City of Canton v. William L. George, 85-LW-2655

• Decision Date: 22 April 1985
• Docket Number: 85-LW-2655,CA-6496
• Parties: CITY OF CANTON, Plaintiff-Appellee v. WILLIAM L. GEORGE, et al., Defendants-Appellants Case
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

CITY OF CANTON, Plaintiff-Appellee v. WILLIAM L. GEORGE, et al Defendants-Appellants

No. CA-6496.

85-LW-2655 (5th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District Stark.

April 22, 1985

Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Case No. 84-059-AP.

For Plaintiff-Appellee W. SCOTT GWIN, City Law Director, JOHN S COURY, Assistant Law Director, Canton City Hall, Canton, Ohio 44702.

For Defendants-Appellants JERRY P. HONTAS, 622 Citizens Building Canton, Ohio 44702.

OPINION

Before Hon. Norman J. Putman, P.J., Hon. Earle E. Wise, J., Hon. Ira G. Turpin, J.

WISE J.

This is an appeal of the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, wherein a jury awarded defendants-appellants (appellants) the sum of Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($19,500) as total compensation for property appropriated by the plaintiff-appellee (appellee) pursuant to its power of Eminent Domain. The relevant facts are as follows:

On January 12, 1984, the appellee filed an appropriation proceeding against the appellants, which sought the appropriation of the fee simple interest in appellants' real property which consisted of a house and a large lot, totalling approximately 12,700 square feet.

Appellee offered and deposited the sum of Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($19,000), based upon appellee's expert's determination of the reasonable market value of the property it was acquiring, allowing various sums for the land, the residential structure, and for improvements thereto.

The parties were unable to agree on a total compensation figure, and this issue was tried to a jury on August 13, 1984. The jury awarded appellants the sum of Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($19,500) as total compensation for the land and improvements.

During the trial, after appellant William L. George testified as to his personal valuation of the property, appellee's counsel was permitted to inquire upon crossexamination as to the amount appellants originally paid for the property in 1971. The court overruled appellants' objections to this inquiry. Subsequent to the jury verdict, appellants filed a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new trial, which the court overruled on October 5, 1984. Appellants raise the following two assignments of error:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE, OVER APPELLANTS' OBJECTION, EVIDENCE OF THE PRICE APPELLANTS PAID FOR THEIR PROPERTY IN THE YEAR 1971, APPROXIMATELY THIRTEEN (13) YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE APPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE INSTANT CASE.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT IN THE INSTANT CAUSE AND FOR A NEW TRIAL.

We affirm.

I

Appellants claim that the trial court erred in permitting cross-examination concerning the purchase price of the subject property in 1971. They base this claim on the proposition that the date of purchase is too remote in time to have any probative impact on the present value of appellants' property. Appellants contend that admission of this testimony constitutes reversible error. We disagree.

The decided weight of authority supports the proposition that much must be left to the discretion of the trial court in the matter of admitting or rejecting evidence relating to the value of appropriated property. Ohio Turnpike Commission v. Ellis (1955), 164 Ohio St. 377; City of Columbus v. Wilcox (1975), 46 Ohio App.2d 129. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the question concerning evidence of this character is not one of admissibility but rather one of weight. Foster v. United States (1944, 8th Cir.), 145 F.2d 873.

We observe, however, that appellants have cited us to the case of Ornstein v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co. (1937), 11 O.O. 129, which does stand for the proposition that the purchase price of appropriated property is not competent evidence where the purchase date is so remote in time so as not to have any tendency to reflect the current market value of the property. It is clear though that even under this view, appellants in the instant case must demonstrate that they were prejudiced by the admission of the purchase price testimony.

Appellants fail to adequately demonstrate the prejudice suffered as a result of this testimony. The record reveals that the only expert on the subject of valuation was presented by the appellee who opined that appellants' property was worth Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($19,...