City of Chicago v. Taylor
Decision Date | 28 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 1-01-0414.,1-01-0414. |
Parties | The CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dane TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Corporation Counsel of Chicago, Appeals Division, Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna R. Solomon, and Suzanne M. Loose, Chicago, for Appellant.
Stephen J. Nagy, Glenview, for Appellee.
On October 1, 2000, Dane Taylor was arrested at his home at 4153 N. Ashland, Chicago, Illinois, and charged with unlawful discharge of a firearm, possession of a firearm without a Firearm Owners Identification Card (FOID card), and three counts of possession of an unregistered firearm. During the arrest, the Chicago police recovered three unregistered firearms which included a Valmet assault rifle 308, a North American 1 1/2" short barrel stainless revolver, and a Parker Bros. shotgun.
On November 29, 2000, Dane Taylor pled guilty to three Charges and was subsequently sentenced to one year of supervision, concurrent on all charges, and a $300 fine. The City of Chicago (the City) then moved to confiscate and destroy the seized firearms. Dane Taylor objected.
On December 14, 2000, John Taylor, Dane Taylor's father, petitioned for return of the seized Parker Bros, shotgun. The petition stated that: John Taylor, a resident of Glencoe, Illinois, was the owner of the shotgun and possessed a valid State firearm identification card; the shotgun was a family heirloom, having sentimental value; the shotgun was regarded as a valuable antique, because it was made by Parker Brothers, before Parker Brothers merged with Remington around 1930; and John Taylor had loaned the shotgun to Dane Taylor for a future hunting trip.
On December 14, 2000, following a hearing on John Taylor's petition for release of the shotgun, the trial court granted the petition and ordered the shotgun returned to John Taylor. On January 24, 2001, the circuit court denied the City's motion to reconsider. However, the court's order was stayed pending appeal. The City filed its timely notice of appeal on February 2, 2001. On appeal, the City contends that the trial court erred by ordering the City to release the unregistered shotgun to John Taylor. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's order directing the City to release the shotgun.
The construction of a municipal ordinance is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Garner v. City of Chicago, 319 Ill.App.3d 255, 235 Ill.Dec. 134, 744 N.E.2d 867 (2001).
In the instant case, the City asserts that the trial court erred by ordering it to release the unregistered shotgun to John Taylor, where section 8-20-040 of the Chicago Municipal Code (Chicago Municipal Code § 8-20-040 (1999)) forbids an individual from possessing an unregistered firearm within the City of Chicago and where section 8-20-220 of the Chicago Municipal Code provides that a confiscated, unregistered firearm must be destroyed when it is no longer needed as evidence (Chicago Municipal Code § 8-20-220 (1999)).
Section 8-20-040 of the Chicago Municipal Code, entitled "Registration of firearms," provides in relevant part:
Chicago Municipal Code § 8-20-040 (1999).
Section 8-20-220 of the Chicago Municipal Code, entitled "Destruction of weapons confiscated," provides:
The City contends that the shotgun at issue was not registered in the City of Chicago as required by section 8-20-040 of the Chicago Municipal Code, and therefore it was subject to confiscation and mandatory destruction under section 8-20-220 of the Chicago Municipal Code.
In response, John Taylor1 contends that: (1) the City's gun control ordinance is an improper exercise of home rule authority; (2) the ordinance violates his right to bear arms under article I, section 22, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution because it applies to all firearms; (3) the ordinance denies him due process; (4) the ordinance adversely affects a nonresident hunter's ability to travel through Chicago with hunting firearms that have not been registered with the City of Chicago; (5) the ordinance's definition of antique firearms is arbitrary and capricious; and (6) the City fails to cite any authority regarding the amount of time an individual can possess an unregistered firearm in the City of Chicago before it has to be registered. We must reject all of John Taylor's contentions.
In 1970, Illinois adopted a provision for home rule power in its constitution.2 Home rule government is based on the premise that local governments are in the best position to assess the needs and desires of their communities, and therefore, can most effectively enact legislation addressing local concerns. Carlson v. Briceland, 61 Ill.App.3d 247, 18 Ill.Dec. 502, 377 N.E.2d 1138 (1978); Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill.2d 483, 83 Ill.Dec. 308, 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984) ( ).
Under the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6), effective July 1, 1971, local units of government became, or were given the power to become, home rule units.3 The basic grant of home rule power is contained in article VII, section 6(a), of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, which provides in relevant part:
"Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare[.]" Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a).
Home rule units are granted the right to exercise such powers concurrently with the state. Article VII, section 6(i), of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides:
"Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i).
In addition, article VII, section 6(m), provides:
"Powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(m).
Home rule units have expansive powers to govern as they deem proper, including the authority to impose greater restrictions on particular rights than those imposed by the state. See, e.g., Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill.2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974) ( ); City of De Kalb v. White, 227 Ill.App.3d 328, 591 N.E.2d 522, 169 Ill.Dec. 349, 591 N.E.2d 522 (1992) ( ). The only limits on a home rule unit's autonomy are those imposed by the Illinois Constitution or by the Illinois General Assembly exercising its authority to preempt home rule in specific instances.4
In City of Carbondale v. Yehling, 96 Ill.2d 495, 71 Ill.Dec. 683, 451 N.E.2d 837 (1983), the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the two-part test to be used in determining the validity of an ordinance passed by a home rule unit. First, the subject matter of the ordinance must pertain to the city's government and affairs. If pertinent, it must then be determined whether the ordinance is preempted by state regulation of the subject matter.
In Kalodimos, a pivotal decision regarding the validity of an ordinance regulating handguns, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a village ordinance banning the possession of operable handguns, with certain exceptions, was a permissible exercise of the village's home rule powers and did not violate article VII, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Kalodimos, 103 Ill.2d at 500-08,83 Ill.Dec. 308,470 N.E.2d 266. The court noted that delegates to the 1970 Illinois constitutional convention acknowledged that weapons control was a suitable field for local regulation pursuant to home rule authority, and the court went on to find that the ordinance at issue in its case was valid since it addressed the village's local interest in reducing crime within its boundaries, minimizing the effects of domestic violence, and reducing handgun accidents involving children. Kalodimos, 103 Ill.2d at 503-04,83 Ill.Dec. 308,470 N.E.2d 266. The court also determined that state law regulating handguns did not preempt the village's gun control law, even if the village's law was more stringent than the state law. Kalodimos, 103 Ill.2d at 506. 506, 83 Ill.Dec. 308,470 N.E.2d 266.
In the instant case, as in Kalodimos, we hold that the City's gun control...
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