City of Coral Gables v. Coral Gables, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1935
• Citation: 119 Fla. 30,160 So. 476
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF CORAL GABLES v. CORAL GABLES, Inc., et al.

160 So. 476

119 Fla. 30

CITY OF CORAL GABLES v. CORAL GABLES, Inc., et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

April 5, 1935

Suit by the City of Coral Gables against Coral Gables, Inc., and others. From a decree dismissing complainant's bill of complaint, complainant appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Paul D Barns, Judge.

COUNSEL

O. D Batchelor, of Miami, for appellant.

Evans Mershon & Sawyer and Thos. McE. Johnston, all of Miami, E. B. Hope, of Coral Gables, Shutts & Bowen and Joseph F. McPherson, all of Miami, for appellees.

OPINION

TERRELL Justice.

The bill of complaint herein was filed by the city of Coral Gables, a municipal corporation, against Coral Gables, Inc., and various other defendants for the purpose of enforcing special assessment liens more specifically described therein. It is alleged in the bill that the city complied with the requirements of its '1925 charter,' chapters 10418 and 10419, Sp. Acts 1925, in charging the abutting property with the cost of the improvement from which the liens accrued.

Demurrers to the bill were overruled, answer was filed, a special master was appointed who took the testimony and found that the procedure followed by the city in making the assessments was fatally defective and that no valid liens were in consequence acquired by it. He recommended that the bill be dismissed. Exceptions to the master's report were entered and a rereference ordered with the same result. On final hearing the chancellor sustained the finding of the master and dismissed the bill of complaint. The instant appeal is from the final decree.

Nine questions are argued here but they may be resolved into these queries: (1) Will the courts inquire into the motives of the city commission in making the assessments? (2) Were the assessments complained of void as against the abutting property? (3) Was the act of the city commission in making the assessments against the abutting property in violation of sections 7 and 10, article 9, of the Constitution of Florida? and (4) Was the fee allowed the special master excessive? An estoppel was also raised and argued as to some of the defendants.

In a decision of the foregoing questions these are the essential facts to bear in mind: In 1925 George E. Merrick incorporated Coral Gables Corporation for the purpose of developing the subdivision known as Coral Gables, later the city of Coral Gables. All contracts executed by Coral Gables Corporation for the sale of lots contained a covenant to pave the streets and sidewalks without cost to the purchaser. Soon after the formation of Coral Gables Corporation the City of Coral Gables was created by chapter 10418, Special Acts of the Legislature of 1925. In the act creating the city of Coral Gables, George E. Merrick, Telfair Knight, Charles F. Baldwin, F. W. Webster, and Edward E. Dammers, all officers or employees of Coral Gables Corporation, were named as city commissioners of the city of Coral Gables for a period of four years, or until their successors should be elected and qualified; the first election for city commissioners being designated in the act to take place on the second Tuesday in June, 1929.

In the summer of 1926 the financial condition of Coral Gables Corporation became such that it could no longer carry on the improvements it was under contract with its lot purchasers to complete. The work of paving its streets and sidewalks had up to this time been done by W. T. Price, Inc.

At its regular meeting, held June 16, 1926, the city commission of the city of Coral Gables discussed the matter of the city undertaking to pave the streets and sidewalks that Coral Gables corporation was under contract to pave. At a subsequent meeting of the city commission, held June 18, 1926, Coral Gables Corporation made an agreement with the city of Coral Gables to assume all costs of paving and save abutting property owners harmless from any lien by reason of the issuance of bonds by the city to pay for paving any and all lots it was under contract to pave.

At a meeting of the city commission of the city of Coral Gables, held June 19, 1926, forty-eight resolutions were adopted providing for the paving of streets and sidewalks affecting approximately 13,000 lots in the city, all of which were under contract to be paved by Coral Gables Corporation. Subsequently, contracts were made by the city for the paving and bonds were issued by it to pay the cost, assessing said cost against the abutting property. The contract for the paving was let to W. T. Price, Inc., which had paving contracts with Coral Gables Corporation, and made no distinction in work done by it for the city and the corporation.

It is first contended by the appellant that the act of the city commission in taking over the paving contracts, issuing bonds therefor, and in levying special assessments against the abutting property to pay for them was a legislative act pursuant to authority conferred on it by its charter, and that the good faith of the commission in doing so cannot be inquired into by the courts.

It is settled that the courts will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature in enacting laws. And by analogy to this rule it is very generally held that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of members of a municipal council for the purpose of determining the validity of ordinances enacted by them. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 5 S.Ct. 730, 28 L.Ed. 1145; Cramton v. City of Montgomery, 171 Ala. 478, 55 So. 122; Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co., 160 N.Y. 377, 54 N.E. 1081; Moore v. Village of Ashton, 36 Idaho, 485, 211 P. 1082, 32 A. L. R. 1512.

While the rule as prescribed in the foregoing cases is well recognized, we do not understand that the motive of the city commission in passing the ordinance brought in question is being attacked. We are here urged to determine whether or not the action of the city commission in assuming the paving contracts as referred to and in levying special assessments to pay for them was a lawful exercise of its taxing power.

Whether in the form of ordinances or resolutions the acts of municipal corporations may be looked into by the courts to determine whether they were legally exercised, or whether the purpose accomplished by them was within the scope of its power, or whether they were in fact consummated through fraud or overreaching. Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) vol. 2, p. 914, § 580; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) vol. 4, § 1520, p. 267; Soon Hing v. Crowley, supra; Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839; People ex rel. v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 298 Ill. 574, 132 N.E. 204; St. Paul Trust & Savings Bank v. American Clearing Co. (D. C.) 291 F. 212, approved in Citizens' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Trust & Savings Bank (C. C. A.) 10 F. (2d) 1017. In the case at bar, the inquiry was well within the latter rule.

It is next contended that the assessments complained of were void as against the owners of the abutting property because of failure to comply with the charter provisions in imposing them.

This contention is grounded on the alleged failure of the city commission to comply with mandatory requirements of its charter in the following respects: (1) Filing with the city clerk plans and specifications of the work to be done including the amount to be assessed against each foot of abutting property; (2) recordation in the improvement and assessment book of the...