City of Cushing v. Gillespie
| Decision Date | 21 April 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 35325,35325 |
| Citation | 208 Okla. 359,256 P.2d 418 |
| Parties | , 36 A.L.R.2d 1420 CITY OF CUSHING v. GILLESPIE et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Statutes providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain will be strictly construed.
2. In determining the extent or quantum of estate taken by virtue of condemnation proceedings, the court will examine the statute authorizing the condemnation and the proceedings instituted pursuant thereto, and will determine what estate or interest is reasonably necessary to serve the public purpose in view.
3. A condemnor is not required to go to the full extent permitted by law, but may voluntarily restrict itself to so much of the landowner's interest as the public need actually requires.
4. Where, in condemnation proceedings instituted pursuant to Title 11 O.S.1951 § 293, the record does not clearly show the extent or quantum of the estate taken; and where it is not shown that the public purpose in view requires the taking of title to the minerals; Held, that title to the minerals under the land involved does not pass to the condemnor.
Sterling N. Grubbs, Cushing, Guy L. Horton, Stillwater, for plaintiff in error.
A. R. Swank, A. R. Swank, Jr., and E. C. Swank, Stillwater, for defendants in error, Francis G. Gillespie, Guy James and Martin Wunderlich.
Everett E. Berry, Jr., Joe E. Johnson, Jr., and M. C. Kratz, Stillwater, for the other defendants in error.
In 1924, the City of Cushing, hereinafter referred to as City, condemned certain lands involved in this action for the purpose of enlarging a water reservoir. The lands at that time belonged to George T. Gillespie and his wife. In 1931, George Gillespie executed an oil and gas lease covering the lands herein involved; he also sold mineral rights to various people. On May 15, 1951, the City issued a drilling permit covering the land herein involved; it was shown that neither at that time, nor at any other time prior to the filing of the instant action, did the City claim to own the mineral rights to the land condemned.
On June 14, 1951, certain heirs and successors of Gillespie, to whom we shall refer hereafter as plaintiffs, filed an action to quiet their title to the mineral rights under the lands condemned in 1924 by the City. The City filed an answer and cross petition in which it set up a claim to the mineral rights and asked that its title thereto be quieted. Plaintiffs recovered judgment in the trial court and defendant, City, has duly appealed.
The sole question for our determination here is whether, by virtue of the 1924 condemnation proceedings, the City acquired title to the minerals under its reservoir.
Prior to and during the condemnation proceedings, Gillespie and the City were unable to agree on a price for his land; both Gillespie and the City excepted to the report of the commissioners appointed to appraise the land and demanded a jury trial, which was had.
The City argues first that the applicable law authorized it to acquire a fee simple title; second, that the proceedings instituted pursuant to the applicable legislative act show a fee simple title was acquired; and third, that the proceedings subsequent to the commissioners' report did not limit the title to less than a fee simple title.
The truth of the first argument is conceded by plaintiffs, and as is shown below, a determination of the second argument is controlling in this case.
Defendant (plaintiff in error) City cites Jones v. Oklahoma City, 192 Okl. 470, 137 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 375 in support of its contention that a fee simple title was taken. In that case, certain lands had been condemned by a railroad company in 1900, and the successors of the original owners had brought an action in ejectment against Oklahoma City, which was the successor in interest of the railroad company. The railroad company had proceeded under a statute of the Oklahoma Territory which had been adopted from Dakota Territory. Such statute provided for the condemnation of land by railroad companies, and specifically gave to the railroad company the right to sell the land when it was no longer required for railroad purposes. Since the Oklahoma statute had not been judicially interpreted at that time, this court in Jones v. Oklahoma City adopted the interpretation of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, to the effect that the express power to sell, conferred upon the railroad company by the statute, was inconsistent with the passing of less than a fee simple title in the condemnation proceedings.
The City of Cushing, in its 1924 condemnation proceedings, acted under the terms of Title 11 O.S.1951 § 293, which permits (but...
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...we are guided by the longstanding general rule of strict statutory construction of eminent domain statutes. See City of Cushing v. Gillespie, 1953 OK 121, 256 P.2d 418. Further, as a general rule, we construe our state constitutional eminent domain provisions "strictly in favor of the owner......
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