City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. of America

• Citation: 84 Ohio App. 43,81 N.E.2d 310
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 15 March 1948
• Parties: CITY OF CLEVELAND et al. v. DIVISION 268 OF AMALGAMATED ASS'N OF STREET ELECTRIC RAILWAY & MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA et al.

81 N.E.2d 310

84 Ohio App. 43

CITY OF CLEVELAND et al. v. DIVISION 268 OF AMALGAMATED ASS'N OF STREET ELECTRIC RAILWAY & MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA et al.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga.

March 15, 1948

Robert J. Shoup, of Cleveland, for plaintiff appellant.

Dan Duffy and Bernard Friedman, both of Cleveland, for defendant appellees.

HURD, Presiding Judge.

This matter comes to this court at this time upon the motion of plaintiff appellant for a temporary restraining order 'in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff's petition in case No. 587223 of the Common Pleas Court' which case has been docketed in this court on appeal on questions of law from the final order of the common pleas court dismissing the petition in said action.

The form of application requires reference to the original petition filed February 12, 1948, the prayer of which is as follows:

'Wherefore plaintiff prays that, pending final hearing and determination of the issues hereof, a restraining order be issued forthwith against the defendants, and each and all of them, their officers, agents, members and employees and of others to whom knowledge of this order should come, restraining and enjoining them:

'1. From interfering in any manner whatsoever with the plaintiff's officers, supervisors, agents, employees and representatives in the operation of plaintiff's car lines; and from interfering by force, intimidation or threats, in any manner whatsoever with those of plaintiff's employees carrying out the orders and regulations of plaintiff's supervisors officers and agents;

'2. From protecting, aiding or abetting or assisting any one in the commission of said acts;

'3. From counselling, advising, directing or ordering any of plaintiff's employees to violate the provisions of Ohio General Code Sec. 17-8;

'4. From intimidating, coercing or unlawfully influencing plaintiff's employees from remaining in or from assuming their required public employment and from inducing, coercing or intimidating plaintiff's employees to stop their work or to abstain in whole or in part from the full faithful and proper performance of their duties.

'5. From interfering with the egress from plaintiff's car houses of any of plaintiff's cars; and that upon final hearing, said order be made permanent, and for such order and further relief as the plaintiff may be entitled within the premises.'

At the time of the filing of the petition in common pleas court the appellant herein filed affidavits in support of its application for a temporary order and on February 12, 1948, the court made an entry allowing a temporary restraining order as prayed for. Thereafter the case came before the trial court for trial on the merits on March 2, 1948 at which time at the conclusion of the opening statements the defendants moved the court for judgment, which motion was granted, the injunction denied and the petition dismissed.

It is from the final order of the court that this action is here upon appeal and the temporary restraining order is prayed for pending decision on appeal.

While injunction in Ohio is to a certain degree statutory, it has always been recognized to be equitable in its nature and subject to all the rules of courts of chancery. It is frequently denominated as 'the strong arm of the law' or 'of equity' and is often characterized as 'summary' high or 'extraordinary.' ^[1]

Injunction is essentially a preventive remedy designed to guard against future injury rather than to afford redress for wrongs already suffered.

Concerning the effect of change in conditions, we find the following in 21 Ohio Jurisprudence 993, paragraph 10:

'The principle that the extent and nature of the relief granted by a court of equity will be determined by the facts as they exist at the time of the decree and not, as at law, according to those existing at the inception of the litigation, applies to actions for injunctions with particular force by reason of the fact that injunctions must operate in the future. Accordingly, even though there may have been a right to an injunction as matters stood at the institution of the action in which it is sought, the injunction will not be granted if at the time of the hearing conditions are so changed that no unlawful act is threatened. * * * This rule applies not only to changes occurring while the action is pending in the court of original jurisdiction, but also to those which occur while it is pending in an appellate court.' (emphasis ours)

Generally speaking, injunctions and restraining orders should be granted only to prevent injustice and unnecessary...