City of Chicago v. Washingtonian Home of Chicago

Decision Date09 October 1919
Docket NumberNo. 12339.,12339.
Citation124 N.E. 416,289 Ill. 206
PartiesCITY OF CHICAGO v. WASHINGTONIAN HOME OF CHICAGO.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; Wells M. Cook, Judge.

The Washingtonian Home of Chicago was found guilty in the municipal court of violating the fire prevention ordinance of the City of Chicago, and it appeals. Affirmed.A. W. Martin and Edward H. S. Martin, both of Chicago, for appellant.

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corp. Counsel, and Harry B. Miller, both of Chicago (Daniel Webster, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

STONE, J.

The appellant, the Washingtonian Home of Chicago, a corporation, was found guilty, after a trial without a jury in the municipal court of Chicago, in an action to recover a penalty for the violation of paragraph (f) of section 16, and section 18, 24, and 22b of the fire prevention ordinance of the city of Chicago, due to and arising out of its failure to equip on July 14, 1916, its buildings at 1533 Madison street, in said city, with an approved system of automatic sprinklers. The evidence consists of a written stipulation dated May 31, 1918, and certified portions of the fire prevention ordinance of the city of Chicago, of which the municipal court took judicial notice. Said ordinance was passed July 22, 1912, and has been at all times thereafter in full force and effect. The court found appellant guilty and rendered judgment for a fine of $5 and costs.

Paragraph (f) of section 16 of said ordinance places every building used for a hospital, for housing of the sick and infirm, imbeciles, or children, and every jail, police station, asylum, house of correction and detention, and every home for the aged and decrepit, where sleeping accommodations are provided for more than ten persons, in class IIc. Section 18 of the ordinance provides that every building specified in subsequent sections of the ordinance which is in existence at the time of the passage of the ordinance shall be equipped with an approved automatic sprinkler system within two years from and after the date of the passage of the ordinance; that the owner of such building shall submit plans for such proposed sprinkler system for approval to the chief of the fire prevention and public safety department, in which plans shall be shown the size, capacity, and location of all sprinkler heads, pumps, tanks, or pipes, and any other apparatus to be used in connection therewith, within six months from and after the passage of the ordinance, which plans, when approved, shall be stamped showing such approval before the proposed sprinkler system shall be installed by the owner. Section 24 provides for an approved automatic sprinkler system on all floors and basements of nonfireproof buildings more than two stories in height and having an area of more than 6,000 square feet, excepting certain rooms. Section 22b provides a penalty for a violation of the provisions with reference to installing a sprinkler system of not less than $5 nor more than $200 for each offense, and each and every day such building is occupied contrary to said ordinance shall be considered a separate and distinct offense.

It is stipulated that the building of the appellant is not equipped with an approved system of automatic sprinklers; that the appellant is a charitable corporation and is not organized for profit, and in carrying out its corporate objects cares for certain inebriate patients without charge, and makes charges for the care of certain patients able to pay; that the expenses of the institution equal in amount its receipts from certain charitable trust funds and other sources; that the appellant is endowed with valuable grounds and buildings thereon; that the insurance premiums would be reduced from $1.16 for $100 of insurance for one year to 65 cents by the installation of the proposed sprinklers; that the plans and specifications attached shall be a part of the stipulation; that the appellant conducts in the second, third, fourth and fifth stories in section A shown in said plan, and in all the stories of sections B and C shown therein, an institution for the care, cure and reclamation of inebriates and has since said building was erected; that all of the first floor of section A, except the hall and entrance, is occupied by stores, namely, a drug store, shoe store, and grocery store, including the basements of the respective stores; that the stores contain the usual and ordinary oils and imflammable materials that are incident to such business; that section A of the building was built in 1875, section B in 1880, and section C in 1883; that all are lighted with gas; that there are hallways and communications between such sections; that all of said sections are in class He described in section 16a of the ordinance. The stipulation also sets out the material used in the construction of the outside walls and interior partitions. Defendant has been notified by the bureau of fire prevention and public safety to install an approved system of automatic sprinklers as provided for in the ordinance, and has never submitted plans for such system for approval or installed such a system. The stipulation also sets out a comprehensive description of an approved system of automatic sprinklers. It is also stipulated that in section A are sleeping accommodations for 61 persons, in section B for 7 persons, and in section C for 44 persons; that said sections are operated as one building; that certain windows, rooms, and fire escape exits are barred with iron gratings, mostly permanent, and some locked with padlocks, to prevent the escape of patients under treatment; that there are three padded cells, with heavy doors, used for the confinement of violent patients, locked with padlocks when so used. The stipulation also contains a statement of the advantages of the use of the sprinkler system.

Appellant argues numerous assignments of error. Its principal contentions are, however, that the ordinance does not apply to the buildings and premises of the appellant, that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void, because not within the power of the city council to pass.

In support of the first contention appellant cites section 24 of the ordinance, as follows:

‘The following buildings hereinbefore referred to shall be equipped with an approved automatic sprinkler system, except as otherwise provided: * * *

Class IIb and IIc Buildings.-On all floors and basements of non-fireproof buildings more than two stories in height, and having an area of more than 6,000 square feet, except in sleeping rooms, reading rooms, parlors, bath rooms, dining room, smoking rooms, gymnasiums, and except hallways containing stair or elevator shafts inclosed with incombustible or fireproof material.’

The evidence and stipulation in the record show that said premises consist of three buildings used and operated as one building. Said buildings are connected by passageways, so that they form, in fact, one structure. We are of opinion that the structures in question should be treated as one building. This being true, a computation shows the ground space occupied by said buildings amounts to more than 6,000 feet. It is contended that the space referred to in the ordinance should be construed as being floor space and not ground space. If this contention be adopted it can avail appellant nothing, as the floor space on all floors would necessarily be computed. In either view of the matter it is clear that the buildings occupy more than 6,000 square feet and come within the purview of section 24 of the ordinance.

As to appellant's contention that the statute of limitations applies, it is sufficient to say that the offense designated in the ordinance is a continuing offense; it being provided under section 22b of the ordinance that ‘each and every day that said building is so occupied contrary to this ordinance shall be considered a separate, distinct offense.’ The statute of limitations, therefore, does not apply.

The principal contention of appellant is that the city is without power to pass the ordinance in question. Such an ordinance, to be valid, must be within the police power of the state, which may be delegated to city councils. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 116 N. E. 182;Williams v. City of Chicago, 266 Ill. 267, 107 N. E. 599, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 514;City of Chicago v. Mandel Bros., 264 Ill. 206, 106 N. E. 181. Section 1 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 24) provides the powers of city councils. An examination of paragraphs 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 71, 75, 77, 78, and 98 shows that the city council has the general power to regulate the construction and maintenance of buildings of the character of the one in question here. A municipality has power to pass any ordinance which is necessary or proper to carry into effect the powers granted by the Legislature. Such powers may be expressly conferred by the statute or may be implied from the duty imposed upon the city council to protect the lives, health, and property of the public. City of Chicago v. Mandel Bros., supra; Williams v. City of Chicago, supra.

Reasonable regulations for the protection of the lives and the safety of citizens, as well as of property against destruction by fire, are within the powers delegated to the city and which may be exercised by it. Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N. E. 718;Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340 52 N. E. 44,48 L. R. A. 230. A power within the police power of a city may be reasonably exercised, even though such exercise may result in inconvenience or loss to the individual. In the case of Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920,34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 998, the court said:

‘All uses of property or courses of conduct which are injurious to the health, comfort, safety, and...

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