City of Chicago v. Crane

• Decision Date: 02 July 1943
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 42542.
• Citation: 49 N.E.2d 802,319 Ill.App. 623
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. CRANE.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

319 Ill.App. 623

49 N.E.2d 802

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.CRANE.

Gen. No. 42542.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

July 2, 1943.

Appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; John Gutknecht, Judge.

The City of Chicago filed a quasi-criminal complaint against G. Crane for violating a city ordinance prohibiting the parking of automobiles at any curb within 15 feet of a fire hydrant. From a judgment for defendant, the City of Chicago appeals.

Reversed and remanded. Barnet Hodes, of Chicago (J. Herzl Segal and Alphonse Cerza, both of Chicago, of counsel) for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

O'CONNOR, Presiding Justice.

May 1, 1942, a quasi-criminal complaint, by leave of court, was filed, charging that defendant, G. Crane, on January 24, 1942, violated certain sections of the Municipal Code of Chicago. Then follow more than 70 different ordinances that defendant is said to have violated and concluding, “In violation of Chapter 27 Section 19-7 of the Municipal Code of Chicago.” On the same day a quasi-criminal warrant was issued for the arrest of Crane and he was taken into custody June 2, 1942, when an order was entered postponing the trial and a number of other similar orders were thereafter entered. One of the orders recited that defendant elected to waive a jury and by agreement, the cause was submitted to the court. July 2, 1942, an order was entered which recites that the cause came on for trial before the court and by agreement of parties, a jury was waived; that defendant entered a plea of not guilty, the court heard the evidence, found defendant not guilty, and he was discharged. Afterward, August 6, an order was entered denying plaintiff's motion to vacate the order discharging defendant.

From the report of the proceedings of the trial it appears that defendant is a lawyer and represented himself. At the opening of the trial he stated that he was appearing specially. “It is my contention that the court does not have jurisdiction over me and that sections 27-34.1 and 27-34.2 of the Municipal Code of Chicago are invalid.” Thereupon counsel for the City stated that defendant was charged with having violated § 27-19(7) of the Municipal Code of Chicago. The ordinances above mentioned by defendant provide, 27-34.1: “Whenever any vehicle shall have been parked in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter prohibiting or restricting parking, the person in whose name such vehicle is registered shall be subject to the penalty for such violation.

“27-34.2. Whenever any vehicle is parked in violation of the provisions of this chapter prohibiting or restricting parking and there is no person in attendance upon such parked vehicle to be arrested or served immediately with a notice to appear in court to answer the charge of such violation, any police officer observing such violation may attach to the vehicle used in such violation, a notification or ticket, so that the person in whose name such vehicle is registered may appear in the Municipal Court of Chicago on a day certain and at a designated court room, to be named in such notice and answer to the charge of such violation.

“It shall be unlawful for any person, other than the driver of the vehicle to which said notice is attached, to remove the same from said vehicle.”

The other sections of the ordinances are (27-19(7) ): “It shall be unlawful for the operator of a vehicle to stop, stand or park such vehicle in any of the following places, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or official traffic sign or signal: * * *

“(7) At any curb within fifteen feet of a fire hydrant.”

After these ordinances were called to the attention of the court the parties stipulated that “on January 24, 1942 the defendant owned an automobile with Illinois license plates bearing number 172-951 and a Chicago vehicle tax emblem bearing number A608991; that on said day the said automobile was seen parked for thirty-five minutes five feet away from a fire hydrant located at the curb in front of the premises located at 408 N. Clark Street, in the City of Chicago. * * * That a police officer of the City of Chicago saw the defendant's car parked at said time and place and attached to said motor vehicle a ticket stating that there had been a violation of section 27-19(7) of the Municipal Code of Chicago and directing the owner to appear in the Municipal Court on January 26, 1942.” The stipulation further shows that defendant failed to appear and afterward a letter was sent to him (by a representative of the City) advising him that if he did not voluntarily appear within 48 hours a warrant would issue for his arrest.

At the conclusion of the stipulation defendant elected not to put in any evidence. The court, in rendering his decision said that the City had introduced no evidence against defendant that tended to prove he had violated the parking ordinance except that the license plates on the car showed it was owned by defendant [and defendant stipulated that he did own a car]. The court continuing said: “Counsel for the city stated no law or ordinance that could make the defendant liable for the act of illegal parking where the defendant had not committed it or directed, save a certain ordinance passed on April 3, 1940. This ordinance purports to make the owner of a car liable whenever the car is illegally parked. Such an ordinance, as I see it, is completely without basis in law. There is no power delegated by the State Legislature to the city that enables it to make a defendant liable for a parking violation which he did not commit or authorize.”

The contention of defendant made at the opening of the trial (he has filed no brief in this court) seems to be that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over him because the police officer attached a ticket to the parked automobile. This is clearly a misapprehension. The City does not claim it obtained jurisdiction in this manner but says that afterwards a complaint was filed, a warrant issued and he was taken on the warrant and appeared in the trial of the case. Obviously the court had jurisdiction over him.

Section 27-19 makes it unlawful for the “ operator” of a vehicle to park it at any curb within 15 feet of a fire hydrant, while § 27-34.1 provides that when any vehicle shall have been parked in violation of § 27-19(7) “the person in whose name such vehicle is registered shall be subject to the penalty for such violation.” We are of opinion that under the stipulated facts, defendant violated the ordinance and was liable, and the court erred in discharging him.

When it appeared from the stipulation of facts that defendant owned the car that was parked near the fire hydrant, the City made out a prima facie case against him. Howard v. Amerson, 236 Ill.App. 587;Kavale v. Morton Salt Co., 329 Ill. 445, 160 N.E. 752, affirming this court in the same case, 242 Ill.App. 205. Although these two cases were civil actions and the instant case is quasi-criminal [City of Chicago v. Dickson, 221 Ill.App. 255], we think the rule is applicable.

In Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601, defendant was charged with parking or allowing to be parked, an automobile registered in her name contrary to the regulation adopted by the Boston Traffic Commission. She was found guilty on each of the two counts and sentenced to pay a fine of $5 on each...