City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Commission

• Decision Date: 21 May 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34627,34627
• Parties: , 24 P.U.R.3d 334 The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 776

150 N.E.2d 776

13 Ill.2d 607, 24 P.U.R.3d 334

The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Appellees.

No. 34627.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 21, 1958.

John C. Melaniphy, Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Joseph F. Grossman, J. J. Danaher, and Edward V. Hanrahan, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen. (Harry R. Begley, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Ill. Commerce Commission.

Ross & O'Keefe, Chicago (Clarence H. Ross, Melvin A. Hardies, John M. Connery and Joseph H. Mueller, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co.

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

This case involves an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission, herein called Commission, directing that a cost-of-natural-gas adjustment clause be filed as part of the regular tariffs of Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, herein called Peoples. The city of Chicago, appellant, took an appeal to the superior court of Cook County, which confirmed the Commission's order, and from that order it brings this direct appeal, under section 69 of the Public Utilities Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 111 2/3, par. 73.

Upon petition of Peoples, the Commission, on December 18, 1956, ordered that Third Revised Sheet No. T-6 be filed in its present schedule of rates, providing for an automatic adjustment from time to time of its sales price for gas, to reflect changes in the wholesale cost to Peoples of natural gas purchased. In substance, the automatic adjustment or escalator clause provides for increases or decreases in the charges for gas sold by Peoples (except to certain classes of customers) to the extent of increases or decreases in the wholesale price of such gas.

Peoples is a public utility engaged in the business of distributing and selling gas within the city of Chicago. It purchases its entire supply of natural gas from two subsidiaries, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, herein called Natural, and Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Company, herein called Texas Illinois. Peoples owns 100% of the common stock of Natural and approxmately 70% of the common stock of Texas Illinois, both of which are natural gas companies under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, herein called FPC. (U.S.C.A. Title 15, §§ 717c and 717d.) Natural and Texas Illinois either purchase or produce natural gas in the gas fields, transport it by pipe line, and sell it to at least 10 gas distribution companies which resell it to customers. More than 60% of the total natural gas volume of Natural and Texas Illinois is sold to distributors and customers other than Peoples. In 1955 the wholesale cost of natural gas, fixed by the FPC, amounted to approximately 46% of the operating expense of Peoples, and constituted the largest item of such expense.

The city of Chicago contends that the automatic adjustment clause is unnecessary and against the public interest, and that the action of the Commission exceeded its statutory power. The Commission and Peoples claim that the Public Utilities Act permits such an automatic adjustment clause, and that the present order of the Commission is not an abuse of discretion.

We turn first to the question of the power of the Commission to authorize an automatic adjustment clause in a utility rate schedule. It is conceded that this question is one of first impression in this court, although, as an administrative practice, such automatic adjustment clauses have long been permitted. (Public Utilities Fortnightly, Nov. 24, 1955, p. 894; Report of Subcommittee on Rate Adjustment Clauses of the American Gas Association, 1956, sec. VI.) The governing statutory provisions are contained in section 36 of the Public Utilities Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 111 2/3, par. 36) which provides the method for any change 'in any rate or other charge or classification, or in any rule, regulation, practice or contract relating to or affecting any rate or other charge, classification or service, * * *.' The section requires that the utility must file its proposed new schedule with the Commission 30 days before the schedule is to be effective. After the schedule is filed, the Commission shall have the power 'either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, * * * to enter upon a hearing concerning the propriety of such rate or other charge, classification, contract, practice, rule or regulation, and pending the hearing and decision thereon, such rate or other charge, * * * shall not go into effect. * * * All such rates or other charges, * * * not so suspended shall, on the expiration of thirty days from the time of filing the same with the Commission, or of such lesser time as the Commission may grant, go into effect and be the established and effective rates or other charges, * * * subject to the power of the Commission, after a hearing had on its own motion or upon complaint, as herein provided, to alter or modify the same.'

