City of Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Com.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. E005492,E005492
• Citation: 258 Cal.Rptr. 795,210 Cal.App.3d 1277
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CITY OF COACHELLA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RIVERSIDE COUNTY AIRPORT LAND USE COMMISSION, a local public agency, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 795

258 Cal.Rptr. 795

210 Cal.App.3d 1277

CITY OF COACHELLA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RIVERSIDE COUNTY AIRPORT LAND USE COMMISSION, a local public agency, Defendant and Appellant.

No. E005492.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

May 25, 1989.

Gerald J. Geerlings, County Counsel, and Katherine A. Lind, Deputy County Counsel, Riverside, and Adams, Duque & Hazeltine, Richard R. Terzian and Cristina L. Sierra, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant

Richards, Watson & Gershon, William L. Strausz, Mitchell E. Abbott and William B. Rudell, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

CAMPBELL, Presiding Justice.

This case involves a dispute between a local airport land use commission and a city concerning the commission's (non)compliance with certain provisions of the State Aeronautics Act. (Pub.Util.Code, § 21001, et seq.)

Appellant (hereafter, the Commission) appeals from a judgment of the superior court granting the petition of respondent (hereafter, the City) for a writ of mandate to void, annul and set aside the Thermal Airport Land Use Plan which had been adopted by the Commission.

FACTS

On May 29, 1986, following two public hearings on the matter, the Commission adopted the Thermal Airport Land Use Plan (TALUP) pursuant to sections 21674, subdivision (c), and 21675, subdivision (a), of the Public Utilities Code. In very general terms, the TALUP purported to: (1) Identify those areas surrounding the Thermal Airport that were (or might be) subject to increased hazard or detriment occasioned by the operation of the airport; and (2) establish development standards and criteria for the identified areas so as to minimize the anticipated hazards and detriments. The City, although it had received notice of the public hearings concerning the adoption of the TALUP, chose not to participate in (or submit written materials for consideration at) either of the two hearings.

In November 1986, the Commission determined that certain tentative tract maps being processed by the City were inconsistent with the provisions of the TALUP. Pursuant to section 21676.5, subdivision (a), of the Public Utilities Code, the Commission communicated this determination to the City, which then promptly overrode the Commission's determination pursuant to that same statutory provision.

Shortly thereafter, on January 22, 1987, the Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) of Riverside County met to consider an application to have a certain parcel of land annexed to the City. The parcel lay within the area identified by the TALUP as being influenced by the operation of the Thermal Airport. The Commission appeared at the LAFCO hearing to oppose the annexation on the ground that the proposed use of the parcel, under the land-use regulations of the City, would conflict with the TALUP. The LAFCO staff agreed with the position taken by the Commission, and the LAFCO denied the application for annexation.

On June 4, 1987, the Commission determined that the City's "general plan" was inconsistent with the requirements of the TALUP.

Four days later, on June 8, 1987, the City filed the substantive equivalent of the instant action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Following a determination by that court that an improper venue had been chosen for the action, the matter was refiled in Riverside County on August 19, 1987. ¹

The City's action sought a writ of "traditional" mandate (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085) to void, annul and set aside the TALUP. The gist of the City's attack on the TALUP was that it failed to meet the statutory requirements set forth in the Public Utilities Code for airport land-use plans--in particular, the statutory requirement that such land-use plans "shall include a long-range master plan that reflects the anticipated growth of the airport during at least the next 20 years." (Pub.Util.Code, § 21675, subd. (a).)

On March 28, 1988, following extensive briefing and oral argument, the trial court issued its Memorandum of Intended Decision "A review of all of the competent evidence that has been presented to this Court has caused this Court to conclude that the Thermal Airport Land Use Plan ('TALUP') which has been adopted by the respondent does not satisfy the requirements of Section 21675(a) when read in conjunction with Section 21670. The 'TALUP' plan does not contain either a noise study or a safety study. It also fails to reflect the realistic growth of the Thermal Airport during the next twenty years....

which memorandum stated in pertinent part:

"For the reasons discussed above, this Court has concluded that the respondent has a mandatory duty pursuant to Section 21675 to formulate a long-range master plan that reflects the anticipated growth of the Thermal Airport during at least the next 20 years. (C.C.P. 1085.) The adoption of the so-called 'TALUP' plan does not satisfy that statutory requirement because it does not contain either a noise study or a safety study, among other deficiencies. The petitioner is a party who is beneficially interested in the performance of such duty by the respondent. (C.C.P. 1086) Substantial rights of the petitioner are at stake and the petitioner has no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. (C.C.P. 1086.)

"Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandate."

The Commission filed objections to this Memorandum of Intended Decision, seeking a more detailed and definitive statement of decision by the trial court. The trial court declined to consider these objections on the ground that they had not been timely filed.

On April 12, 1988, the trial court formally adopted its Memorandum of Intended Decision as its Statement of Decision under section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure and entered judgment in favor of the City. On May 18, 1988, the writ of mandate issued.

The Commission has appealed from the judgment of the trial court and has raised the following issues and contentions (somewhat re-characterized for clarity and focus) on appeal;

(1) The City's action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations;

(2) The City's action was barred by the doctrine of laches;

(3) The trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the matter inasmuch as the City failed to exhaust its administrative remedies;

(4) The trial court reviewed the TALUP under the wrong standard of review--which standard, if it had been used, would have led to a determination that the TALUP is valid;

(5) The trial court's statement of decision is deficient as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in not considering the Commission's objections thereto; and

(6) The writ issued by the trial court is excessively overbroad in that it undermines the legislative intent reflected in the statutory scheme at issue.

Additional facts will be referred to, as needed, in the discussion and analysis which follows.

DISCUSSION

I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), of the Government Code (a statutory provision found in Division 1, "Planning and Zoning," of Title 7, "Planning and Land Use," of that Code) sets forth a 120-day statute of limitations for all actions seeking "[t]o attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a legislative body to adopt ... a general or specific plan." The Commission argues that this statute of limitations bars the City's action because the adoption of an airport land use plan under the authority of the State Aeronautics Act is "analogous" to the adoption of a general or specific plan under the authority of the land-use planning and zoning authority of the Government Code. While we agree with the Commission that the two types of "adoption" are, in general terms, analogous, we do not agree that this analogical similarity compels the application of the 120-day statute of limitations of The Legislature has expressly declared that the purpose of Government Code section 65009 is "to provide certainty for property owners and local governments regarding decisions made pursuant to this division." (Gov.Code, § 65009, subd. (a)(3), emphasis added.) The decision to adopt an airport land use plan is not a decision made pursuant to Division 1, Title 7, of the Government Code.

Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), to the matter at hand.

If the Legislature had intended to apply the 120-day statute of limitations here in question to an airport land use plan, it presumably would have done so in clear and unambiguous language. It is beyond argument that the Legislature is at least aware of the interplay between airport land use plans and the type of planning directly contemplated by Division 1, Title 7, of the Government Code--section 65302.3 of the Government Code specifically addresses the need for consistency between local general plans and airport land use plans.

We are persuaded that the Government Code's reference to airport land use plans in section 65302.3, together with the lack of any such reference in section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), of that code, evinces a legislative intent that the 120-day statute of limitations found in section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), of the Government Code not apply to actions such as this one. This conclusion is entirely consistent with the limited purpose of Government Code section 65009 expressed by the Legislature in subdivision (a)(3) of that section.

The City's action was not barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1).

II. LACHES

The Commission next argues that the City's action is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.

"[T]he affirmative defense of laches requires unreasonable delay in bringing suit 'plus either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.' ... Generally speaking, the existence of laches is a question of fact to be determined by...