City of Chattanooga v. Keith

• Decision Date: 23 June 1906
• Citation: 94 S.W. 62,115 Tenn. 588
• Parties: MAYOR, ETC., OF CHATTANOOGA v. KEITH.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

94 S.W. 62

115 Tenn. 588

MAYOR, ETC., OF CHATTANOOGA v. KEITH.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 23, 1906

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hamilton County.

Action between Hugh Keith and the mayor and aldermen of Chattanooga. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

Geo. W Chamlee, for appellants.

Doughty & Titus, for appellee.

BEARD C.J.

The only question in this case is as to the constitutionality of a clause in the charter of the city of Chattanooga, which is as follows: "In all civil cases in which the fine imposed does not exceed $10, the judgment of the city court shall be final, and no appeal shall be therefrom."

The authorities agree that the remedy by appeal was unknown to the common law, and was only employed for the review of cases of equity, ecclesiastical, and admiralty jurisdiction; writ of error was the remedy to review judgments of the common pleas and other inferior courts of record when the proceedings were according to the course of common law. 4 Archibald Pr. 4; Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 321, 1 L.Ed. 619. Consequently the remedy by appeal in actions at law is altogether of constitutional or statutory origin. 2 Cyc. pp 507-517.

So the authorities held that where the Constitution does not define the specific limits of appellate jurisdiction, this may be abridged or extended by the Legislature as public policy may require; but it has been held, and we think properly, that even in the absence of legislative provision, the establishment of an appellate court by the Constitution is an implied declaration that some right of appeal exists which cannot be unreasonably restricted by statute law. 2 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 14. Illustrating the first proposition in the above paragraph is the case of Sherer v. Lasson county, 94 Cal. 354, 29 P. 716, where it was ruled that a constitutional provision, that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to cases arising in the inferior courts restricts that jurisdiction to the mode and extent prescribed by the Legislature; and, as authority for the last proposition therein contained, are the cases of People v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929, and Branson v. Studabaker, 133 Ind. 147, 33 N.E. 98, in which it is held that from the establishment of an appellate court it is to be implied there shall be a review to a reasonable extent of the judgment of inferior tribunals, and that the right of appeal must be reserved for the Supreme Court, at least in cases involving legal questions of great public importance.

The Constitution of the state of Mississippi did not, save in the most general terms, fix the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The provision of that Constitution conferring this jurisdiction was as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to the court of appeals." The question of the right of appeal under this clause was considered by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Dismukes v. Stokes, 41 Miss. 430. In the course of the opinion delivered in that case, it was said: "The subject is one depending on general considerations of public policy which for the most part must be determined by the Legislature, subject to such restrictions on their general powers as are contained in the Constitution. For this reason by universal acquiescence, the power is conceded to the Legislature to prescribe the form of action and the modes of procedure in courts, and to limit the case and the extent to which certain remedies may be pursued. The only exception to this power is where specific rights are secured to a party in the Constitution with a remedy indicated for their protection, in which case the right and remedy thus guarantied would be beyond the legislative power. But generally all these questions pertain to the remedy, and are subject to the power of the Legislature. The right to prosecute a writ of error or an appeal in this, or any inferior court, is a matter pertaining to the mode of judicial procedure or remedy. It is not guarantied as a matter of right in the Constitution, and though it is possible that this court, in the light of judicial procedure in England, *** from whose jurisprudence our system is mostly derived, might, in the absence of legislative enactment on the subject, be disposed to favor the right when sanctioned by established precedent, yet, when the Legislature has passed laws regulating the mode of proceeding, and limiting the cases and the courts in which the right may be exercised, the rules prescribed must be followed because they are clearly such as the Legislature had power to enact. Nothing appears to be more clearly within the legislative power over matters pertaining to public policy than the question, in what cases and in what courts sha...