City of Crown Point v. Lake County

• Decision Date: 31 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 64S03-8611-CV-975,64S03-8611-CV-975
• Citation: 510 N.E.2d 684
• Parties: CITY OF CROWN POINT, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. LAKE COUNTY, Indiana; Board of Commissioners of Lake County, Indiana; Lake County Community Corrections Program, and Lake County Community Corrections Advisory Board, Appellees (Defendants Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 684

510 N.E.2d 684

CITY OF CROWN POINT, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. LAKE COUNTY, Indiana; Board of Commissioners of Lake County, Indiana; Lake County Community Corrections Program, and Lake County Community Corrections Advisory Board, Appellees (Defendants Below).

No. 64S03-8611-CV-975.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 31, 1987.

Timothy R. Sendak, Sendak, Sendak & Luke, Bruce A. Lambka, Brown & Chael, co-counsel, Crown Point, for City of Crown Point.

James A. Holcomb, Lucas, Holcomb & Medrea, Merrillville, for Lake County Community Corrections Program and Lake County Community Corrections Advisory Bd.

Edward H. Feldman, Asst. Lake County Atty., Highland, for Lake County, and Bd. of Com'rs of Lake County.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

This case requires us to decide whether a county government's property is subject to the zoning authority of the city within which it is located. We conclude that it is.

In 1972, the City of Crown Point annexed territory which encompassed the Lake County Government Center, bringing the Government Center within the boundaries of that county seat. At the time, the City's zoning ordinance declared that all annexed property would be zoned R-1, residential, and that public buildings were not a permitted use in such a zone. However, the public buildings of the Government Center continued to operate on the annexed property as a pre-existing nonconforming use.

The Government Center consists of a Courts Building, County Jail, Juvenile Detention Center, and numerous other buildings housing various County operations. These included a house which had once been used as a residence for the administrator of the hospital located on the grounds and more recently as a residence for the County Sheriff and his family. The house has been used only for residential purposes.

The house, now referred to as the Old Sheriff's Home, has been vacant for some seven years. The County intends to use it for the Community Corrections Program, making improvements to the house as necessary and housing up to fifteen class D felons. Such a use is not permitted on property zoned R-1, though apparently a special use permit would allow it.

The County did not apply for re-zoning or a special permit, and the City sought an injunction. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the injunction, holding that requiring the County to comply with the City's zoning code would impose a duty without express statutory authority and thus violate Indiana's Home Rule Act. We granted the City's petition for transfer pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(A)(10), Ind.Rules of Appellate Procedure. We are grateful to counsel for providing us with excellent briefs.

Disposition of the case requires that we resolve the following issues:

1) Whether requiring the County's compliance with generally applicable City ordinances which are authorized by statute violates Home Rule by improperly imposing a duty for which there is no express statutory authority;

2) Whether the County is estopped from denying the authority of the City zoning code or the City is estopped from enforcing its zoning code against the County, and

3) Whether the County is immune or exempt from the City's zoning code.

I. Home Rule

Indiana's Home Rule Act, Ind.Code Sec. 36-1-3-1 to -9 (Burns 1981 Repl.), abrogated the traditional rule that local governments possessed only those powers expressly authorized by statute and declared that a local government possesses "[a]ll other powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of its affairs...." Ind.Code Sec. 36-1-3-4(b)(2). However, some powers are specifically prohibited, among them, "[t]he power to impose duties on another political subdivision, except as expressly granted by statute." Ind.Code Sec. 36-1-3-8(3).

As no statute specifically states that one government unit may require that another political subdivision comply with its zoning code, the County argues that the Home Rule Act bars the City's enforcement of its code against another political subdivision. The City says that the legislature's intent was to grant the City the power to enforce its zoning code against any and all property owners, be they political subdivisions or private citizens.

Thus, the question is whether the statute authorizing City planning and zoning is the kind of "express grant" required by Ind.Code Sec. 36-1-3-8(3) to sustain enforceability against another governmental unit. The City argues that express statutory authorization to perform a specific governmental function is sufficiently explicit and that the power to require compliance of other political subdivisions arises from such a general grant of power.

