City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 74--595

• Decision Date: 31 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 74--595,74--595
• Parties: CITY OF CORAL GABLES, Petitioner, v. William L. WOOD, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 261

305 So.2d 261

CITY OF CORAL GABLES, Petitioner, v. William L. WOOD, Respondent.

No. 74--595.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 31, 1974.

Charles H. Spooner, City Atty., and Robert D. Zahner, Asst. City Atty., for petitioner.

Therrel, Baisden, Peterson, Stanton & Stillman, Miami Beach, for respondent.

Before PEARSON, HAVERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ.

NATHAN, Judge.

The City of Coral Gables, Florida, has presented this petition for writ of certiorari to review an order of the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity, reversing the trial court's conviction for violation of a Coral Gables zoning code ordinance in that the respondent had illegally parked or stored a camper type vehicle in his back yard.

The respondent, William L. Wood, is the owner of an Apache vehicle which he keeps outside at the rear of his residence in Coral Gables; it will fit in his garage, but not conveniently. This action began when a neighbor complained about the camper. The police investigated and a citation was issued to Wood charging him with parking a camper or vehicle fit for human habitation on private property within the City of Coral Gables, in violation of § 4.09(a) of the city zoning code. The ordinance provides:

'SECTION 4.09 HOUSE CAR, CAMP CAR, CAMPER OR HOUSE TRAILER.

(a) No House Car, Camp Car. Camper or House Trailer, nor any vehicle, or part of vehicle, designed or adaptable for human habitation, by whatever name known, whether such vehicle moves by its own power or by power supplied by separate unit, shall be kept or parked on public or private property within the City, except if enclosed within the confines of a garage, and unoccupied; or parked upon a duly licensed or legally operating parking area, which is not a concomitant and required under the zoning--or other--ordinance of the City (1506)

(b) Under no circumstances and in no area, however zoned, shall any vehicle be used as living or sleeping quarters within the limits of the City. (1506).'

At the trial of the case in the municipal court of Coral Gables, Wood was found guilty and fined $15.00, plus $5.00 court costs. Wood's motion for rehearing was denied, and upon appeal to the Dade County Circuit Court, Wood alleged that the trial court erred in failing to find that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and that it was arbitrary, discriminatory and confiscatory as applied to him. After the cause was heard, the ordinance was found to be facially overbroad, unconstitutionally vague and violative of the guarantees of the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and the judgment was reversed. This petition for writ of certiorari followed.

The questions presented to us in the City's petition are (a) whether § 4.09 of the zoning ordinance is constitutionally invalid as being unclear, indefinite and vague, and (b) whether or not the ordinance as applied to Wood is arbitrary, discriminatory and confiscatory. In his brief, the respondent states the general rule that validity of an ordinance as to vagueness is measured by whether it gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden thereunder. State v. Penley, Fla.App.1973, 276 So.2d 180, citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989. Although there could be some doubt as to whether or not certain vehicles are covered by the ordinance, for instance station wagons or vans with pull-down seats, there is no question that the Apache vehicle, subject of the instant case is a 'camper' as contemplated by the ordinance. Mr. Wood, a duly licensed Florida attorney, testified that he had...