City of Coleman v. Kenley
Decision Date | 12 February 1943 |
Docket Number | No. 2326.,2326. |
Citation | 168 S.W.2d 926 |
Parties | CITY OF COLEMAN v. KENLEY. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Coleman County; O. L. Parish, Judge.
Action by Wilson J. Kenley against the City of Coleman and others to recover for the death of plaintiff's minor son by electrocution. A compromise settlement was agreed on by plaintiff and the defendants other than the City of Coleman, and they were dismissed from the action. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the City of Coleman, the City of Coleman appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Dibrell & Snodgrass, of Coleman, for appellant.
Baker & Baker, of Coleman, for appellee.
Wilson J. Kenley instituted this suit against the City of Coleman and A. J. Wallace, M. E. Ruby and L. R. Bowden to recover damages suffered by reason of the accidental death by electrocution of his minor son, W. J. Kenley, Jr. On March 10, 1942, the cause came on for trial, whereupon a compromise settlement was agreed upon by Plaintiff and Wallace, Ruby and Bowden, whereby in consideration of the payment to plaintiff of $2,000, Wallace, Ruby and Bowden (hereinafter referred to as Wallace et al.) were dismissed from the suit. Plaintiff then (on March 10, 1942), filed an amended petition in which the City of Coleman was the sole defendant and in which the City alone was charged with negligently causing the death of his boy. The cause then proceeded to trial against the City as the sole defendant. Upon a jury verdict finding the damages suffered by Plaintiff to be $4,500, judgment was rendered against the City for $2,500, thus crediting the judgment with the $2,000 paid by Wallace et al. The City has appealed.
The City's first four points are that the Court erred (1) in overruling Appellant's motion for judgment, (2) in refusing to instruct a verdict for the City, and (3) in overruling the City's second and (4) third grounds of his motion for judgment. Under these points the City presents two propositions, stated as follows:
One: "Appellee, having received a full satisfaction and compensation for damage resulting from the tortious death of his son, W. J. Kenley, Jr. in the settlement with this Appellant's alleged joint tort-feasors, Wallace, Ruby and Bowden, was not entitled to any recovery herein against Appellant."
Two: "The appellee having accepted a payment of $2000.00 from Wallace, Ruby and Bowden, alleged joint tort-feasors with Appellant City of Coleman, in full discharge, release and satisfaction of all claim against them arising or growing out of the death of W. J. Kenley, are precluded from recovering against the Appellant for any damage allegedly arising out of said death."
Kenley answered said propositions, among other things, with counter-points asserting that the compromise settlement and agreed judgment between Kenley and Wallace et al. (made with the knowledge and consent of the City and the City being a party to the agreement and judgment) did not release the City, but on the contrary in the agreement and judgment Kenley expressly reserved the right to sue the City for damages, and that it was not contemplated or intended by any of the parties that the payment by Wallace et al. was to be in full satisfaction of the damages suffered by plaintiff; that plaintiff accepted $2,000 from Wallace et al. only as part satisfaction of his damages and was not thereby estopped from seeking the balance of his damages from the City.
At the time of the compromise settlement, agreed judgment and dismissal of Wallace et al. from the suit, there was a companion case pending in the same court against the same defendants, that is, the case of Elder Smith et al. v. City of Coleman et al. Smith also made a compromise settlement with Wallace et al. Thereupon the following agreed judgment was rendered in each of said cases:
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