City of Columbus v. Woodrick

• Decision Date: 04 May 1976
• Citation: 2 O.O.3d 232,48 Ohio App.2d 274,357 N.E.2d 58
• Parties: , 2 O.O.3d 232 The CITY OF COLUMBUS, Appellee, v. WOODRICK, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 274

48 Ohio App.2d 274

357 N.E.2d 58, 2 O.O.3d 232

The CITY OF COLUMBUS, Appellee, v. WOODRICK, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

May 4, 1976.

Syllabus by the Court

The failure of a court to allow defense counsel in a criminal trial to present a closing argument is reversible error, in the absence of a plain showing that there was an intentional waiver of the right.

John L. Francis, City Atty., Daniel W. Johnson, City Prosecutor, and Edwin L. Kirby, Columbus, for appellee.

William A. Toler, Columbus, for appellant.

REILLY, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court. The record shows defendant was arrested and charged with interfering with the custody of a juvenile who was duly committed to the Ohio Youth Commission. Columbus Code 2321.01(A)(1). The case was tried to the court. Defendant was found guilty and sentence was imposed. This appeal has now been perfected.

There was conflicting evidence presented. The city's case indicated that Carwona Bailey, a juvenile, was committed to the custody of the Ohio Youth Commission sometime during November 1973; that she was released November 27, 1974; and that she was absent without leave from her custodian, who was her mother. She was arrested by an officer of the Columbus Police Department, March 18, 1975, for 'solicitation to engage in sexual activity for hire.' The arrest was made at an apartment rented by defendant's husband. The record indicates Miss Bailey lived with him at the time of the arrest. Moreover, there was evidence presented in the city's case that she worked for him as a prostitute and he was aware of her status as a runaway.

The transcript also shows that defendant was seen the following day, March 19, 1975, with her husband removing clothing from the apartment where Miss Bailey was arrested. Subsequently, defendant and her husband, Johnny Woodrick, resided together at 947 Champion Avenue and took Carwona Bailey into their home. Defendant apparently posted bond for her. It appears she lived in the Woodrick residence for three or four weeks and generally was on friendly terms with defendant. The evidence does not reveal that she explicitly stated to defendant she was a juvenile and a runaway. There is some evidence, however, that defendant was aware of her soliciting activity.

Defense counsel moved at the close of the city's case for a judgment of acquittal, and this motion was overruled by the trial court; whereupon, the defense was presented. Miss Bailey testified that she did not tell defendant her past background and that she told her she was 22 years old. Defendant testified that she kept children for the Franklin County Children Services Board as well as the Franklin County Catholic Social Services. She verified that Miss Bailey told her she was 22 years of age and said her actions indicated she was not a minor. She also testified she was unaware of her husband's activities involving prostitution, and that her role in arranging bail for Miss Bailey was more or less as an innocent bystander. Defendant further testified that Carwona Bailey left her home. She said she took considerable time to find her so that she would be available for her hearing and, at least by inference, so she would not forfeit her bond money.

The trial court expressed a belief that defendant was aware of what was happening and was a participant in her husband's business. The court added that such a view was incidental to the particular charge involved. At any rate, the trial court found defendant guilty and proceeded with sentencing without the opportunity for oral argument by defendant's counsel.

This appeal was timely filed, including the following assignment of error:

'The Trial Court's summary pronouncement of its verdict without allowing defendant's counsel to present his closing oral argument after the presentation of the defendant's evidence amounted to a tacit refusal to hear closing arguments which thus denied defendant her right to effective assistance of counsel and due process of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.'

We recognize the pressures upon a trial court to expedite the completion of cases. Moreover, it appears unlikely that counsel's arguments would have changed the verdict. The determinative issue, however, involves a waiver of a constitutional right. The United States Supreme Court, in Herring v. New York (1975), 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, has specifically addressed this question. Mr. Justice Stewart, in the majority opinion, wrote at pages 2553-2554 as follows:

'There can be no doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial. Accordingly, it has universally been held that counsel for the defense has a right to make a closing summation to the jury, no matter how strong the case for the prosecution may...