City of Carmel v. Barham Invs.

• Docket Number: 22A-PL-2399
• Decision Date: 30 October 2023
• Parties: City of Carmel, Appellant-Defendant, v. Barham Investments, LLC, Marion County Treasurer, and Coast to Coast Carmel Corporation, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

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City of Carmel, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
Barham Investments, LLC, Marion County Treasurer, and Coast to Coast Carmel Corporation, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 22A-PL-2399

Court of Appeals of Indiana

October 30, 2023

Appeal from the Marion Circuit Court The Honorable Stephen R. Creason, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49C01-1712-PL-46760

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Bryan H. Babb Jonathan W. Hughes Bradley M. Dick Bose McKinney &Evans LLP Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES BARHAM INVESTMENTS, LLC &COAST TO COAST CARMEL CORP. Alice M. Morical Riley H. Floyd Janet Lynn Thompson Hoover Hull Turner LLP Indianapolis, Indiana

Judges May and Mathias concur.

OPINION

Bradford, Judge.

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Case Summary

[¶1] The City of Carmel used its power of eminent domain to convert the intersection of Keystone Avenue and 96th Street into a roundabout interchange ("the Project"). Barham Investments, LLC ("Barham"), owns a car dealership, whose main entrance was on Threel Road, near the intersection that Carmel needed to acquire to complete the Project. In April of 2018, the trial court entered an agreed order of appropriation and appointment of appraisers ("the Agreed Order"). Barham considered the appraisers' valuation of the Property to be too low because the taking allegedly extinguished its easement in Threel Road.

[¶2] In January of 2021, Carmel moved for partial summary judgment arguing that Barham was not entitled to compensation for its loss of access to Threel Road, which motion the trial court denied. In May of 2022, after a jury trial, the jury awarded Barham $2.4 million in damages. Carmel moved to correct error, for new trial, or for remittitur. The trial court denied Carmel's motions and Carmel appealed, raising multiple issues, including whether the trial court had erred in denying its partial-summary-judgment motion. Because we find that issue dispositive, and because Barham did not have a cognizable interest in Threel Road at the time, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant Carmel partial summary judgment on this issue.^[1]

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Facts and Procedural History

[¶3] In December of 2017, Carmel exercised its eminent-domain power to construct the Project. In doing so, Carmel filed a condemnation complaint in which it claimed that it needed to acquire three separate property interests from Barham, including 0.017 acres in fee simple, an access-control line, and 0.0111 acres in a temporary right-of-way for construction ("the Property"). Barham objected to Carmel's complaint, claiming that Carmel had "failed to properly identify all of the ownership interests being extinguished by the taking. Namely, the easement rights of the landowner to access and use Threel Road." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97. Barham's car dealership consisted of a four-story, glass-enclosed car showcase and a guest-entry area positioned towards the dealership's main entrance on Threel Road, which had run alongside Keystone Avenue. However, Carmel had already condemned Threel Road in a separate cause: Carmel v. County Line Owners Association, Inc., Case No. 49D02-1801-PL-003953 ("the County Line Action"). So, Carmel did not name Threel Road in its condemnation complaint or seek to acquire it.

[¶4] In April of 2018, the trial court denied Barham's objection and the parties entered into the Agreed Order, which authorized Carmel's acquisition of the Property. Barham consented to the "Appropriation of Real Estate as sought in the Complaint." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 104. In the Agreed Order, the trial court ordered that the taking consisted of "frontage along Threel Road" and that the access-control line "will be the new west property line of the subject, and the intent is to limit any access to the west of this line towards Keystone."

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Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 104-05. The Agreed Order did not include any acquisition of Threel Road.

[¶5] Later that month, the trial court instructed the three court-appointed appraisers to appraise the Property described in Carmel's complaint. In June of 2018, the appraisers assessed the total just compensation due to Barham to be $163,000.00. Barham disputed the appraisers' valuation, alleging that the "total damages assessed to [Barham] are too low[,]" and requested a jury trial. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 124.

[¶6] In January of 2021, Carmel moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Barham was not entitled to compensation for its loss of access to Threel Road. In its motion, Carmel relied on the County Line Action, which, in part, had granted Carmel "the total acquisition of Threel Road" in April of 2018. Appellant's App. Vol. IV p. 16. In March of 2022, the trial court denied Carmel's motion for partial summary judgment, finding that "there are genuine issues of material facts that remain unresolved." Appellant's App. Vol. IV p. 108. In doing so, trial court explained that Carmel "cite[d] no law that definitively foreclose[d] [Barham]'s arguments for compensation for the elimination of the ingress and egress easements or the diminution of value that the loss ha[d] caused to the value of their properties." Appellant's App. Vol. IV p. 110.

[¶7] The trial court conducted a jury trial from May 24 to May 26, 2022, at the conclusion of which the jury awarded Barham $2.4 million in damages.

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Carmel moved to correct error, for new trial, or for remittitur, and moved to strike and correct the judgment concerning interest. The trial court agreed with Carmel's position on interest; however, it denied Carmel's motions to correct error and for new trial or remittitur.

Discussion and Decision

A. Standard of Review

[¶8] Carmel sought partial summary judgment claiming that Barham was not entitled to compensation "as a result of the loss of access to Threel Road." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 142. "The standard of review of a summary judgment ruling is the same as that used in the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Row v. Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (Ind. 2007). All inferences should be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

[¶9] In denying Carmel's motion, the trial court concluded that Carmel had "cite[d] no law that definitively foreclose[d] [Barham]'s arguments for compensation for the elimination of the ingress and egress easements or the diminution of value that the loss has caused to their properties." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 110. "We review the trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo." Coutar Remainder I, LLC v. State, 91 N.E.3d 610, 614 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), trans. denied.

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B. Whether the Closing of Access to Threel Road Constitutes a Compensable Taking

[¶10] Whether a taking has occurred is a question of law, Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, LLC, 860 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Ind. 2007), which we review de novo. Bradley v. City of New Castle, 764 N.E.2d 212, 216 (Ind. 2002). When considering whether a taking has occurred, the threshold question is "whether the...