City of Cuyahoga Falls v. David F. Lewis
| Decision Date | 23 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | 19006,98-LW-5157 |
| Parties | CITY OF CUYAHOGA FALLS, Appellee v. DAVID F. LEWIS, JR., Appellant C.A. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE CUYAHOGA FALLS MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE NO. 97 TRC 19933
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
Defendant-appellant David F. Lewis appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court denying his motion to dismiss the charges of driving under the influence, making a prohibited left turn, and a marked lane violation. We affirm.
On October 31, 1997, Lewis was stopped by Patrolman Chad A Johnson of the Cuyahoga Falls Police Department at the intersection of Howe Avenue and Main Street in the City of Cuyahoga Falls. Lewis was charged with driving under the influence, in violation of Ord. of Cuyahoga Falls 333.01A1 making a prohibited left turn, in violation of Ord. of Cuyahoga Falls 313.01, and a marked lane violation, in violation of Ord. of Cuyahoga Falls 331.08. Because Lewis refused to submit to a breath test, Lewis' driver's license was subject to an Administrative License Suspension ("ALS").
In November 1997, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles notified Lewis that he was required to pay a $280.00 fee in order to have his driving privileges reinstated. In December 1997, Lewis paid the reinstatement fee. On January 7, 1998, Lewis moved the trial court to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that the imposition of both the ALS reinstatement fee and the punishment on the underlying charges constituted double jeopardy. The trial court denied this motion. Lewis pled "no contest," and the trial court found him guilty on all the charges. Lewis was fined $800.00 plus court costs and sentenced to thirty days in jail for driving under the influence. The trial court then suspended $600.00 of the fine and twenty-seven days of the jail sentence on the conditions that Lewis: 1) obey all laws for one year; 2) not repeat the offense of driving under the influence; and 3) complete any after-care recommended by Oriana. Lewis' operator's license was suspended for six months, beginning on the date of his offense. The charges for making a prohibited left turn and for the marked lane violation were merged with the driving under the influence charge and dismissed.
The same day, the trial court filed an amended order, which stated:
IT IS ORDERED THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSION IN THIS CASE BE VACATED AND THAT NO REINSTATEMENT FEE BE COLLECTED BY THE BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES ON THE GROUNDS THAT TO DO OTHERWISE VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. REINSTATEMENT FEE FROM ALS WILL BE APPLIED TO ANY REINSTATEMENT FEES DUE ON OUI SUSPENSION.
Lewis appeals, assigning one error:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WHERE THE APPELLANT HAD ALREADY BEEN PUNISHED FOR THE SAME CONDUCT.
Lewis argues that his payment of the $280.00 fee to reinstate his driving privileges constitutes a punishment under the double jeopardy clause. Therefore, Lewis argues, the state should be precluded from punishing him on the underlying charges. Lewis' argument is not well taken.
Lewis' license was administratively suspended for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test, not for driving with a prohibited alcohol level. Any person who operates a motor vehicle on a public roadway in the state of Ohio is deemed to have given consent to chemical tests to determine the presence of alcohol or other substances in the person's blood, breath, or urine. R.C. 4511.191(A). A person who refuses to submit to a chemical test is subject to an ALS pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(E). A person who submits to a chemical test is subject to an ALS pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(F) if such test shows that the person has a prohibited concentration of alcohol in his or her blood, breath, or urine. Because Lewis' license was suspended for refusal to submit to a chemical test, and not for driving with a prohibited alcohol content, the ALS and the license suspension imposed for driving under the influence sanction two different behaviors. We agree with the reasoning of the Cleveland Heights Municipal Court in Cleveland Heights v. Murphy (1995), 74 Ohio Misc.2d 29, 32-33.
A suspension imposed as a result of a refusal does not sanction a defendant for the same offense for which he will be prosecuted under either Sections 333.01(A)(1) or (A)(3), that is, driving with a blood-alcohol level over the legal limit or driving under the influence of alcohol. A refusal suspension is imposed to sanction the very act of refusing. Therefore, with respect to an ALS imposed as a result of a refusal, a double jeopardy argument must fail on that basis alone.
See, also, Twinsburg v. Buckley (Dec. 13, 1995), Summit App. No. 17226, unreported, at 2, affirmed In re Administrative License Suspension Cases (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 597, 599.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions do not preclude criminal prosecution for driving under the influence subsequent to an ALS arising out of the same arrest. State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, paragraph one of the syllabus. The ALS is remedial in nature, and becomes "punitive in nature" for Double Jeopardy purposes only where "the suspension continues subsequent to adjudication and sentencing ***. Id., paragraph three of the syllabus. Recognizing that both criminal and civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, the United States Supreme Court, however, has warned that a line could be crossed at which civil damage recoveries could...
To continue reading
Request your trial