City of St. Louis v. Cook

• Decision Date: 13 June 1949
• Docket Number: 41077
• Parties: The City of St. Louis, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent, v. Fernand J. Cook, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

221 S.W.2d 468

359 Mo. 270

The City of St. Louis, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent, v. Fernand J. Cook, Appellant

No. 41077

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 13, 1949

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction; Hon. David W. FitzGibbon, Judge.

Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

A conviction for illegal parking may be based upon the presumption in the ordinance of the City of St. Louis that the person in whose name an illegally parked vehicle is registered is the person who has parked or authorized the parking of such vehicle. The presumption is reasonable and does not violate defendant's constitutional rights.

Fernand J. Cook and Vincent J. Correnti for appellant.

(1) "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause." Bill of Rights, Article 1, Section 19, Missouri Constitution of 1945. "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (2) "That in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the witnesses against him face to face to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county." Section 18 (a) of Article I, Constitution of Missouri, 1945. (3) "That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written oath or affirmation." Sec. 15, Art. 1, Missouri Constitution 1945. (4) In cases which have held that prosecutions for violations of city ordinances are civil cases, where regard for personal liberty demands it, the application of the strict rules adhered to in criminal cases, govern. Marble Hill v. Caldwell, 189 Mo.App. 286; Stanberry v. O'Neal, 166 Mo.App. 709, 150 S.W. 1104; City of Grant City v. Simmons, 167 Mo.App. 183, 151 S.W. 187. (5) Ordinance 41240, upon which the information and judgment is based, is unconstitutional and void because it establishes a presumption of guilt and permits a finding of such guilt when in fact there has been no proof of any guilt on the part of the defendant, and thus deprives him of his life, liberty and property without due process of law in contravention of Article 1, Section 10, Missouri Constitution of 1945 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. (6) "If the accused shall not avail himself or herself of his or her right to testify, or of the testimony of the wife or husband, on the trial in the case, it shall not be construed to affect the innocence or guilt of the accused, nor shall the same raise any presumption of guilt, nor be referred to by any attorney in the case, nor be considered by the Court or jury before whom the trial takes place. Section 4082, R.S. 1939. (7) Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of proving that the defendant had parked the vehicle at the time and place charged and defendant's demurrer to the state's evidence should have been sustained, for the defendant by the strong presumption of innocence should not be required to meet the State's cases when the State, unassisted has made no case. State v. King, 53 S.W.2d 252, 331 Mo. 268; State v. Perkins, 18 S.W.2d 6; State v. Hardy, 34 S.W.2d 102, 326 Mo. 969; Burnside v. Doolittle, 324 Mo. 722, 24 S.W.2d 1011; Frohman v. Lowenstein, 303 Mo. 339, 260 S.W. 460. (8) "Further we must be governed by the fundamental rules; that the appellant is presumed to be innocent; that the state must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that he cannot be prejudiced by his failure to testify; that the difficulty of proving an essential fact does not dispense with the necessity of proving it, and that since the evidence is wholly circumstantial, the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other and tend to prove guilt, and must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." State v. Simler, 350 Mo. 646. (9) As a matter of law the mere (registration of) ownership of a vehicle should not be sufficient evidence to constitute an inference that the owner violated the law, nor to rebut the presumption of innocence of the defendant. In State ex rel. v. Cox, 298 Mo. 427, the Supreme Court held, in effect, that where the evidence demonstrates that defendant's liability is built on presumption or inference dependent upon other presumption or inference, and therefore founded on mere conjecture, a judgment for plaintiff cannot stand. Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1; Yarnell v. Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 570; Bigelow v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 48 Mo.App. 367; State v. Lackland, 136 Mo. 26; Glick v. Railroad, 57 Mo.App. 97.

James E. Crowe, City Counselor, John P. McCammon and Frank A. Neun, Assistant City Counselors, for respondent.

(1) Proof that defendant is registered owner of vehicle parked in violation of ordinances is sufficient to sustain conviction. People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 747, 31 N.E.2d 501; State v. Morgan, Rhode Is., 48 A.2d 248. (2) Ordinance enacting prima facie presumption that registered owner parked vehicle in no parking zone violates no constitutional provisions and, in absence of proof as to who did park the vehicle, will sustain a conviction. People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248; Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601; City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill.App. 623, 49 N.E.2d 802; Commonwealth v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 20, 122 S.W.2d 1006; People v. Bigman, 38 Cal.App. (2d) 773, 100 P.2d 370. (3) Parking violation is not a crime against public law, nor malum in se. Although by statute the trial is governed by criminal procedure, it yet remains a civil action. City of Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo.App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935; Sec. 7363, R.S. 1939. (4) City ordinance may declare what facts shall be prima facie evidence of the fact sought to be established in prosecution for parking violation. O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762; State v. Shelby, 333 Mo. 1036, 64 S.W.2d 269; Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664. (5) Enacted presumption is a rule of evidence requiring defendant to go forward with the evidence. Its use is not excluded by ancient axioms of criminal law. It does not compel defendant to testify against himself. Nor does it negate the presumption of innocence or the burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248; Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 45 S.Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904; State v. Shelby, 333 Mo. 1036, 64 S.W.2d 269.

Van Osdol, C. Bradley and Dalton, CC., concur.

OPINION

VAN OSDOL

This case involves questions of the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 41240 of the City of St Louis, which ordinance provides, "The presence of any vehicle in or upon any public street . . . in violation of any ordinance regulating the parking of such vehicle . . . shall be prima facie evidence that the person . . . in whose name such vehicle is registered on either the records of the City License Collector or the records of the Secretary of State of the State of Missouri, committed or authorized such violation." Section 3568 of the Revised Code of St. Louis, 1936, provides, "It shall be unlawful for the operator of a vehicle to stop, stand or park such vehicle in any of the following places . . . (c) between a safety zone and the adjacent curb . . .." Defendant-appellant was charged and convicted in the City Court for the violation of Section 3568, supra, and upon appeal was tried in the Court of Criminal Correction, found guilty, and fined five dollars and costs.

Upon trial in the Court of Criminal Correction, plaintiff-respondent introduced evidence tending to establish a Ford Tudor sedan had been parked between a safety zone and the adjacent curb at 101 North Fourth Street in St. Louis, in violation of the Section 3568, supra. City police officers and traffic officials testified the vehicle had been "tagged" with an "arrest notice" to the registered owner to appear at the Traffic Violation Bureau and pay a nominal fine; otherwise, an arrest would be ordered or a summons served by due process of law. In default of his appearance, within the stated time, defendant was served with summons to appear in the City Court and answer the stated charge. The evidence showed the vehicle so parked and "tagged" was registered on the records of the Secretary of State in defendant's name, and likewise on the records of the City License Collector of St. Louis. No other or direct evidence was introduced tending to identify the person who had actually parked the vehicle. And defendant did not introduce any evidence.

It is contended by defendant-appellant the Ordinance No. 41240 is unconstitutional and void in that it deprives a defendant "of life, liberty or property without due process of law" (Section 10, Article I, Constitution of Missouri 1945; Section 1, Amendment 14, Constitution of the United States); and in that it compels a person "to testify against himself in a criminal cause" (Section 19, Article I, Constitution of Missouri, 1945). It is asserted the ordinance violates the fundamental rules that a defendant is presumed to be innocent; that the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and that he cannot be prejudiced by his failure to testify. Defendant also cites Sections 15 and 18 (a), Article I, Constitution of Missouri, 1945; and Section 4082 R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A. § 4082, as intended to prevent the "intrusion upon a...