City of Chi. v. Fulton

• Decision Date: 14 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-357,19-357
• Citation: 208 L.Ed.2d 384,141 S.Ct. 585
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, Petitioner v. Robbin L. FULTON, et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

141 S.Ct. 585

208 L.Ed.2d 384

CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, Petitioner

v.Robbin L. FULTON, et al.

No. 19-357

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued October 13, 2020

Decided January 14, 2021

Mark A. Flessner, Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Ellen W. McLaughlin, City of Chicago, Office of Corporation Counsel, Chicago, IL, Craig Goldblatt, Danielle Spinelli, Joel Millar, Isley Gostin, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, Allyson M. Pierce, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Catherine Steege, Adam T. Swingle, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, Eugene R. Wedoff, Counsel of Record, Carl Wedoff, Jenner & Block LLP, New York, NY, John P. Wonais, Michael A. Miller, The Semrad Law Firm LLC, Chicago, IL, for Respondents.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

When a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code protects the debtor's interests by imposing an automatic stay on efforts to collect prepetition debts outside the bankruptcy forum. Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC , 589 U.S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 140 S.Ct. 582, 588–589, 205 L.Ed.2d 419 (2020). Those prohibited efforts include "any act ... to exercise control over property" of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). The question in this case is whether an entity violates that prohibition by retaining possession of a debtor's property after a bankruptcy petition is filed. We hold that mere retention of property does not violate § 362(a)(3).

I

Under the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a bankruptcy petition has certain immediate consequences. For one thing, a petition "creates an estate" that, with some exceptions, comprises "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." § 541(a)(1). Section 541 "is intended to include in the estate any property made available to the estate by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. , 462 U.S. 198, 205, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983). One such provision, § 542, is important for present purposes. Titled "Turnover of property to the estate," § 542 provides, with just a few exceptions, that an entity (other than a custodian) in possession of property of the bankruptcy estate "shall deliver to the trustee, and account for" that property.

A second automatic consequence of the filing of a bankruptcy petition is that, with certain exceptions, the petition "operates as a stay, applicable to all entities," of efforts to collect from the debtor outside of the bankruptcy forum. § 362(a). The automatic stay serves the debtor's interests by protecting the estate from dismemberment, and it also benefits creditors as a group by preventing individual creditors from pursuing their own interests to the detriment of the others. Under the Code, an individual injured by any willful violation of the stay "shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages." § 362(k)(1).

Among the many collection efforts prohibited by the stay is "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate ." § 362(a)(3) (emphasis added). The prohibition against exercising control over estate property is the subject of the present dispute.

In the case before us, the city of Chicago (City) impounded each respondent's vehicle for failure to pay fines for motor vehicle infractions. Each respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and requested that the City return his or her vehicle. The City refused, and in each case a bankruptcy court held that the City's refusal violated the automatic stay. The Court of Appeals affirmed all of the judgments in a consolidated opinion. In re Fulton , 926 F.3d 916 (CA7 2019). The court concluded that "by retaining possession of the debtors' vehicles after they declared bankruptcy," the City had acted "to exercise control over" respondents' property in violation of § 362(a)(3). Id., at 924–925. We granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Courts of Appeals over whether an entity that retains possession of the property of a bankruptcy estate violates § 362(a)(3).¹ 589 U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 680, 205 L.Ed.2d 449 (2019). We now vacate the judgment below.

II

The language used in § 362(a)(3) suggests that merely retaining possession of estate property does not violate the automatic stay. Under that provision, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a "stay" of "any act" to "exercise control" over the property of the estate. Taken together, the most natural reading of these terms—"stay," "act," and "exercise control"—is that § 362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Taking the provision's operative words in turn, the term "stay" is commonly used to describe an order that "suspend[s] judicial alteration of the status quo." Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 429, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009) (brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted). An "act" is "[s]omething done or performed ... ; a deed." Black's Law Dictionary 30 (11th ed. 2019); see also Webster's New International Dictionary 25 (2d ed. 1934) ("that which is done," "the exercise of power," "a deed"). To "exercise" in the sense relevant here means "to bring into play" or "make effective in action." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 795 (1993). And to "exercise" something like control is "to put in practice or carry out in action." Webster's New International Dictionary, at 892. The suggestion conveyed by the combination of these terms is that § 362(a)(3) halts any affirmative act that would alter the status quo as of the time of the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

We do not maintain that these terms definitively rule out the alternative interpretation adopted by the court below and advocated by respondents. As respondents point out, omissions can qualify as "acts" in certain contexts, and the term " ‘control’ " can mean " ‘to have power over.’ " Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. , 566 F.3d 699, 702 (CA7 2009) (quoting Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 272 (11th ed. 2003)). But saying that a person engages in an "act" to "exercise" his or her power over a thing communicates more than merely "having" that power. Thus the language of § 362(a)(3) implies that something more than merely retaining power is required to violate the disputed provision.

Any ambiguity in the text of § 362(a)(3) is resolved decidedly in the City's favor by the existence of a separate provision, § 542, that expressly governs the turnover of estate property. Section 542(a), with two exceptions, provides as follows:

"[A]n entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate."

The exceptions to § 542(a) shield (1) transfers of estate property made from one entity to another in good faith without notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and (2) good-faith transfers to satisfy certain life insurance obligations. See §§ 542(c), (d). Reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere retention of property, as respondents advocate, would create at least two serious problems.

First, it would render the central command of § 542 largely superfluous. "The canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme." Yates v. United States , 574 U.S. 528, 543, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (plurality opinion; internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Reading "any act ... to exercise control" in § 362(a)(3) to include merely retaining possession of a debtor's property would make that section a blanket turnover provision. But as noted, § 542 expressly governs "[t]urnover of property to the estate," and subsection (a) describes the broad range of property that an entity "shall deliver to the trustee." That mandate would be surplusage if § 362(a)(3) already required an entity affirmatively to relinquish control of the debtor's property at the moment a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Respondents and their amici contend that § 542(a) would still perform some work by specifying the party to whom the property in question must be turned over and by requiring that an entity "account for ... the value of " the debtor's property if the property is damaged or lost. But that is a small amount of work for a large amount of text in a section that appears to be the Code provision that is designed to govern the turnover of estate property. Under this alternative interpretation, § 362(a)(3), not § 542, would be the chief provision governing turnover—even though § 362(a)(3) says nothing expressly on that question. And § 542 would be reduced to a footnote—even though it appears on its face to be the governing provision. The better account of the two provisions is that § 362(a)(3) prohibits collection efforts outside the bankruptcy proceeding that would change the status quo, while § 542(a) works within the bankruptcy process to draw far-flung estate property back into the hands of the debtor or trustee.

Second, respondents' reading would render the commands of § 362(a)(3) and § 542 contradictory. Section 542 carves out exceptions to the turnover command, and § 542(a) by its terms does not mandate turnover of property that is "of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate." Under respondents' reading, in cases where those exceptions to turnover under § 542 would apply, § 362(a)(3) would command turnover all the same. But it would be "an...