City of Charleston Housing Authority v. Brown
| Decision Date | 24 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2018-002155,Opinion No. 5941 |
| Parties | CITY OF CHARLESTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent, v. Katrina BROWN, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Matthew M. Billingsley, of S.C. Legal Services, of N. Charleston, and Adam Protheroe, of S.C. Appleseed Legal Justice Center, of Columbia, both for Appellant.
Theodore Parker, III, of Parker Nelson & Associates, of Las Vegas, NV, and Jacqueline Dixon Phillips and Thomas Bacot Pritchard, both of Parker Nelson & Associates, of Charleston, all for Respondent.
Katrina Brown, a tenant of the City of Charleston Housing Authority (CHA), appeals the circuit court's order affirming her and her minor children's eviction from their home. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings in accord with this opinion.
The facts are not disputed. On December 16, 2015, Brown renewed her lease as a public housing tenant at CHA. Brown's minor son and daughter were named in the lease as residents and members of her household. On January 13, 2016, Brown's son—who was seventeen at the time—was arrested a mile away from his home carrying a gun. Two weeks after his arrest, CHA sent an official thirty-day notice of termination for Brown's lease. The notice informed Brown that her termination was based on the lease's prohibition against violent criminal behavior.
CHA then began eviction proceedings in magistrate's court to evict Brown and her family. At the hearing in front of the magistrate, CHA presented Detective Jason Jarrell from the Charleston Police Department who testified Brown's son confessed to an attempted armed robbery that occurred two days before his arrest and approximately a mile away from Brown's housing complex. CHA did not present any other evidence at the hearing.
Brown testified her son was being held in the Charleston County jail, and if he was able to make bond, the plan was for him to stay at her mother's (his grandmother's) house and no longer reside with her and her daughter. Brown testified neither of her son's crimes were alleged to have taken place on CHA grounds, and she had no knowledge of the alleged incidents until her son was arrested.
After finding "evictions based on criminal activity provisions of the housing lease agreements must be determined on a case-by-case basis," the magistrate considered the testimony as well as factors from federal law ( 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5) (2022) ), and denied CHA's application for eviction. CHA appealed, and the circuit court remanded the case to the magistrate for further factual findings and analysis regarding whether Brown's eviction was warranted under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2012 & Supp. 2021), the federal statute governing public housing leases, which is colloquially known as the "One-Strike Rule."1 In the remand order, the circuit court stated the magistrate "may conduct an additional evidentiary hearing or rely upon the previous record." The magistrate declined Brown's written request for another hearing but accepted memoranda of law regarding whether eviction was warranted under federal law. In her memorandum, Brown asserted her son's actions did not amount to good cause for her eviction under the One-Strike Rule, but even if they did, CHA acted arbitrarily by evicting her.
On May 15, 2017, the magistrate issued an order evicting Brown based on her son's actions. Relying specifically on United States Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker , which upheld the constitutionality of the One-Strike Rule, the magistrate found there was good cause for Brown's eviction. 535 U.S. at 128, 122 S.Ct. 1230. Brown appealed.
At the appeal hearing before the circuit court, Brown asserted under Rucker , § 1437d(l)(6), and 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(ii), non-drug related criminal activity can only be grounds for termination of a public-housing tenancy if the activity constitutes a present threat to the residents of the public housing authority and occurred in the immediate vicinity of the public housing authority. Brown asserted her son was not a threat to public housing tenants because his alleged criminal activity did not occur within the immediate vicinity of CHA and he would not be returning to her home if he were released from custody.
Brown also argued that, under the One-Strike Rule, both Rucker and § 1437d(l)(6) require local public-housing authorities to demonstrate they used discretion in evaluating the circumstances and alternatives to the eviction of an innocent tenant before evicting an entire household for the actions of one of its members. Brown asserted that, because CHA made no showing it exercised discretion by considering the mitigating circumstances of her case before pursuing eviction, the eviction was arbitrary and an abuse of the discretion conferred on CHA by Congress.
The circuit court affirmed Brown's eviction, issuing an order finding her son's actions warranted eviction under the One-Strike Rule but not addressing Brown's discretion argument. Brown filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP motion asking the circuit court to reconsider the order and also seeking a ruling on her discretion argument. The circuit court denied Brown's motion for reconsideration, finding first, there was evidence CHA exercised its discretion because it was aware of the applicable regulations when it proceeded with Brown's eviction, and second, the One-Strike Rule did not require the threat to tenants to be ongoing to be cause for eviction. Rather, the circuit court found, in order for the eviction to be proper under § 1437d(l)(6), Brown's son's alleged criminal activity need only have been a threat when it occurred. This appeal follows.
In an eviction action first heard by the magistrate and affirmed by the circuit court, the court of appeals is without jurisdiction to reverse the findings of fact of the circuit court if there is any evidence supporting them. Vacation Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc. v. Kiwi Corp. , 280 S.C. 232, 233, 312 S.E.2d 20, 21 (Ct. App. 1984). However, the court of appeals "retains de novo review of whether the facts show the circuit court's affirmance was controlled or affected by errors of law." Bowers v. Thomas , 373 S.C. 240, 245, 644 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ct. App. 2007).
"It is axiomatic that judicial interference with the discretion accorded [by Congress to a public housing authority] is only warranted when a review of its actions reveals by clear and convincing evidence some arbitrary action outside the boundaries of the federal laws and regulations."
Greenville Hous. Auth. of City of Greenville by Carlton v. Salters , 281 S.C. 604, 608, 316 S.E.2d 718, 720 (Ct. App. 1984).
Brown contends her eviction lacked good cause. We disagree. Under § 1437d(l)(6) every public housing authority is required to use leases that:
provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy ....
The regulations accompanying § 1437d(l)(6) further expound that a public-housing authority "may terminate the tenancy only" for the enumerated grounds in the regulation, and non-drug-related criminal activity is cause for termination of a public-housing lease if that activity "threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of their residences by persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises." 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.4(l)(2) and (5)(ii)(A) (2022).
The text of § 1437d(l)(6) and 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2022) is unambiguous. See S.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Blue Moon of Newberry, Inc. , 397 S.C. 256, 261, 725 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2012) (). Drug-related criminal activity is grounds for termination of a lease regardless of where the activity occurred, whereas non-drug related activity—even violent criminal activity—may only be grounds for termination if the activity "threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment" of other tenants or "persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises." § 1437d(l)(6) ; 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2) and (5)(ii).
In Lowell Housing Authority v. Melendez , 449 Mass. 34, 865 N.E.2d 741 (2007), the Massachusetts Supreme Court found while not all non-drug related crimes committed a mile outside of the premises of a public housing authority constitute cause for termination of a lease under the One-Strike Rule, a violent robbery certainly did. Id. at 744–45. In Lowell , the tenant of a public-housing authority robbed a convenience store a mile away from his apartment with a knife. Id. at 741–42. The question on appeal was whether this crime constituted a threat to the "health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants." Reasoning that this type of crime could be a ground for termination of the public-housing lease, the Lowell Court found:
Whether the criminal activity is cause for termination will depend largely on the facts of each case. It is enough to say here that certain criminal activity, such as assault by means of a dangerous weapon and armed robbery, is so physically violent, or associated with violence, that one who engages in it normally would pose a threat to, or reasonably inspire a significant level of fear on the part of tenants forced to live in close proximity to the offending tenant To hold otherwise would send a message that it is acceptable for persons to commit violent crimes elsewhere and continue to be entitled to live in public housing developments. Tenants of public housing developments ... represent some of the most needy and vulnerable segments of our population, including low-income families, children, the...
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