City of Concord v. Public Emp. Labor Relations Bd.
| Decision Date | 12 October 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-050,79-050 |
| Parties | , 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2949 CITY OF CONCORD v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, State of New Hampshire. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Paul F. Cavanaugh, City Sol., by brief and orally for city of concord.
Dunn & Hilliard, Concord (Russell F. Hilliard, Concord, orally), for intervenor, Local 1045 of the Internl. Ass'n of Firefighters.
Appeal by the city under RSA ch. 541 from a denial by the Public Employee Labor Relations Board (hereinafter PELRB) of its petition for a declaratory judgment to invalidate the choice of a negotiating team by Unit B of Local 1045 of the International Association of Firefighters, its exclusive bargaining representative. RSA 273-A:11 IV.
By order of the PELRB, the Concord Fire Department was comprised of two bargaining units as follows:
Unit "A:" Firefighters; Dispatcher; Fire Alarm Lineman; Fire Prevention Inspector; and Firefighter Mechanic.
Unit "B:" Lieutenants, Chief Mechanic; Fire Department; Fire Alarm Superintendents; Assistant Fire Prevention Officer; Fire Prevention Officer; and Training Officer.
The two bargaining units were certified in conformity with the provision of RSA 273-A:8 II, which provides in part as follows:
Persons exercising supervisory authority involving the significant exercise of discretion may not belong to the same bargaining unit as the employees they supervise.
This controversy arose when Unit B (supervisory employees) chose, as members of their contract negotiating team, a fire lieutenant (member of Unit B) and two firefighters (members of Unit A).
The city maintains that if the above provisions are to have meaning they must be interpreted as expressing a legislative intent that a supervisory unit cannot designate nonsupervisory employees among its negotiating representatives. The city argues that there would be no point to mandate separate bargaining units for supervisors and for firefighters if negotiating, the primary function of these units, was permitted to be conducted by teams comprised jointly of supervisors and firefighters.
The basis of the requirement of RSA 273-A:8 II, that supervisory personnel must not be in the same unit with the rank-and- file firefighters, is to avoid conflicts between the two groups because of the differing duties and relationships which characterize each group. See Neb. Ass'n of Pub. Emp. v. Neb. Game and Parks Com., 197 Neb. 178, 247 N.W.2d 449 (1976); Elk Grove Firefighters Local No. 2340 v. Willis, 400 F.Supp. 1097, 1103 (N.D.Ill.1975).
The supervisors in Unit B are assigned the duty to supervise, discipline and evaluate the rank-and-file firefighters in Unit A. See Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 660, 94 S.Ct. 2023, 40 L.Ed.2d 443 (1974). The city argues that having two firefighters constituting the three-member team negotiating for the supervisors could influence and hinder the latter in the performance of their assigned duties. Favorable results of negotiations for the supervisors would depend in large measure on the two firefighters they are charged with supervising. The resulting conflicting interests, the city argues, would endanger the overall purpose of RSA ch. 273-A to foster harmonious and cooperative relations between public employers and their employees. RSA 273-A:1.
The intervenors properly argue that under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and similar statutes, neither the employer nor the union has any right to determine the individuals who will personally conduct the negotiations for the other party. General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 213, 214 (6th Cir. 1963). Furthermore, unless the presence of specific negotiators would prevent good-faith collective bargaining, the employer cannot refuse to negotiate with the chosen union representatives. I...
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