As we said in Antioch Milling Co. v. Public Service Co., 4 Ill.2d 200, 204, 123 N.E.2d 302, 304: 'This language seems clearly to contemplate that the commission shall analyze a proposed rate change, and reach a conclusion as to whether it is to be permitted to go into effect without a formal hearing, or whether it is to be suspended until a formal hearing has been had. * * * The commission has thus been given authority either to suspend the new rate or let it go into effect, a technique of utility regulation which is not at all uncommon.'

The city of Chicago contends that the authorization of the automatic adjustment clause contravenes section 36 and permits changes in rates without the filing of rate schedules and constitutes an abuse of the exercise of the Commission's discretion. We cannot agree. As commonly used, 'rate' is defined as a 'price or amount stated or fixed on anything with relation to a standard; a fixed ratio; a settled proportion.' (Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2d ed., p. 1496.) Under the statute, "Rate' includes every individual or joint rate, fare, toll, charge, rental or other compensation of any public utility or any two or more such individual or joint rates, fares, tolls, charges, rental or other compensation of any public utility or any schedule or tariff thereof, and any rule, regulation, charge, practice or contract relating thereto.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 111 2/3, par. 10.16.) Under the common, as well as the statutory definition, it is clear that the statutory authority to approve rate schedules embraces more than the authority to approve rates fixed in terms of dollars and cents. The present automatic adjustment clause is a set formula by which the price of natural gas to the ultimate consumer is fixed by inserting in the formula the wholesale price of natural gas as established by the FPC. The Public Utilities Act, taken as a whole, contemplates that a rate schedule may contain provisions which will affect the dollar-and-cents cost of the product sold. Many State public utility commissions, operating under similar statutory provisions, have approved automatic adjustment clauses, as is indicated in the Public Utility Reports (PUR). Re Worcester Gas Light Co. (Mass.1955) 9 PUR 3d 152; Re New Jersey Natural Gas Co. (1954) 6 PUR 3d 249; Re Virginia Electric & Power Co. (1954) 7 PUR 3d 108; Re Wisconsin Power & Light Co. (1955) 9 PUR 3d 422; Re Washington Gas Light Co. (D.C.1954) 4 PUR 3d 105.

At the close of 1954, sixty-five gas distributing companies in twenty-six States had adjustment clauses in their rate schedules based on the cost of purchased gas, and twenty-two companies in twelve States had adjustment clauses based on either cost of purchased gas or fuel to manufacture gas. However, we know of only one case where such a clause has been given judicial scrutiny. In City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140, the city appealed from an order of the State Corporation Commission authorizing a substantially similar automatic adjustment clause in the rate schedules of gas distribution companies. The statutory authority of the Virginia Commission is, in all material respects, almost identical with that of the Illinois Commission. (Cf. Code of Virginia, 1950, secs. 56-235 to 56-237.) The city of Chicago apparently concedes that this case is squarely in point on the issue of the basic statutory authority of the Commission. Therefore we have carefully considered the holding and rationale of this decision. The city of Norfolk, like the city of Chicago, agrued, first, that the Commission trancended the limits of the legislative discretion vested in it, and second, that an automatic increase in the charge to consumers, based on an increase in the wholesale cost of gas, is illegal since there is no provision for a public hearing when each additional increase becomes effective. After analyzing the statutory provisions almost identical to those in Illinois, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, at 90 S.E.2d 140, pages 148 and 149 stated:

'Hence, the power of the Commission is not limited to the mere change of a particular rate that the public must pay for the service rendered by a public utility, but it has the power to change, under certain conditions, any part of a filed schedule, rate, rule or regulation that in any manner affects the rates charged or to be charged. The General Assembly has, * * * 'recognized that rate schedules consist not merely of lists of rates in dollars and cents, but that they customarily include provisions that will in various ways affect the rates charged at the time of filing or to be charged thereafter.'

'The proposed escalator clause is nothing more or less than a fixed rule under which future rates to be charged the public are determined. It is simply an addition of a mathematical formula to the filed schedules of the Company under which the rates and charges fluctuate as...