City of Brooklyn v. Copeland

• Decision Date: 04 October 1887
• Citation: 106 N.Y. 496,13 N.E. 451
• Parties: CITY OF BROOKLYN v. COPELAND.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

106 N.Y. 496

13 N.E. 451

CITY OF BROOKLYN

v.COPELAND.

Court of Appeals of New York.

October 4, 1887.

Appeal from general term, supreme court, Second department.

H. C. M. Ingraham, for appellant.

Almet F. Jenks, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J.

The lands in this action in controversy became the property of the city of Brooklyn under the act of the legislature passed May 2, 1861, being chapter 340 of the Laws of that year. Upon a sale by the city of these lands the defendant purchased them, and has since refused to complete his purchase, on the ground that the plaintiff cannot convey a good title in fee. The defendant claims that the act of 1861 did not vest an alienable fee in the plaintiff in lands duly acquired under its provisions, but only a right to the perpetual use of such lands for park purposes. He also claims to raise some constitutional questions regarding the act of 1861, and also the act of 1865, amending that act.

We do not think he is in a position to raise any question of a constitutional character. It is unquestioned that the lands comprised in this controversy were acquired under the provisions of the act of 1861. In the complaint herein it is alleged that the plaintiff, under the provisions of that act, became and still is the owner in fee and possessed of certain real property, (which is the property in question;) and that, by an act of the legislature authorizing it, (chapter 373, Laws 1870, as amended by chapter 795, Laws 1873,) a sale of such lands was made to the defendant; and that he entered into a contract to purchase, but that he refused to take title, or pay the purchase money. The answer of the defendant admitted each and every allegation of the complaint, except that it denied that the legisiative acts therein mentioned were competent to vest in said city the ownership in fee of the lands therein described. This is not a denial of that part of the complaint which alleges that plaintiff, under the provisions of the act of 1861, became and still is the owner in fee and possessed of certain real property. The eighth section of the act of 1861 provides that after the confirmation of the report of the commissioners of appraisal, and upon payment being made to the owners of the lands in such report mentioned, or upon their assent thereto, by deed duly executed, the said lands shall vest forever in the city of Brooklyn for the uses and purposes in this act mentioned. As the complaint alleged an ownership in fee under the provisions of the act, it was equivalent to an allegation of a compliance with the terms of the act under which the fee was claimed, and hence was the same as an allegation that the commissioners' report was confirmed, and that that payment was made to the owners of the lands, or their assent obtained by deed duly executed, and that thereby the lands became vested forever in the city for the uses and purposes mentioned in the act. A denial, therefore, that the acts mentioned were competent to vest in the city a fee in the lands mentioned, clearly does not deny that under the act a payment was made to the owners, or their assent obtained by deed duly executed, which, if true, would preclude such owners from thereafter questioning the validity of the act.

But the denial under consideration would raise the question as to the quantum of the estate which was thus obtained by the city. By the affirmative admission of each and every allegation of the complaint, which the answer makes, with the exception just spoken of, the only issue raised was one as to the amount of the estate obtained by the city; and the constitutional questions affecting the validity...