City of Columbus v. Jamie Goldston, 90-LW-4778

• Decision Date: 23 November 1990
• Docket Number: 90AP-188,90-LW-4778
• Parties: CITY OF COLUMBUS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JAMIE GOLDSTON, Defendant-Appellant CASE
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

CITY OF COLUMBUS, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JAMIE GOLDSTON, Defendant-Appellant

No. 90AP-188.

90-LW-4778 (10th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District Franklin.

November 23, 1990

MR RONALD J. O'BRIEN, City Attorney; MR. JAMES J. FAIS and MR. THOMAS K. LINDSEY, for Appellee.

MR JAMES KURA, Public Defender, and MR. PAUL SKENDELAS, for Appellant.

OPINION

STRAUSBAUGH J.,

This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court in which defendant was found guilty of driving a motor vehicle without a valid operator's license. Following a plea of no contest, the trial court imposed a fine of $250 and costs.

At 2:45 a.m. on May 5, 1989, Blendon Township police officer John Watt, observed two persons and a vehicle parked in the parking lot of a motorcycle equipment store. The business was closed, and there were no other cars in the parking lot. The vehicle did not have its headlights or parking lights on. Watt could see two persons seated in the vehicle but was unable to determine what they were doing. Watt made a U-turn and came back to investigate. Watt testified that several vehicles had been broken into in the area along Cleveland Avenue and that several businesses had also been burglarized, generally occurring between 8:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. As he approached, Watt testified that the vehicle exited the parking lot and that he then proceeded to follow the vehicle and pulled it over.

Defendant, Jamie Goldston, was driving the vehicle. Watt asked defendant and her passenger what they were doing and they said they were only talking. Watt then asked defendant for identification in order to complete a field investigation report. Defendant produced a work identification and Watt ran her social security number through LEADS. A computer check indicated that defendant had a temporary permit so Watt asked the passenger in defendant's vehicle to produce a driver's license. The passenger was unable to produce a license, and Watt then issued defendant a citation for driving without a license.

At trial, defendant requested that the trial court suppress evidence alleging that the stop of defendant's vehicle and the resulting investigation by Watt were constitutionally unlawful. The trial court denied defendant's motion and a no contest plea was entered upon which defendant was convicted.

On appeal, defendant sets forth but one assignment of error for this court's review:

"The trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of appellant's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution."

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to suppress evidence since the circumstances giving rise to the stopping of her vehicle failed to provide the officer with a reasonable suspicion for the intrusion. Defendant points out that Watt had been a police officer for less than seven months at the time he observed defendant and her friend in the parking lot of a business bordering on Cleveland Avenue. Defendant argues that there existed no visual evidence indicating that a crime had been committed at the business nor did Watt observe any unusual movements inside or outside the vehicle.

In State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, certiorari denied (1981), 454 U.S. 822, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that there exists no bright line test for determining the validity of a stop.

The court held in paragraph one of the syllabus:

"The propriety of an investigative stop by a police officer must be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances."

The court continued in the body of its opinion in Freeman, supra, stating:

"We hold that the facts as presented herein did give the officer the right to minimally intrude upon the appellant. The specific and articulable facts supporting our conclusion are, to wit: (1) the location of the investigation being a high crime area; (2) the officer being quite aware of recent criminal activity in the motel parking lot in which appellant was parked; (3) the time of night being 3:00 a.m.; and (4) the appellant sitting alone in the car at the rear of the building for approximately 20 minutes with the engine turned off.

"All facts considered, we hold that the officer was only performing his police duties in a conscientious manner. It is contra to the very nature of the duty of an officer to patrol in a high crime area and to be oblivious to such aforementioned facts. * * *" Id. at 295.

Given the facts in the present case and their similarity to those presented in Freeman, supra, we find that Watt was justified in his initial' stop of defendant's vehicle.

Even if the initial investigatory stop was justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion, defendant insists that the detention which followed was unlawful since Watt pursued a general investigation of defendant long after he was satisfied that she had not been engaging in any criminal enterprise. Defendant insists that the request for identification in the present case was an administrative act designed to complete a field investigation report and was not supported by any facts or circumstances suggesting criminal activity.

In support of this position, defendant cites State v. Chatton (1984), 11 Ohio St. 3d. 59, certiorari denied, 469 U.S. 856. In Chatton, supra, the officer stopped the car for failing to display license plates. However, as he approached the car, the officer observed a temporary tag in the window. While no evidence of any other crime existed, the officer continued his investigation and eventually found a concealed weapon. The court reversed the concealed weapon conviction and held that since the officer no longer had a reasonable suspicion that defendant's vehicle was not properly licensed or registered, it was improper to further detain the defendant.

In Chatton, supra, the court stated:

"* * * [I]n Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, the United States Supreme Court condemned the use of random stops of vehicles to check the validity of the operator's driver's license and the vehicle's registration. The court held at 663:

"`* * * [E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 61.

In the present case, we believe that under Freeman, supra, Watt had "specific and articulable facts" sufficient to warrant a stop of defendant's vehicle and to briefly determine the validity of the identification given by defendant. In Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, the United States Supreme Court held:

"In Terry [v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1], this Court recognized that `a police officer may in appropriate circumstances in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.' Id., at 22. * * * The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. See id., at 23. * * * A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. * * *" Id. at 145-146.

Apparently, when stopped and asked for a driver's license, defendant gave Watt a work identification card. It has been held that the failure of an operator of a motor vehicle to produce his driver's license or to furnish satisfactory evidence thereof constitutes prima facie evidence of his not having obtained a...