City of Bryan v. Texas Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 August 1973
• Docket Number: No. 5249,5249
• Citation: 499 S.W.2d 750
• Parties: CITY OF BRYAN, Appellant, v. TEXAS SERVICES, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 750

499 S.W.2d 750

CITY OF BRYAN, Appellant, v. TEXAS SERVICES, INC., Appellee.

No. 5249.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,

Waco.

Aug. 30, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1973.

Pete Eckert, City Atty., Bryan, for appellant.

Douglas W. Howell, Bryan, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

The primary question posed on this appeal is whether the City of Bryan was the proper situs for ad valorem taxation of motor vehicles owned by appellee, Texas Services, Inc., for the years 1971 and 1972 . The trial court held that it was not. We agree.

Appellee initiated this action seeking a declaration of its rights and responsibilities regarding assessments for ad valorem taxes made by the City of Bryan against motor vehicles and office furniture and equipment owned by appellee. The City filed a cross-action for the collection of the taxes.

After a hearing without a jury, the court allowed the City recovery of taxes on the office furniture and fixtures, denied the City any taxes on the motor vehicles, and assessed costs of suit equally between the parties. The court expressly found and concluded that during the years in question: the motor vehicles assessed by the City were permanently located outside the City 'as the term 'permanently' is used in determining situs of tangible personal property for ad valorem tax purposes'; the furniture and equipment assessed by the City was permanently located in the City; the motor vehicles had acquired a situs for taxation 'outside the taxing jurisdiction' of the City; and, the only ad valorem taxes on tangible personal property owed by appellee to the City for the years in question were those assessed against the office furniture and equipment.

The essence of the City's assertions and arguments under the first two of its three points of error is: the conclusions that the motor vehicles acquired a tax situs elsewhere and that the City's recovery is limited to taxes assessed against the office furniture and fixtures, and the findings upon which they are based, are without support in the record.

It is the basic rule of taxation in Texas that personal property of every description is taxable at the domicile of its owner. Great Southern Life Insurance Company v. City of Austin, 112 Tex. 1, 243 S .W. 778, 780 (1922); Texas Land & Cattle Company v. City of Fort Worth (Tex.Civ.App., 1934, writ ref.), 73 S.W.2d 860, 862. However, if the property is tangible and has acquired an actual situs of its own in a state or place other than where the owner is domiciled, then the basic rule does not apply and the property is taxable at the place of its situs. State v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. (Tex.Civ.App., 1951, writ ref.), 242 S.W.2d 457, 461.

To acquire a tax situs of its own in a particular taxing jurisdiction, it is not necessary that tangible personal property be situated there with absolute permanency or with no intention on the part of the owner to remove it; it is enough to fix tax situs that it be situated there with a degree of permanency which will distinguish it from property which is there on a purely temporary or transitory basis. Greyhound Lines, Inc., v. Board of Equalization (Tex.Sup., 1967), 419 S.W.2d 345, 349.

William H. Corbusier gave the following testimony: He is president of Corbusier Chevrolet Company. He is also appellee's president. Both are Texas Corporations and maintain their home offices at 500 Texas Avenue in the City of Bryan. Appellee operates branch offices as a Hertz System Licensee in the Texas cities of Beaumont, College Station, Orange, and Victoria, and in Alexandria, Louisiana. As a Hertz System Licensee, appellee maintains its vehicles for, and rents them to, people who desire the convenience of having self-driven transportation on call. The vehicles do not operate on...