City of Chicago v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 21 April 1920
• Docket Number: No. 13154.,13154.
• Citation: 127 N.E. 49,292 Ill. 406
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

292 Ill. 406

127 N.E. 49

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 13154.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 21, 1920.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Bridget Gallagher, the widow, for the death of her husband John Gallagher, opposed by the City of Chicago, the employer. Compensation was awarded by the Industrial Commission, the award confirmed by the circuit court, and the City brings error.

Judgment reversed, and award set aside.

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corp. Counsel, and William H. Devenish, City Atty., both of Chicago (Robert H. Farrell, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Joseph P. Mahoney, of Chicago (W. P. Quinby, of Chicago, of counsel), for defendants in error.

DUNN, C. J.

John Gallagher, a laborer in the employ of the city of Chicago, was at work on August 3, 1917, loading sand from a freight car into wagons near the municipal pier. He got down from the car and went to a hydrant to get a can of drinking water, with which he returned to the car. A negro named Ramsey was working on an adjoining car and asked Gallagher for a drink, but Gallagher told him to get his own water. Ramsey called him a name and told him to climb on the car and he would knock his head. Gallagher said nothing, but after standing there for a few minutes climbed upon the car to go on with his work, and Ramsey called him a name and struck him on the head with a shovel. Gallagher died as a result of the injury, and the Industrial Commission affirmed a decision of an arbitrator allowing compensation to his widow. The circuit court confirmed the decision of the Industrial Commission, and upon the petition of the city a writ of error was awarded to review the judgment of the circuit court.

The only question in the case is whether the accident arose out of the deceased's employment. The rule is that an accident, to be within the Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, §§ 126-152i), must have had its origin in some risk of the employment, but the cases are so various that it is impossible to establish a fixed rule for determining what is a risk of the employment. We have held that an injury to an employé in a fight with another employé growing out of a quarrel about the employer's work in which they were engaged arises out of the employment. In Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Com., 285 Ill. 31, 120 N. E. 530, we held that there must be some causal relation between the employment and the...