Assembly for the items at issue in this litigation?
The questions presented in these cases arose out of the financial crisis faced by the state. The existence of this crisis was recognized by the General Assembly in a legislative finding in § 14 of No. 1 of the Special Acts of the June 1971 special session (the appropriations act), in the following language: This was recognized by the legislature in the revenue act, Public Act No. 8 of the June 1971 special session, § 96 of which provides as follows: 'The appropriations for the expenses of the state in sections 1 and 2 of number 1 of the special acts of the current session may be reduced by the governor in an amount equivalent to not more than five per cent thereof and the total of the appropriations in said act to each agency may be reduced by an amount equivalent to not more than five per cent of such total appropriations; provided, however, that any such reduction shall be based on the total departmental or agency appropriation less the total of the grants hereinafter excepted from reduction within said departmental or agency appropriation. Provisions of the general statutes, as amended, or special acts of Connecticut to the contrary notwithstanding, this reduction may be applied to any appropriation enumerated in said special act, except for amounts payable to towns under section 10-262 of the 1969 supplement (sic), section 13 of number 1 of the special acts of the current session, grants to municipalities as provided in section 8-159a of said supplement (sic), grants for special educational programs or services as provided in section 10-266k of said supplement (sic), and appropriations made to the state treasurer for debt service and other grants payable to towns entitled 'Payment to Local Governments."
The defendants urge that this is a clear indication that the legislature believed that state revenues probably would prove inadequate to pay all appropriations in full. Certainly the granting to the governor of this extraordinary power, unprecedented in Connecticut insofar as we have been able to determine, 1 would seem to support this view.
Fundamental to our system of government is the principle of the separation of powers. 'The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.' Conn.Const., art. 2. See Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49, for an historical discussion of this provision. Accordingly, the constitution vests the legislative power of this state exclusively in the General Assenbly. Conn.Const., art. 3, § 1; Adams v. Rubinow, supra; Patterson v. Dempsey, 15i Conn. 431, 442, 207 A.2d 739. 'In the field of legislation, the legislature is supreme.' State v. Malm, 143 Conn. 462, 467, 123 A.2d 276, 278; see also Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, 130 Conn. 122, 133, 32 A.2d 547; Allyn's Appeal, 81 Conn. 534, 536, 71 A. 794.
The power to legislate, which our constitution has committed solely to the General...
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