The General Assembly has given us an indication of its intent: "The policy of the state is to grant units all the powers that they need for the effective operation of government as to local affairs." Ind.Code Sec. 36-1-3-2. Further, "[a]ny doubt as to the existence of a power of a unit shall be resolved in favor of its existence." Ind.Code Sec. 36-1-3-3(b).

Land use control is particularly a local function. Cities or counties may develop a comprehensive land use plan to promote the public health, safety, comfort, morals, convenience and general public welfare. Ind.Code Sec. 36-7-4-501. Specifically, the comprehensive plan may include "[p]ublic buildings and institutions, including governmental administration and service buildings, ... penal and correctional institutions, and other civic and social service buildings." Ind.Code Sec. 36-7-4-503(2)(N). This plan is carried out through local zoning ordinances. Ind.Code Sec. 36-7-4-601--614 (Burns 1986 Supp.).

The general power to regulate zoning does not specifically include the power to require that other political subdivisions comply with zoning regulations. However, a survey of other statutes granting local authority to perform and regulate government functions shows that none of the powers delegated to government units contain explicit authority to require compliance by another political subdivision. Thus, while may "regulate the use of public ways," Ind.Code Sec. 36-9-2-7, no specific authorization is given to enforce such regulation on any other political subdivision. Though "a municipality that operates sewage works ... may require: (1) Connection to its sewer system of any property producing sewage or similar waste; and (2) Discontinuance of the use of privies, cesspools, septic tanks and similar structures," Ind.Code Sec. 36-9-23-30(a), no specific enforcement is provided against other political subdivisions.

Strict interpretation of the limitation that a unit may not impose a duty on a political subdivision without express statutory authority would lead to the conclusion that counties may not enforce speed zones against city employees and cities may not prohibit counties from dumping raw sewage in rivers and streams. "[A]dherence to such strict letter would lead ... to absurdity." Zoercher v. Indiana Associated Telephone Corp. (1937), 211 Ind. 447, 455, 7 N.E.2d 282, 285 (quoting Stout v. Board of Commissioners (1886), 107 Ind. 343, 347, 8 N.E. 222, 224).

Counsel for Lake County recognized this difficulty during oral argument before this Court. When asked whether counties had authority to regulate landfills owned by municipalities but located in unincorporated areas, he affirmed that they did--because counties have specific authority to regulate landfills. Of course, this authority derives not from the general powers of counties, Ind.Code Sec. 36-1-3-4, but from the planning and zoning statutes, such as Ind.Code Secs. 36-7-4-503 and 36-7-4-601(b).

Therefore, we hold that Home Rule Act does not bar units from enforcing against other political subdivisions those regulations of general applicability which are specifically authorized by statute. However, the resolution of this discrete question is not dispositive of the City's power to enforce its zoning requirements against all other governmental entities under all circumstances.

II. Estoppel

Both the City and the County argue equitable estoppel. Of course, each argues that the other is the party estopped.

The party claiming equitable estoppel must show its "(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially." Damler v. Blaine (1943), 114 Ind.App. 534, 542-543, 51 N.E.2d 885, 889.

The City first raises a claim of estoppel based on the County's history of apparent compliance with the zoning code. For some earlier improvements to the County Government Center, contractors working for the County did obtain work permits from the City. The County even sought a City building permit for the construction of the Juvenile Detention Center in 1976; the City views its approval of this request as "a slip up." As a result of these transactions, the City claims that it was "lulled into a false idea of the County's position regarding the City's authority," and, as a result, "the City was not as vigilant as it should have been."

The City concludes that the County's apparent acquiescence and the City's resulting complacency now estop the County from denying the Crown Point's zoning authority. To prevail on this claim, the City would have to show that it lacked knowledge or the means of knowledge of the matter in question. Id. at 542, 51 N.E.2d at 889. Estoppel cannot be applied if the facts are equally known by or accessible to both parties. Advisory Board of Zoning Appeals v. Foundation for Comprehensive Mental Health (1986), Ind.App., 497 N.E.2d 1089, 1093; City of Evansville v. Follis (1974), 161 Ind.App. 396, 403, 315 N.E.2d 724, 728.

The City was certainly aware of its own zoning ordinance. It should also have been aware that, while the County complied with some City requirements, the County also built the Juvenile Detention Center in 1976 and the Animal Control...